STUART'S CAVALRY IN THE GETTYSBURG
By Col. John S. Mosby.
A Review by COL. T. M. R. Talcott.
After reading, Col. Mosby's book, which I had not seen until recently, I asked Col. Walter H.
Taylor whether he had made any reply to it, and received the following letter from him:
"Norfolk, Va., March, 12th, 1909.
Colonel T. M. R. Talcott, Richmond, Va.
Dear Colonel,--I have received your letter of the 10th inst. I read what Mosby had to say about Gettysburg some time ago. I did not attach much importance to his statements and did not publish, neither have I any intention to publish, anything in reply. I think some of the partisans of General Stuart have done him more harm than good in their contributions concerning army movements in the Gettysburg Campaign.
What I have claimed is simply this: Although certain discretion was allowed General Stuart as to his movements, he was admonished all the while to keep in touch with our main army and to keep General Lee informed as to the movements of the enemy. Secondly: that General Lee was greatly disturbed and embarrassed at not receiving any tidings from General Stuart concerning the movements of the enemy.
Some of General Stuart's defenders have claimed that he simply exercised the discretion allowed him when he crossed the Potomac where he did and pursued the route that he did; and that it was impossible for him to keep General Lee informed of the movements of himself and the enemy because the enemy intervened between him and General Lee. It is not a good defense of General Stuart to say that it was impossible for him to communicate with General Lee when he had himself put himself in a position where it was impossible, although admonished all the while not to do this. In a few words, it seems to me that this describes impartially just how far General Stuart was to be blamed.
Yours very truly,
(Signed) W. H. Taylor.
In the preface of his book, Col. Mosby says:
"These pages have been written as a duty I owe to a soldier to whom great injustice has been
done. The statements in the two reports of the commanding general in regard to his orders and
the management of the cavalry in the Gettysburg campaign have been generally accepted without
question; and the criticisms of his staff officers and biographers on the conduct of the Chief of
Cavalry have assumed them to be true. * * I have tried to explain how his name is signed to
papers that do so much injustice as well to himself as to General Stuart."
In a note on page 203, Col. Mosby says:
"My criticism of General Lee's report, which I believe he signed without reading, does not imply
any criticism of him as a general. * * * * It is doubtful if he ever read it, or if it was even read to
On page 209 he further says:
"The report is understood to have been written by a staff officer. * * * It is unfair to Stuart as it
says nothing about Ewell having gone several days in advance into Pennsylvania; and that Stuart
was ordered to join him with three brigades of cavalry--or that Stuart had authority to cross the
Potomac in Hooker's rear--or that he left two brigades of calvary with Longstreet and General
As regards Col. Mosby's belief that General Lee signed his reports without reading them, or even
having them read to him, Col. W. H. Taylor, whose attention I called to Col. Mosby's note on
page 203 of his book, has this to say:
"In reference to Colonel Mosby's note on page 203 of his book, you and I know that General Lee
never sent a formal battle report to the Department that was not carefully revised before he signed
it; and Col. Mosby's gratuitous assertion that the report of Gettysburg was signed without being
read, and his doubt if General Lee ever read it, or if it was even read to him, is a bald assumption
on his part, contrary to the evidence of those who were present and know the manner employed
and the care exercised in the preparation of all of his reports."
My own observation, as a member of his staff, of General Lee's preparation of official documents was not as frequent or for so long a period as that of his Adjutant General; but even without this emphatic statement from Col. Taylor, I cannot for one moment entertain the suggestion made by Col. Mosby that General Lee signed his official reports of the battle of Gettysburg without reading them, or having them read to him.
Col. Mosby says that General Lee's report is unfair to Stuart because it says nothing about Ewell having gone several days in advance into Pennsylvania. It was not that Ewell advanced ahead of time, but that Stuart was two days behind time in crossing the Potomac, which permitted the Federal army to intervene between his command and that of Ewell; so that after crossing the Potomac, instead of going west to Fredericktown, Md., as indicated by General Lee, Stuart was forced to move northward through Westminster to Carlisle, Penn., in order to effect a junction with Ewell at that point.
Col. Mosby is mistaken in saying that General Lee's report made no mention of the fact that Stuart had authority to cross the Potomac in Hooker's rear, as will be seen by reference to the extracts from the reports, hereinafter quoted.
Col. Mosby's statement that General Lee's report is unfair to Stuart, in that it says nothing about Stuart's having "left two brigades with Longstreet and Lee," is in support of his contention, in defense of Stuart, that Lee had sufficient cavalry to keep him informed of the enemy's movements during Stuart's absence. The two brigades referred to were by General Lee's instructions to Stuart, left in Virginia, to watch the flank and rear of the army until the enemy retired from their front, then picket the passes of the Blue Ridge and close upon the rear of the army; but it was not until after the enemy was in Maryland and the order to follow had been repeated, that they crossed the Potomac and joined General Lee. It cannot, therefore, be properly said that Lee had these two brigades of cavalry available to mask his movements and keep him informed of the enemy's movements during the absence of Stuart. If they were not available because of failure to obey orders, Stuart must have erred in the selection of the officer whose duty it was to carry them out.
To facilitate comparison of the two reports, in so far as they relate to the cavalry, the following
extracts from them are given in alternate quotations from each report, under nine different
headings, as follows:
(1) Cavalry was directed to hold the mountain passes until the
enemy, crossed the Potomac.
General Stuart was left to guard the passes of the mountains and observe the movements of the
enemy, whom he was instructed to harass and impede as much as possible, should he attempt to
cross the Potomac.
General Stuart was directed to hold the mountain passes with part of his command as long as the
enemy remained south of the Potomac.
(2) If the enemy attempted to cross the Potomac a part of the
cavalry was to cross into Maryland.
In that event General Stuart was directed to move into Maryland.
And with the remainder to cross into Maryland.
(3) Discretion as to his crossing the Potomac east or west of
the Blue Ridge was given at the suggestion of Stuart.
Crossing the Potomac east or west of the Blue Ridge as in his judgment should be best.
Upon the suggestion of the former officer that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage
of the river by getting in his rear, he was authorized to do so, and it was left to his discretion
whether to enter Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge.
(4) After crossing the Potomac Stuart was to take position on
the right of the advancing column.
And take position on the right of our column as it advanced.
But he was instructed to lose no time in placing his command on the right of our column as soon
as he perceived the enemy moving northward.
(5) When Longstreet and Hill were encamping near Chambersburg
June 27th, nothing had been heard from Stuart.
By the 24th, the progress of Ewell rendered it necessary that the rest of the army should be in
supporting distance, and Longstreet and Hill marched to the Potomac. The former crossed at
Williamsport, and the latter at Shepherdstown. The columns reunited at Hagerstown, and
advanced thence into Pennsylvania, encamping near Chambersburg on the 27th. No report had
been received that the Federal army had crossed the Potomac, and the absence of the cavalry
rendered it impossible to obtain accurate information.
It was expected that as soon as the Federal army should cross the Potomac, General Stuart would
give notice of its movements, and nothing having been heard from him since our entrance into
Maryland, it was inferred that the enemy had not left Virginia.
(6) By the route Stuart pursuer the Federal army was inter-
posed between his command and our main body.
General Stuart continued to follow the movements of the Federal army south of the Potomac,
after our own had entered Maryland, and in his efforts to impede its progress advanced as far as
Fairfax Court House. Finding himself unable to delay the enemy materially, he crossed the river at
Seneca and marched through Westminister to Carlisle, where he arrived after General Ewell had
left for Gettysburg. By the route he pursued the Federal army was interposed between his
command and our main body, preventing any communication with him until he arrived at Carlisle.
(7) The march towards Gettysburg was slower than it would
have been if the movements of the Federal army,
had been known.
The march towards Gettysburg was conducted more slowly than it would have been if the
movements of the Federal army had been known.
General Ewell was recalled from Carlisle and directed to join the army at Cashtown or
Gettysburg, as circumstances might require. The advance of the enemy to the latter place was
unknown, and the weather being inclement the march was conducted with a view to the comfort
of the troops.
(8) Intelligence of Stuart's arrival at Carlisle was received on
July 1st, after Hill had met the enemy.
The leading division of General Hill met the enemy in advance of Gettysburg on the morning of
July 1st. During the afternoon intelligence was received of the arrival of General Stuart at
Carlisle, and he was ordered to march to Gettysburg and take position on out left.
(9) Jones and Robertson were ordered to join the army as soon
as it was known that the enemy was in Maryland.
As soon as it was known that the enemy had crossed into Maryland, orders were sent to the
brigades of Robertson and Jones, which had been left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, to
join the army without delay, and it was expected that General Stuart with the remainder of his
command would soon arrive.
These are in substance all of the statements in General Lee's two reports "in regard to his orders and the management of the cavalry in the Gettysburg campaign," which Mosby says, "have been generally accepted without question," but which he does not believe General Lee is responsible for, although they appear over his signature. He thinks the advance of Longstreet and Hill on the 24th was premature and resulted disastrously; he claims that Stuart was carrying out orders of General Lee when he moved directly to Carlisle after crossing the Potomac at Seneca (probably through failure to give due weight to General Lee's letter of the 23rd) ; and he endeavors to show that General Hill was responsible for the miscarriage of General Lee's plans; and that the scout's report and Ewell's recall were not as stated, but if he has made any specific denial of the above statements of General Lee "in regard to his orders and the management of the cavalry in the Gettysburg campaign," it has escaped my attention.
General Lee says in his first report: "No report had been received that the Federal army had crossed the Potomac, and the absence of the cavalry rendered it impossible to obtain accurate information." Mosby says in answer to this that the cavalry, with Stuart, was not needed to obtain information of the enemy's movements, and that it was better employed elsewhere.
In his second report, General Lee says: "General Stuart was directed to hold the mountain passes with part of his command (i.e., Robertson's and Jones' brigades), as long as the enemy remained south of the Potomac, and with the remainder (three brigades), to cross into Maryland and place himself on the right of General Ewell. Upon the suggestion of the former officer (Stuart), that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage of the river by getting in his rear, he was authorized to do so, and it was left to his discretion whether to enter Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge; but he was instructed to lose no time in placing his command on the right of our column as soon as he perceived the enemy moving northward. * * It was expected that as soon as the Federal army should cross the Potomac General Stuart would give notice of its movements, and nothing having been heard from him since our entrance into Maryland, it was inferred that the enemy had not yet left Virginia." Mosby says (pages 179 and 180), "he could not have expected Stuart to communicate with him while he was executing the movement, simply because Stuart was too far away and the Blue Ridge and Hooker's army was between them." This is a denial of what General Lee says he expected of Stuart, and is justified only by Mosby's assumption that Stuart was, acting under General Lee's orders in moving directly to Carlisle.
Whether or not General Lee had a right to expect that General Stuart would promptly take
position on Ewell's right, and keep him informed as to the movements of the enemy, either
directly or through General Ewell, must be determined by the instructions General Stuart had
received from General Lee. Col. Mosby himself says (page 214), "The gravamen of the complaint
the report makes against Stuart is that the cavalry was absent and that it was needed, not in the
battle, but to make preliminary reconnaissances before the battle."
LEE'S INSTRUCTION TO STUART.
Col. Mosby says (page 72), that General Stuart rode to see General Lee on the night of June 21st, but there is no record of what passed between them at that meeting. The next day (June 22), General Lee wrote to General Stuart as follows (page 89):
"I have just received your note of 7:45 this morning, to General Longstreet. I judge the efforts of the enemy yesterday were to arrest our progress and ascertain our whereabouts. Perhaps he is satisfied. Do you know where he is and what he is doing? I fear he will steal a march on us and get across the Potomac before we are aware. If you find that he is moving northward and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland and take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy's movements and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army. One column of General Ewell's army will probably move towards the Susquehanna by the Emmittsburg route, another by Chambersburg. Accounts from last night state there was no enemy west of Frederick. A cavalry force (about 100), guarded the Monocracy bridge, which was barricaded. You will of course take charge of Jenkins' brigade and give necessary instructions."
On the same day (June 22), General Lee wrote to General Ewell, as follows: "I directed General Stuart, should the enemy have so far retired from his front as to permit of the departure of a portion of the cavalry, to march with three brigades across the Potomac and place himself on your right and in communication with you, keep you advised of the movements of the enemy and assist in collecting supplies for the army. I have not heard from him since."
Col. Mosby says (page 88), that this letter "settles a question that has been raised whether Stuart's instructions required him to remain in Virginia and march north on the right flank of the two corps that were with Lee, or to move into Pennsylvania and join Ewell on the Susquehanna." It merely advised General Ewell, who had been authorized to, move towards the Susquehanna, that Stuart would be on his right and in communication with him during his march, and not afterhe reached the Susquehanna.
When on June 22nd, Ewell was authorized to move towards the Susquehanna he was in Maryland, "opposite Shepherdstown," and Anderson's division of Hill's corps was to be at Shepherdstown the next day--which would relieve Early's division and enable Ewell to move his whole corps into Pennsylvania, with Jenkins' cavalry in advance and Imboden on his left. If Hooker was moving northward, Stuart was to cross the Potomac with three brigades of his cavalry, "take position on Ewell's right, place himself in communication with him, guard his flanks," etc., and he was also to "take charge of Jenkins' brigade." The other divisions of Hill's corps were advancing to the Potomac at Shepherdstown. Longstreet had been withdrawn from the Ashby's and Snicker's Gap Roads, west of the Shenandoah, and was to follow the next day. The first and third corps were moving to follow Ewell's advance when General Lee wrote to General Stuart on the 22nd, and asked: "Do you know where he (Hooker) is and what he is doing? I fear he will steal a march on us and get across the Potomac before we are aware."
Col. Mosby says (page 91), that General Stuart received another letter from General Lee, which
differed from the first (of June 22), "in suggesting to Stuart to cross the Potomac in Hooker's
rear." He quotes from this letter of June 23rd, but does not give it in full. According to the
official records, it was as follows:
"Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia,
June 23, 1863, 3:30 P. M.,
Major-General J. E. B. Stuart, Commanding Cavalry.
General,--Your notes of 9 and 10:30 A. M. today have just been received. As regards the purchase of tobacco for your men, supposing that Confederate money will be taken, I am willing for your commissaries or quartermasters to purchase this tobacco and let the men get it from them.
If General Hooker's army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades to watch him, and withdraw with the three others, but should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain tomorrow night, cross at Shepherdstown next day, and move over to Fredericktown.
You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting information, provisions, etc.
Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left behind, to watch the flank and rear of the army, and (in the event of the enemy leaving their front), retire from the mountains west of the Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the passes, and bringing everything clean along the Valley, closing upon the rear of the army.
As regards the movements of the two brigades of the enemy moving toward Warrenton, the commander of the brigades must do what he can to counteract them, but I think the sooner you cross into Maryland, after to-morrow, the better.
The movements of Ewell's corps are as stated in my former letter. Hill's first division will reach the Potomac today, and Longstreet will follow tomorrow.
Be watchful and circumspect in all your movements.
I am very respectfully and truly yours,
(Signed), R. E. Lee,
The letter of the 23rd was written by General Lee after receiving two notes from General Stuart, which no doubt stated in reply to his letter of the 22nd that General Hooker's army was still inactive, although Mosby did not so report to General Stuart until the next day. In it General Lee tells Stuart that Longstreet and Hill are moving to the Potomac; and Stuart chose the route via Seneca, with full knowledge that they were following Ewell.
According to the first order, Stuart was to cross the Potomac if Hooker's army was moving northward, and according to the second order he was to do so even if Hooker's army remained inactive. In his last order General Lee suggested that he cross the Potomac west of the Blue Ridge mountains "and move over to Fredericktown," which would place him on the right of Ewell; but discretion was allowed Stuart to cross east of the mountains if he could do so without hindrance. In either case, after crossing the Potomac, "he must feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting information, provisions, etc." He was to be with Ewell on the march towards the Susquehanna and not merely to join him "on the Susquehanna."
Of the movements of Longstreet and Hill while Hooker was still lying quiet south of the river, of
which Stuart was advised as above stated, Col. Mosby says (page 103):
"This premature movement of Longstreet's and Hill's troops * * * made the Gettysburg campaign
the Iliad of the South. It set Hooker's army in motion for the Potomac the next day."
And on page 173:
"The selection (by Stuart), of the route through Hooker's army was based on the theory that the
conditions would be maintained as they were until Stuart got through. The preservation of the
status in Hooker's army depended on Lee. At that time the design was perfectly practicable; his
army corps were separated by many miles."
And he further says on page 179:
"If Longstreet and Hill had rested one day longer in the Shenandoah Valley, Hooker would have
done the same, and Stuart would not have found the roads blockaded by his (Hooker's) column,
marching to the Potomac. Early on the evening of the 25th Stuart would have crossed and
bivouacked for the night at Seneca."
And again on Page 192:
"If Longstreet and Hill had stayed quiet a day longer Stuart would have crossed the Potomac in
advance of Hooker's army early in the evening of the 25th, and the fate of the Confederate cause
might have been different. There was no pressing necessity for the movement."
General Lee did regard the movement of Longstreet and Hill as a pressing necessity, for he says in his first report: "By the 24th, the progress of Ewell rendered it necessary that the rest of the army should be in supporting distance."
From the above quotations it would appear that Col. Mosby holds General Lee responsible for the failure at Gettysburg, because he ordered Longstreet and Hill to cross the Potomac "prematurely," and thereby set Hooker's army in motion, which delayed Stuart's crossing at Seneca two days; but Stuart knew they were moving before it was too late to change the route he had selected.
The only ground upon which the advance of Longstreet and Hill could be regarded as premature is that it put the Federal army in motion and delayed Stuart's crossing of the Potomac; and if that made the Gettysburg campaign "the Iliad of the South," it must have been because of the absence of Stuart's cavalry ana lack of information; but Mosby elsewhere repeatedly denies that it was the absence of the cavalry that caused the failure at Gettysburg. He goes so far as to say (on page 180): "It would have been far better if the orders had been less rigid and Stuart been given discretion to operate independently of the main army." Furthermore he claims that Hill and Heth should bear the blame because they precipitated the battle by an unexpected collision with the enemy. This might have been avoided if they had been informed of the movements of the Federal army, of which they were ignorant because the cavalry was absent.
There is nothing in either order to Stuart, or in General Lee's letter to General Ewell, of June
22nd, that justifies Col. Mosby's inference that Stuart was "to move to Pennsylvania and join
Ewell on the Susquehanna," or to justify his statement on page 180:
"Lee had informed Stuart that he would find Ewell on the Susquehanna. Stuart obeyed orders,
and on the morning of the 28th, moved in that direction."
The reason why General Stuart availed of the discretion allowed him to cross the Potomac cast of
the Blue Ridge will, I think, be found in Col. Mosby's Book (pages 76, 77, 78, 79), where he says:
"I pointed out to Stuart the opportunity to strike a damaging blow, and suggested to him to cross the Bull Run Mountains and pass through the middle of Hooker's army into Maryland. * * * * He could pass the Bull Run Mountains early in the morning and cross the Potomac early in the evening. * * * *
"When I got back from my trip inside Hooker's lines with my drove of mules, Stuart told me that
General Lee was anxious to know if Hooker's army was moving to cross the Potomac. He did
not ask me to go, but I volunteered to return and find out for him. With two men I recrossed the
mountain on the path where I had been bushwhacked the day before; and on the morning of June
23, was again riding between the camps of the different corps in Fairfax and Loudoun. All was
quiet, there was no sign of a movement. Hooker was waiting for Lee. * * The camps of the
different corps were so far apart that it was easy to ride between them. After gathering the
information General Lee wanted, I turned my face late in the afternoon to the Bull Run Mountain.
. . Reynolds with the first Corps was at Guilford, about two miles off; the third corps (Sickles),
was at Gum Springs about the same distance in another direction; while Meade's corps and the
cavalry were six or eight miles away at Aldie."
He says on page 81:
"I got to Stuart early the next morning. He listened to what I told him, wrote a dispatch, sent off
a courier to General Lee. * * * * The information was that Hooker's army was still resting in the
camps where it had been for a week."
And again, on pages 169 and 170, June 24th:
"Stuart was anxiously waiting to hear what Hooker was doing. He must then have received General Lee's order of 5 P. M., of the 23rd. * * * I told him that Hooker was quiet, waiting on Lee."
"After hearing my report, Stuart wrote a letter to General Lee--the most of it at my
dictation--giving him the information I had brought."
The information obtained by Col. Mosby on the 23rd and communicated to General Stuart on the morning of June 24th, after he had received the second letter from General Lee, dated June 23rd, giving him permission to cross the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, provided he could do so without hindrance, no doubt influenced him to cross at Seneca instead of Shepherdstown, for Hooker's army had then made no movement northward; and he believed that by crossing at Seneca he would lose no time in getting into the position. assigned him on Ewell's right; but at the critical moment Hooker's movement toward the Potomac began, and delayed Stuart's crossing of the river two days. Thus it occurred that when he entered Maryland on the night of the 27th, the whole of the Federal army was also in Maryland, and communication with General Lee was cut off; for, as Mosby says, Pleasanton's cavalry, which was the rear guard of the Federal army, crossed the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry at the same time that General Stuart crossed at Seneca. Ewell was by that time at Carlisle, and Longstreet's and Hill's corps were also in Pennsylvania at Chambersburg, having, as General Lee says, advanced so far without any report that the Federal army had crossed the Potomac.
General Lee says in his second report that General Stuart was directed to lose no time in placing his command on the right of our column as soon as he perceived the enemy moving northward. He might have said that Stuart was authorized to cross the Potomac and join with Ewell in his advance without waiting for the enemy to move northward; for Ewell's right was the place assigned to him at the time Ewell's advance was ordered. There was no uncertainty about his instructions to take position en Ewell's right and guard his flank, for they were reiterated whether he crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown, as General Lee suggested, or elsewhere. That was the essential point of his instructions, and General Lee had the right to expect that they would be carried out.
Stuart knew he was expected to be on Ewell's right and intended to be there. His report as
published by Col. Mosby, states the causes of his delay in getting into position, (pages 176, 177
"Accordingly, three days rations were prepared and on the night of the 24th, the following
brigades--Hampton's, Fitz Lee's and W. H. F. Lee's--rendezvoused secretly near Salem Depot. * *
At one o'clock at night the brigades, with noiseless march, moved out. * * Moving to the right we
passed through Glasscock's Gap without difficulty and marched for Haymarket. * * As we neared
Haymarket, we found Hancock's corps en route through Haymarket for Gum Springs, his infantry
well distributed through his trains. I chose a good position and opened with artillery on his
passing column with effect, scattering men, wagons and horses in wild confusion; disabled one of
the enemy's caissons, which, he abandoned, and compelled him to advance in order of battle to
compel us to desist. * * I sent a dispatch to General Lee concerning Hooker's movements and
moved back to Buckland to deceive the enemy."
From this it appears that at the very outset of his enterprise, General Stuart encountered such a
"hindrance" as General Lee anticipated might occur if he tried to pass through Hooker's army, but
he did not then abandon his own plans and adopt General Lee's suggestion to cross the Potomac
at Shepherdstown; for as Mosby says (page 177):
"He made a wide detour through Fairfax and crossed the Potomac the night of the 27th at Seneca,
and went into bivouac on the Maryland shore. On the same night Pleasanton's cavalry corps, the
rear-guard of the army, crossed ten or twelve miles above on the pontoon at Edwards' Ferry, and
marched on to Frederick."
If Stuart had crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown on the 25th, as suggested by General Lee, he would have been in position on General Ewell's right on the 26th of June, on which date the two columns of the Second Corps left Chambersburg, going towards the Susquehanna and General Lee arrived at that place. (See page 115).
If he had crossed at Seneca on the 25th, as he expected to do before Hooker's army moved, he might still have had time "to move over to Fredericktown," as indicated by General Lee; but when he had crossed the Potomac on the 27th, it was too late to go to Fredericktown, and Ewell's movement had so far progressed that it was too late for Stuart to join him en route to the Susquehanna. The only thing that was then left for him to do was to go on to Dover, where he had reason to believe be would find Ewell's corps. Unfortunately he was again too late, for before he got to Dover, looking for the column that General Lee said would probably move by Emmittsburg, both columns of Ewell's corps had been withdrawn and General Lee was concentrating his army for the battle of Gettysburg.
It is a pleasure to concur with Col. Mosby, when he says, on page 59:
"As the Chief of Cavalry of an army--as a commander of outpost service in masking his own side
and unmasking the other--Stuart never had an equal."
General Lee knew this from past experience, and for that very reason felt more keenly the absence
of Stuart and his cavalry when they were most needed in the Gettysburg campaign, to mask the
movements of his army, and keep him informed of every movement of the enemy.
(Source: Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. 37, pages 21-37)