Joseph Kershaw

Esteemed member Heather K Peake contributes: But my duty today is open a discussion on Brig. Gen. Joseph Brevard Kershaw and his activities on July 1 and 2. I'm posting this in two parts because of its length. Despite its length, this is a bare-bones version of Kershaw's story. For brevity's sake, I also excluded discussing the Union position on July 2, although I hope we can discuss this as well.

To my mind, Kershaw's experiences are an excellent illustration of the difficulties faced by Confederate forces on July 2. When we get into arguments about sunrise attacks and who-said-what- when-to-whom-at-what-spot, I always need to remind myself that indecisiveness at the top -- no matter whose fault it was -- had a very real, frequently tragic, impact on men in the field.

For biographical info on Kershaw, Larry provided a really nice post this weekend (thus saving me some typing!).

Joseph Kershaw carried a sterling reputation with him into Pennsylvania. Forty-one, handsome, commanding, his division commander Layfayette McLaws described him as "a very cool, judicious and gallant gentleman." His brigade was composed of the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 8th and 15th South Carolina Infantry and the 3rd South Carolina Battalion --- approx. 1,800 veteran men.

JULY 1, 1863

Kershaw's Brigade, as part of McLaws Division in Longstreet's First Corps, had enjoyed a quiet invasion. On the night of June 30, 1863, the bulk of Longstreet's First Corps was bivouacked at Greenwood, Pennsylvania, about 15 miles northeast of Gettysburg on the Chambersburg Pike. Shortly after they arrived, word came to have the men prepare three days worth of rations as early as possible the next day. This was the first sign something big could be coming.

At 10:00 am on July 1, Longstreet ordered his corps to head for Gettysburg. McLaws Division was in front, and Kershaw's brigade the first in the column, so Kershaw's men were lined up early. They were supposed to follow Johnson's Brigade, but Johnson's column was promptly followed by Ewell's Corps wagon trains. With the battle at Gettysburg not yet in full pitch, there was little urgency in getting fresh infantry up, so McLaws was ordered to wait until Ewell's train passed, wait an hour, then commence. The train turned out to be 14 miles long, meaning the first wagons reached the burg while the last trains were filing past Kershaw. It was 4 pm before Kershaw led off down the road.

Despite good roads and the relative cool of evening, it took 8 hours to cover the 12 miles to GB. At 10:00 pm, Longstreet rode back and filled McLaws in on events of the day, then personally led his troops to their bivouac on Marsh Creek, just off the Cahmbersburg Pike. Exhausted by a long day of waiting and stop-and-go marching, Kershaw's men simply dropped to the ground and slept.

JULY 2, 1863 4:00 am-4:00 PM

As became evident the next morning, it really didn't matter how fast the First Corps got to the field, because nobody was sure how to deploy them. Plans for the day's offensive had been limping along since about 5:00 the previous evening. Lee had encountered stiff resistance from Longstreet, who wanted to swing the entire army south, positioning it between Meade and Washington and thus winning the chance to fight on ground of their own choosing. Lee had disagreed, saying: "If the enemy is there tomorrow, we must attack them." Without support from Longstreet, without his own army fully concentrated, without a clear idea of the enemy's strength or concentration, plans had been made and changed several times before Kershaw's men were up and ready to go at 4:00 on the morning of July 2.

Again at the head of McLaws Division, Kershaw headed south, stopping about 500 yards from the Black Horse Tavern near Fairfield Road. Meanwhile, McLaws had gone to find Lee and Longstreet. Lee ordered McLaws to move his troops into a position perpendicular to the Emmitsburg Road. They would be guided by Captain S.R. Johnson, who had made a reconnaissance of the Union position early that morning. Longstreet, standing nearby, finally lost his temper altogether. Directly contradicting Lee, he told McLaws to position himself at a right angle to the position Lee had just pointed out, and he absolutely forbade McLaws to be lead by Johnson. Ignoring the outburst, Lee repeated the orders and assigned Johnson not to McLaws, but Longstreet, perhaps thinking Johnson should guide the entire First Corps into position. Longstreet continued to drag his feet, and it wasn't until 12:00 p.m. that there was any significant movement by troops of the First Corps.

Kershaw and his men waited 4-5 hours for instructions. Finally, around 1:00 p.m., McLaws ordered them to move towards the enemy by flank, following Marsh Creek and staying as much under cover as possible. At the head of the division, Kershaw, with McLaws and Capt. Johnson, lead the way to the south to the Black Horse Tavern, turning on to a farm road connecting the tavern with Fairfield Road that lead southeasterly towards Willoughby Run.

Unfortunately, Johnson was not as familiar with the topography of the Confederate lines as he was with the Union lines. Trying to move two divisions over Herr's Ridge to the heights at Emmitsburg Road without being seen proved impossible. Kershaw's Brigade had just made the turnoff when they came to a rise that could clearly be seen from the Little Round Top signal station. So they halted. McLaws rode forward with Johnson to examine the position, and McLaws rode back, said one of Kershaw's men, "saying thing I would not like to teach my grandson to repeat."

Longstreet soon appeared, and he and McLaws rode forward to reconnoiter. "Very soon," Kershaw recalled, "these gentlemen returned, both manifesting considerable irritation, as I thought." McLaws ordered a countermarch to Black Horse Tavern. Then they moved north and west along Herr's Ridge, and turning, worked their way east by crossing fields. From there, they followed Willoughby Run to the crossroads by Pitzer's School House. Beyond Pitzer's, the men could move more freely, turning left at the crossroads and coming to a stop in a patch of woods near the Peach Orchard.

At 3:00 p.m., Longstreet ordered Kershaw to attack the Union line in the Peach Orchard, using the Emmitsburg Road as a pivot and swinging his line to the left. This would roll up what Longstreet presumed to be a weak Union presence in the field. Kershaw, not having any reason to doubt the accuracy of Longstreet's assessment (or being in any position to refuse even if he had doubts), accepted the order and prepared his men to advance.

The head of Kershaw's column emerged from the woods by the Peach Orchard at about 3:30 p.m. He found himself in an open field, behind a low stone wall running from Flaherty's field eastward to Snyder's field. Then he got his first look at what was in front of him.

"Here we were in full view of the Federal position. Their main line appeared to extend from Little Round Top, where their signal flags were flying, until it was lost to sight far away to the left. An advanced line occupied the Peach Orchard, heavily supported from that point toward our left along the Emmitsburg Road. The intervening ground was occupied by open fields. interspersed and divided by stone walls. The position just here seemed almost impregnable."

Esteemed member Heather K Peake contributes:

First of all....

But my duty today is open a discussion on Brig. Gen. Joseph Brevard Kershaw and his activities on July 1 and 2. I'm posting this in two parts because of its length. Despite its length, this is a bare-bones version of Kershaw's story. For brevity's sake, I also excluded discussing the Union position on July 2, although I hope we can discuss this as well.

For biographical info on Kershaw, Larry provided a really nice post this weekend (thus saving me some typing!).

JULY 1, 1863

JULY 2, 1863
4:00 am-4:00 PM

Esteemed member Heather K Peake contributes:

(part 2 of 2)

Kershaw quickly sent word back to McLaws that there was a heavy Union presence in the field. This came as a surprise to McLaws, whose recent intelligence said there was only one or two regiments and a battery of artillery in the area. He sent word back to Longstreet to ask if he should modify Kershaw's orders.

While waiting for Longstreet's orders, McLaws moved his other brigades into position. Semmes was positioned 200 yards to Kershaw's rear, on the other side of Emmitsburg Road. Barksdale was positioned on Kershaw's left, with Wofford in Barksdale's rear. Cabell's battalion of artillery was at an angle to Kershaw's right, with Cabell's right supported by Col. De Saussure's 15th S.C..

Longstreet refused to believe McLaws report of heavy Union concentration in the field, saying "he was satisfied there was a small force of the enemy in front" and that McLaws should "proceed at once with an assault." Hood's Division moved to McLaws right with the objective of gaining the enemy's left, and Kershaw was ordered to commence his attack after Hood was engaged, swinging around the Peach Orchard and trying to connect with Hood on his right. Hood was to sweep down the Federal line "in a direction perpendicular to our line of battle," said Kershaw. These orders came both in writing and verbally from both McLaws and Longstreet.

Kershaw surveyed his position. Beyond the stone house which marked their center-front, there was a marshy "morass," followed by a "stoney hill, covered with heavy timber and thick undergrowth, interspersed with bowlders [sic] and large fragments of rocks..." He chose the "stoney hill" as his objective, "so as to strike it with my center and thus attack the orchard on its left rear." He gave orders that on a three-gun signal from Cabell's battery, his men were to jump the wall and advance without further orders. He would personally lead the brigade's right wing, composed of the 3rd and 7th S.C., while Col. Kennedy would lead the left flank, the 2nd and 8th S.C. and the 3rd S.C. Battalion. Officers would walk rather than ride, owing to the many obstacles. At 4 p.m., the 3-gun signal went off, and the Carolinians jumped the stone wall.

The advance went well at first. "General Longstreet accompanied me in this advance on foot, as far as the Emmitsburg Road," and sent them on with a shout and a wave of the hat. Facing only minor Federal harassment, Kershaw's men marched into the field, formed up at Rose's farm, and wheeled left towards the batteries in the Peach Orchard.

Here the first wave of Federal resistance hit them. Thirty guns opened at once, cutting down hundreds of men along the way. Kershaw never forgot the "clatter of grape" against the stone barn. One of his privates later wrote: "O the awful deadly surging sounds of those little black balls as they flew by us, through us, between our legs and over us!"

Though individually devastating, the salvo did not stop Kershaw's momentum. The Carolinians did not even stop to fire as they negotiated the many stone outbuildings of Rose's farm. In the process, the 7th S.C. "had lapped the 3rd a few paces," so when they reached the marshy ground at the base of the hill, he ordered the 7th to halt and the 3rd to pull off to the right, to untangle the units.

This move may have cause one of the afternoon's most tragic mistakes. Kershaw's left, under Kennedy, was a short distance away. Perhaps hearing only a portion of Kershaw's shouted orders, "the order was given to move *by the right flank* by some unauthorized person." The three regiments obediently turned right, away from the enemy guns. Union artillery promptly decimated them. Within minutes, Kennedy lost 1/3 of his force. Kershaw later mourned "[H]undreds of the bravest and best men of Carolina fell, victims of this fatal blunder." The survivors regrouped as quickly as possible, the 3rd Battalion and 8th S.C. joining Barksdale's delayed attack on the Peach Orchard, and the 2nd S.C. engaging batteries from a stand of trees at the base of the hill.

Kershaw would later say simply that he occupied the hill, but it was a hard-fought victory. Taking artillery fire on his left and infantry fire on his front, he lost four color-bearers before he even started up the slope. Apparently the strength of his approach intimidated the two Union brigades on the hill, because resistance suddenly melted away. At the summit (such as it was) he began slowly moving north.

Kershaw had directed his left wing (the 3rd S.C.) to engage the batteries on Wheatfield Road. While this was happening, he saw two Union brigades on the approach, threatening his right. Kershaw ordered the right thrown back to meet the threat, a move neatly accomplished by Col. Elbert Bland of the 7th S.C. while Kershaw went back meet with Semmes.

Semmes immediately moved his Georgians to reinforce Kershaw on the hill, and Kershaw moved on to retrieve Col. De Saussure 15th S.C., which had been ordered to stay with Cabell's artillery near Snyder's farm. De Saussure fell mortally wounded as Kershaw approached, and the advance was accomplished by Maj. William Gist.

Kershaw arrived back at the hill in time to see the 7th S.C. engaging the enemy at a distance of just 200 yards, and doing so brilliantly. "They were handsomely received and entertained by this veteran regiment, which long kept them at bay in its front."

While the 7th S.C. held off Kelly's Irishmen and Zook's Germans, Kershaw became concerned about a 100-foot gap between his right flank and Semmes right. federals were ssteadily pushing their way into this gap, folding the 7th's right back towards its left. Finally, the Carolinians broke. Kershaw, unable to get the 2nd moved up to support, ordered the 7th to retreat to Rose's farm.

The 3rd and Semmes 50th Georgia were the only Confederates left on the hill. Assaulted by Federals on their front and both flanks, they too were rapidly folded in half. Kershaw ordered the 3rd to retreat, and as they were withdrawing, he saw a wonderful sight: Wofford's Brigade "coming in splendid style." Kershaw's left wing had joined Wofford's in this drive, and the 2nd joined Wofford's right. Soon, the Federals had been pushed out of the Wheatfield. Kershaw regrouped and joined Wofford as he advanced north toward Little Round Top.

The fighting was not finished for the day. At dusk, the Union made one more move against the Confederate right. Forming on the north slope of Little Round Top, the Federals charged and pushed the exhausted Southerners back across the Wheatfield. Kershaw set up a defensive line at Rose's Farm.

JULY 3 & BEYOND

Kershaw's Brigade was "unemployed" during the final day of battle and retreated with the remainder of Lee's army on July 4-5.

After Gettysburg, he followed Longstreet to Tennessee, fighting at Chickamauga and the Knoxville Campaign. He was with Longstreet the day that general was wounded by his own troops at the Wilderness; Kershaw's cry of "Friends!" probably saved the lives of several of Longstreet's party. Kershaw fought at Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, Cedar Creek and Petersburg, only to be captured at Sayler's Creek on the retreat to Appomattox. He was released from prison in August, 1865.

Returned to Camden, he regained his seat in the legislature in 1865, eventually becoming president of the state senate. Later, he was appointed judge in the 5th District. Ill health forced his resignation. Appointed postmaster of Camden in 1893, he died on April 13, 1894 and was buried in Camden.

Kershaw never took part in the controversy over the management of July 2. He pointed out in a piece for Century Magazine that the individual units fought well and quite gallently. What lost it for the Confederacy, he said, was a lack of "coordination" and "cooperation" between groups.

Esteemed member ltagg@pacbell.net contributes:

Somehow I lost the post, but wasn't someone asking about leaders in Kershaw's brigade? Here's a sketch of Kershaw--as he approached Gettysburg--that I did recently.

Joseph Kershaw was the embodiment of the Confederate gentleman-turned-soldier ideal, a lawyer fromthe "Cradle of the Rebellion," South Carolina. He was intelligent, literate, and dignified, a man of high character in whose life religion had first place. Blond, with light blue eyes, refined features and a resolute expression, he was clean-shaven except for a drooping blond mustache. He had the bearing of command and a clear voice that seemed to inspire courage when it was raised in battle. "Gallant and pious," was how division commander McLaws described him; "cool and judicious."

His father was several times mayor of Camden, S.C., and served a term as a member of Congress. Young Joseph studied law and was admitted to the bar in 1843. In addition to his law career Kershaw had some military experience, having been a lieutenant with South Carolina's "Palmetto Regiment" in the Mexican War. Later a member of the state legislature and a member of his state's secession convention, he raised a militia regiment which went into Confederate service as the 2nd South Carolina regiment when the Civil War began.

Kershaw's regiment was present at Fort Sumter and First Manassas. He had some rough edges early on--he annoyed commanding general Beauregard after First Manassas by not filing a report with him and instead writing an article for a South Carolina newspaper in which it appeared that he had won the battle himself. Beauregard later referred to him as "that militia idiot." Fortunately for Kershaw, Beauregard was transferred away from the Virginia army, and in January 1862 Kershaw took command of his brigade when the previous commander, General Bonham, resigned in a huff over seniority matters. Two weeks later Kershaw was promoted to brigadier general.

On the Peninsula the next summer, Kershaw led his brigade in action at Williamsburg and again at Savage Station during the Seven Days' Battles. In McLaws's official report after those battles, he wrote "I beg leave to call attention to the gallantry, cool, yet daring, courage and skill in the management of his gallant command exhibited by Brigadier-General Kershaw." Thus there was already much expected of Kershaw and and his men before the Maryland campaign in September, where Kershaw's men forced Union soldiers off the critical Maryland Heights before the capture of Harper's Ferry; some of the men had to load and fire from positions where they had to use one arm to keep from rolling down the mountainside. After the battle of Antietam at the climax of that campaign, Kershaw was again highly praised by McLaws.

At Fredericksburg, Kershaw had his finest hour, reinforcing Thomas Cobb's brigade behind the Stone Wall on Marye's Heights and taking command of that embattled salient when Cobb was mortally wounded. Leading his brigade on horseback, Kershaw emerged on the crest of the hill a conspicuous and defiant target, seen and admired by thousands on both sides. It was said later that when he reined in his horse, the Yankees withheld their fire as if out of respect, and that Kershaw took off his cap in acknowledgment before he disappeared behind the bastion of the Stone Wall.

At Chancellorsville, for once, Kershaw was not heavily engaged. Through all the army's battles, Kershaw showed an ability for quick rational decisions. His division commander, McLaws, had complete faith in him and his brigade, and he was much admired by his South Carolinians. The official reports Kershaw wrote are graceful, literate, and restrained. He was a man who passed through these hours of high hazard with a calm center, never losing his dignity. His brigade was always well put in, and Kershaw had never endangered his men rashly. Later in the war, he would rise to command of the entire division, proving himself to be one of the very few exceptions--along with Wade Hampton and John B. Gordon--to Lee's rule that a division commander must be a professionally trained soldier.

Larry Tagg