These archived discussions are still open for comment. To join in write gettysburg@arthes.comLast updated 11/14/95
Hello All,
So far we have discussed many reasons for the outcome of the battle.
We have talked about the 20th Maine (a lot) saving the Union flank and the
futility of Lee's (picket's) Charge. But IMHO, it was not so much the
morale, gallantry or skill that won the battle. It was the ground. The
commanding general of the Union Army on the field on the morning of 1 July
(Howard?) saw the strategic advantage of the ground and was wise to put
reserve forces there in case of retreat.
Sickles, by leaving Cemetery Ridge and extending his line, was asking for the same kind of rout that the First and Eleventh Corps had on the day before. He left the advantageous high ground and was just asking to be pushed back to the ground he vacated.
Lets see if this can spark the same kind of insightful and well documented conversation as the Pike Creek discussion of some time ago did. All we need is for someone to disagree with my opinion that the ground was the major factor in the defeat of the ANV.
Matt Tavener
Rowan College N.J.
Matt Tavener wrote:
>It was the ground. The commanding general of the Union Army on the field
on the >morning of 1 July (Howard?) saw the strategic advantage of the
ground and was >wise to put reserve forces there in case of retreat.
Matt,
The Union general normally given credit for selecting the ground at
Gettysburg is Brig. Gen. John Buford. It is true that Howard dropped off
reserves on Cemetery Hill but Buford selected and defended the ground with
an eye on the "hills".
On the Sickles issue, you wrote:
>Sickles, by leaving Cemetery Ridge and extending his line, was asking >for the same kind of rout that the First and Eleventh Corps had on the day >before. He left the advantageous high ground and was just asking to be >pushed back to the ground he vacated.
I am not defending Sickles and don't mean to split hairs, however, Sickles went forward for the expressed purpose of occuping the high ground to his front (Peach Orchard and the Emmittsburg Road). He thought he was in a hole. From his orginial position, his movement forward was "uphill". As you indicated, it was not the thing to do but getting the high ground in front was the reason he did it. Can't explain why he elected not to occupy Little Round Top which was to his left (his stated reason was that he was not told to and did not have the resources).
Bill
The following quote is somewhat relevant to talk about the ground at Gettysburg. It is an appendix to David G Martin's GETTYSBURG JULY 1 (736 pages, 20 maps, hard cover, $34.95) that is being marketed by Stackpole Books (717-796-0411). The book is well-written and comprehensive, completely overtaking previous first day treatments, including CRISIS AT THE CROSSROADS.
"The battlefield, of course, has suffered significant alterations since 1863. Most notable is the expansion of the town of Gburg, which today covers four times as much as it did at the time of the battle. The northern, eastern, and western approaches of the town were open except for scattered houses, and the area southwest of town (now a development) was all fields. There are also modern housing developments along the Harrisburg Road (where Early's artillery first formed) and south of Fairfield Road (where Lane advanced), not to mention extended commercial development, near the forks of the Carlisle Road, along the York Pike, and at spots (such as General Lee's Restaurant) along the Chambersburg Pike, In addition, Pennsylvania (Gettysburg) College, located at the northwest corner of town, had only three buildings at the time of the battle, and has greatly expanded since the war. The Seminary has also added numerous buildings. The battlefield park owns a small parcel of land where Coster's brigade fought where there is a beautiful mural well worth seeing; however, this is not the entire Union line here, and the town's expansion has covered the ground over which Early's men attacked. But the most intensive development has been the extensive commercial building south of the town (ironically, most of it intended to serve the tourists who come to visit the battlefield). This makes it very difficult to study and appreciate the natural strength of Cemetery Hill as the Union Army's final defensive position on 1 July. Another significant alteration to the first day's battlefield is the recent and unforgivable drastic alteration of the northern face of the eastern railroad cut carried out by Gettysburg College.A number of minor changes need to be mentioned for those who wish to visit and study the field. At the time of the battle, the northwest crest of Barlow's Knoll was totally wooded all the way to the creek. The Almshouse complex, where Barlow's men attempted to rally 3/8 mile south of Barlow's Knoll, is no loonger standing. Herbst Woods was more open than today, and would have extended farther to the east. Today only the McPherson barn remains to the north of Herbst Woods; McPherson's house, outbuilding and apple orchard, all gone today, would have given a much different view of this part of the Union line. Norythern Doubleday Avenue has more trees lining it than would have been there during the battle. The northern part of Baxter's line actually ran along a stone wall (no longer extant) that angled towards the Mummasburg Road farther to the west of Doubleday Avenue.
Despite all these changes and alterations to the battlefield scene, much of the battle area still remains basically like it was in 1863. The Natl Battlefield Park owns and protects most of the ground on which the heaviest fighting occurred; the significant exceptions are at the Seminary (where most of the ground is fortunately preserved in park like condition) and the final XI Corps line on the northern edge of town (now lost to housing). But the Park does not by any means own all the ground on which the troops of both sides marched and fought on 1 July. Most significant is its very limited holdings on Herr Ridge (where most of Hill's Confederates formed prior to their attacks), the ground east of Rock Creek (over which Early attacked), and the area to the left and right of the Almshouse (over which the XI Corps fought and retreated). Hopefully much of this line can be acquired by the Park under expanded boundary goals, before it suffers further loss and development.
These somewhat limited Park holdings on the 1st day's field have noticeably affected the location and placement of battlefield markers. The I Corps' forward line on McPherson's and northern Seminary Ridges is well marked, but little note (besides a few markers, mostly of batteries) is made of positions on the final I Corps line near the Seminary. The positions of the attacking Confederate troops are very poorly marked, primarily because the Park does not own their jump off positions on Herr Ridge. The pre-attack positions of Early's troops are also unmarked for the same reason. On the XI Corps' line, the forward position of Barlow's troops on Barlow's Knoll are well marked, but their secondary position near the Almshouse is not. The position of the monuments of Schimmelfennig's division along western Howard Avenue (between the Mummasburg Road and Carlisle Pike) is very deceptive and gives the impression that Howard had a continuous line here. Most of these troops were actually positioned farther to the south, on land not yet owned by the Park. Since these regiments could not erect their markers on private land, they had to place them here on Howard Avenue on the edge of the Park's property. Thus it is very difficult today to get a true picture of the position of much of the XI Corps during the afternoon solely from the location of its regimental monuments."
Ben Maryniak
Hi Ben,
Thanks for posting the terrific excerpt from Martin's new book. I read a
review of it in this issue of the Civil War News and was instantly
interested. I intend to buy it. David Martin does fantastic work; if you
don't recognize his name, he is the author of Confederate Monuments at
Gettysburg (definitive book on the subject), Co-author with Busey of
Regimental Strengths at Gettysburg (definitive book on the subject) and is
the author of the excellent introduction to the Morningside edition of
Vanderslice's: Gettysburg Then and Now. Any book written by Martin is well
worth paying attention to. The review of GETTYSBURG July 1, in TCWN says
the same thing.
I am a first day battle fan, Ben. Your excerpt has convinced me to pick up the book at the bookshow on the 18th. Thanks again.
Matt wrote:
I suppose you can always argue that the ground has some influence on any
miliary engagement, in some cases more and some less...BUT...battles are
fought by men, not stonewalls or wooded slopes or railroad cuts. There are
many complex and interrelated factors that led to the outcomes of all CW
battles, but certainly the morale of the average fighting men, the courage
displayed by them and their officers, and the skill used by officers in
deploying and manoevering them are as important as numerical superiority, or
lay of the land, or ...luck! Surely it took some skill for the AOP to wind up
in the positions they defended at Gettysburg, and more surely, it took some
courage to hold them. There is no doubt however, that the terrain worked more
in the favour of the AOP at Gettysburg - in contrast to many previous battles,
where the ANV used terrain more effectively.
A good example of where "good ground" proved to be no advantage is Missionary
Ridge. The Confederates held what should have been an impregnable position,
but questionable skill in deployment and poor morale led to a crushing
Southern defeat. The fighting man had lost faith in Braxton Bragg.
Bill wrote:
Agreed...and I remember hearing an interesting story of what motivated Sickles
to get out of that "hole". Back to Chancellorsville again...
Sickles' 3rd Corps had been in the thick of the fighting at Chancellorsville,
nipping at Jackson's Corps heels around the Catherine Furnace during their
circuitous "retreat" around the Union right flank, and the next day trying to
hold the Union center near the Chancellor House salient. Sickles main line
was centered around an artillery position at Fairview, just south of the
salient. Shaken by Jackson's flank attack, Hooker had ordered a withdrawal
from Hazel Grove the previous evening after Archer's Brigade of the ANV had
pushed hard in that area. Hazel Grove, a nicely elevated postion with a clear
firing field about 1/2 mile south of Fairview and the apex of the Union line
was quickly occupied by every ANV artillery battery in the area. Sickles
noted the devasating effects that the lighter Southern artillery (commanded by
E.P. Alexander) had upon his Corps. His impression of sitting in a "hole", as
Fairview appears to be with respect to Hazel Grove, clearly influenced his
decision at Gettysburg, when he percieved that a similar situation existed.
As a result, Sickles moved forward to the Peach Orchard "high ground", worried
that ANV artillery would soon be pummelling his position on Cemetary Ridge.
Ironically, E.P. Alexander WAS there again, and as I remember from his book ,
did plan on moving his artillery forward to that position prior to McLaws
attack.
Of course, this story has no doubt been perpetuated by Sickles own "defence"
on his actions at Gettysburg. But...there does seem to be some consistency of
fact here.
Grant Troop
Ben,
Bill
I agree it was Buford who picked the ground (or saw its
importance). The battle centered on taking (ANV) the ridges, hills and
rock piles. The AOP had only
to hold it in the face of constant attack.
As for the men. I was in Sharpsburg this summer and stopped at a
really fine
gallery (forgot the name). One painting drew me into its scene (don't
remember its name either). Anyhow it was a scene of Confederate troops
behind a smallrise topped by rails and rocks. The view is low and behind
but you can see blue and Union flags just up front. Some of the
"butternut" men are loading and firing but several, especially one is on
one knee chucking a rock at the lead Union soldiers; another is looking on
the ground for another rock.
My point is Gettysburg is just a goup of fields, hill, and piles of
rocks. The issues was settled by men--blue and gray--who fought in spite
of terrain. Ground is always important (just visit Fredricksburg), but men
have taken superior forces and high ground before and after (Heartbreak
Ridge, Korea and Hamburger Hill, Vietnam). I'll take the men every
time...its the former Marine officer in me...
P.S. The submission on the current state of the Gettysburg ground was great!
semperfi@siu.edu
No question, the battle was waged between men. And, it was the human
factors of courage, guts and quick thinking that ultimately brought
resolution. Good ground does not win battles on its own. But, the impact
of the ground can't be ignored.
This may seem like a mute point, but the physical terrain of Gettysburg
served as the field for the engagement, and is inseparable from the action.
The terrain didn't _win_ the battle. But, it's interesting that Lee seems
to have acted with almost a total disregard for the importance of the
ground. And, this attitude cost him a chance at victory.
Tom Swantko
The print that Patrick referred to is by Don Troiani called
THE DIEHARDS. It depicts a scene at Second Bull Run where the
Louisiana brigade of LeRoy A. Stafford was holding the line at the
unfinished railroad cut. When the third wave of Union forces
attacked, they had just about run out of ammunition. The cartridge
boxes of the wounded had been emptied. An Irishman of the 1st
Louisiana stood up and hollered "Boys, give them the rocks!" These
rocks and their last cartridges were enough to allow them to hold on
till reinforcements arrived. (Above courtesy of the publisher's ad
for the print.)
As to the question of the "ground". I would have to agree with those
that feel, the men are the deciding factor. I just finished Cozzens
book on Chickamauga and the battle of Horseshoe Ridge. A formidable
bastion to assault but it was regiments like the 21st Ohio and many
others that actually proved to be the difference.
Hello, everyone,
Nice posts so far. A couple of comments:
Ben Quotes:
>The battlefield park owns a small parcel of land where Coster's brigade fought
>where there is a beautiful mural well worth seeing; however, this is not
>the entire Union line here, and the town's expansion has covered the ground
>over which Early's men attacked.
William Frassanito's _Gettysburg Bicentennial Alblum_ contains images which
help to picture the lost vistas. I can't scan and post them because the
Brothers' Lawrence respect - or at least fear - copyright laws.
Page 76 has an image of Coster avenue and the 27th Pa. Monument
looking across fields toward Cemetery Hill. Wonderful image as are many
others. The book is worth buying.
>But the most intensive development has
>been the extensive commercial building south of the town (ironically, most
>of it intended to serve the tourists who come to visit the battlefield).
>This makes it very difficult to study and appreciate the natural strength
>of Cemetery Hill as the Union Army's final defensive position on 1 July.
Again, Frass has some wonderful shots of the area where the wagon
hotel stands in the _Bicentennial _which complement his shots in the _A
Journey in Time_ book.
Enough of describing images you can't see -
Any word on when Frass' new book will hit the stands?
Dennis
Dennis,
On the subject of "ground". I have a neat little book titled GETTYSBURG
BATTLE AND BATTLEFIELD which was written in the 1920's by W.C. Storrick who
was Superintendent of Guides at the park. It was republished in 1993 and I
found it on a bargin table in one of the mall bookstores. It has a lot of
pictures of the battlefield taken in the 20's (the Whitworth guns now on Oak
Hill are pictured on what looks like Confederate Ave.) and also has little
bios on Bachelder and Cope. If you see it in the bargin bin, grab it.
Again, on the subject of ground, did you see the post is sent in some time
ago on the changes to the ground on Little Round Top. I was quouting from a
letter by a professor at Penn State who has studied the LRT changes
extensively. He discussed road cuts, earth and boulder removal, buildings
between the Round Tops, and the re-stacking of stone walls. If you don't
have it, I'll try to find the letter. I trashed the message.
Bill
Lisa,
Professor Schaefer wrote,
I've been at this study for about five or six months. The impetus
from which this work arose was a micro-study I offered here at the
campus as a part of our ongoing course offering on the campaign and
battle. Inputting together its material, I came to realize how much one
can "tme travel" while traversing LRT's slopes. There are many diferent
"Gettysburg" represented across this piece of real estate, but one must
look for them carefully. They tell a lot about how different eras of
battlefield managers and battlefield visitors reacted to his space. I'm
expecting to turn this research into a publication within the next year.
In looking through your questions, I should be able to help you fill
in some blanks. Succinctly, the hill has been altered quite definitely
over time. The road cutting, trolley line, monuments, and boulder
removals (often for monument, bases on other parts of the field) have
had striking, but probably not wholly dramatic effects on how the
average tourist perceives the place. The breastworks are a different
story. Only one small segment of those on the hill were actucally
fought behind on 2 July (and this is even speculative); that segment is
visible by the site of the 20th Maine's left flank marker. All the rest
were erected after the day's fighting had ended, or in the instance of
other segments of Vincent's or Weed's wall-building, they have been
swallowed up or built over by those walls now extant. Those walls have
been stacked and restacked repeatedly, so their configurationa nd
alignment is now only symbolically representative. They could be as
much as one to three feet away from their original lines; moreover, the
Warren and Cope maps show different configurations. This I've not yet
been able to plot out myself, but come late autumn, I shall.
You are also correct about a small building between the Tops. It,
too, appears on Cope, but I've not wholly determined what it is all
about. If you can wait a few months (this fall semester is a frightful
one for me), I shall be able to give you much more thoughtfully
contrived information..."[Letter, Thomas L. Schaefer to Alexander
Cameron, September 21, 1994]
I hope this helps and you find it as interesting as I did.
Steve Cassell wrote
Great post on the battlefield guides seminar. Makes me yearn for
the field sleet, rain, fog whatever.
You have helped me answer a question I have been kicking around for
over a year about Buford v Lane's square. I have always doubted the
formation ocurred, but romanticaly had hoped it had. There were instances
in the Civil War where such a disciplined formation as the square was
formed, but at Gettysburg attacking mobs seemed to be the order of the day(s).
I appreciate the excellent directions as to how to find the
location of Lane v Buford. Did they discuss how critical Buford's action
was there? I have read that it was quite helpful in allowing the AoP to
retreat to Cemetery Hill. If true, then it is certainly a part of Buford's
action that day that has gone overlooked. Buford was a butt kicker! I like
the image of him ordering the streets barricaded to save the high ground.
On the subject of ground - I guess this is a moot quetsion - but it
is my understanding that Buford had resolved to hold the ridges west of town
as the Aop's line, and saw the ridges south of town as a fall back position
only. Brother Bob tries to tell me that he was fighting a holding action to
preserve the Cemtery Hill line. ??
I am glad you are forwarding info for us on the guides as I think
that will make a nice service for our members.
Take care,
Hi Dennis,
Yes, Mike Phipps did talk about the role of John Buford's horsemen
in holding Lane's brigade in check, long enough for the I Corps to
escape total destruction. When the I Corps Seminary Ridge line collapsed,
after 4:30 P.M., the boys in Blue had to run a gauntlet of Confederate
fire on three sides along the Chambersburg Pike (after all Yankee
opposition had been swept from Oak Ridge, north of the eastern R.R. Cut).
BTW, the 4th U.S., Battery B (Right Section) rolled over the reverse
slope of Oak Ridge, to effect their safe withdrawal from the field --
over the ground declared by G'burg College as "unimportant." I KNEW SO --
the only way they could have retreated!!!
Anyway... the soldiers of the I Corps waited almost too late to retreat,
and had to run a gauntlet of Rebel fire along the Chambersburg Pike.
Confederate brigades of Perrin, Scales and Daniel were closing in from the
west. Daniel began to wheel around the exposed right flank of the I Corps,
after clearing the summit of Oak Ridge. Perrin's soldiers were swarming
around the Lutheran Seminary buildings. And across the battlefield (from
the northeast) came the brigade of John B. Gordon, to join in on the kill.
If Buford was a butt-kicker of the AoP, on the first day, [as you named
him] I think that Gordon would be the Confederate butt-kicker of the day!
Gordon's men out shot and swept aside 3-4 brigades of the XI Corps, in
order to come clear across the battlefield to fire into the mass of the
retreating I Corps -- from north of the Carrie Sheads house.
It was up to Lane's brigade to make it even tougher for the retreating
I Corps to reach the safety of Cemetery Hill. That is, if the remnants of
the I Corps could reach Cemetery Hill. But, Lane was not able to close the
Confederate noose around the I Corps, due to the presence of "Jno." Buford,
on his flank, threatening a mounted attack from the high ground around the
location of the Adams Co. Fairgrounds. Even if Lane did not form a cavalry
square east of Seminary Ridge, the threat of Yankee horsemen (or additional
forces unknown, to Lane) kept him from assisting in the cutting-off the I
Corps from Cemetery Hill.
Buford did everything right on the first day of Gettysburg. His delaying
action is a classic of a lightly armed inferior unit, in a delaying action
against superior enemy forces. A masterful use of his available forces,
terrain and tactics. Buford's leadership is timeless. Mike Phipps, in his
Army Ranger days, used Buford's G'burg tactics in a training exercise.
Phipps with 25 men held up a battalion of Rangers, and forced them to take
two hours to advance a mile of real estate. Phipps's squad fired to stop the
larger force, and cause it to deploy. Then, the smaller force withdrew
before the larger force could make their numbers count. The death of Buford
was a big loss to the AoP. It is a shame that he was not around to work
with Sheridan, Merritt, Custer, et al , during the campaigns of 1864-65.
Buford was in G'burg long enough to have noted the presence of the
"lovely ground" south of town. Being a professional, I am sure that he would
have recognized the importance of Culp's Hill, Cemetery Hill and Cemetery
Ridge. What is not clear, is if the saving of the hills and ridges south of
Gettysburg was his main goal on July 1, 1863. [Does anyone know if Buford
wrote that his main goal was to save the high ground south of Gettysburg,
or in the preserving the strategic road net for Meade's army???]
Buford was protecting the northwest flank of the AoP, in leading the way
for the I Corps. Just as Robert E. Lee ordered the ANV to concentrate in the
Cashtown - Gettysburg area, because of the road net that would bring his army
together from points west, north, and northeast; Buford also sought to save
the same road net. To save the same road network for the AoP advancing from
the south and southeast. In saving the Gettysburg road hub, Buford also
saved the "lovely ground" that was important for July 2nd and 3rd. Buford's
role after the arrival of the I Corps, on the first day of Gettysburg, is a
neglected subject. Without Buford's leadership, we might all be the
Westminister Discussion Group.
Steve Cassel
Steve Cassel wrote:
Steve,
Bill
Bill,
Best Wishes,
Greetings,
"Let us cross over the river,
Talking about fire into three sides of the Yankee retreat from Seminary
Ridge, I enclose a letter by a member of the 94th NYV that I've always
found pretty evocative..
This letter, written on July 2 by then-2nd Lt Walter T Chester of the 94th
NYV, appeared in the Buffalo Daily Courier for July 11, 1863. At
Gettysburg, the 94th was led by Col Adrian Rowe Root and part of Paul's
Brigade, Robinson's Division, I Corps. More than half of the regiment had
been captured as Robinson was driven from his position near Oak Hill, but
Lt Chester managed to escape..
Walter T Chester, a 21-year-old student, enlisted in the 94th NYV at
Buffalo on August 6, 1862. He and a small group of recruits caught up with
the regiment eight days later outside of Culpeper, Virginia; these "fresh
fish" fought at Second Manassas in their civilian clothes because they
hadn't a chance to draw government issue. Appointed Second Lt of Co D
during January of '63, Chester served on General Crawford's staff during
1864 and was also promoted to Captain that year, rejoining the 94th by the
first day of 1865. Interestingly, Captain WT Chester claimed to have been
the last man mustered out of Army of the Potomac. When the AoP was whittled
down to a provisional division with General Ayres in command, the 94th was
ordered to be part of that organization. The same order that constituted
Ayres' division also assigned Captain Chester as mustering officer and
directed him to muster it out. This he did, reserving the 94th to the last
in order to remain in service himself. Chester even mustered out General
Ayres and the volunteer officers of his staff before he discharged the
94th. Captain Chester was then mustered out by Captain Pond of the regular
army..
I didn't erase all the individual identifications I have attached to the
end of this letter. Hope you don't find them annoyingly irrelevant.
One week ago today, our regiment was ordered away from Edwards
Ferry to join our old brigade for the purpose of driving the rebels out of
Pennsylvania. Yesterday, about noon, we reached here in the midst of a
fierce battle. Our Corps fought Lee's whole army during the afternoon and
was driven back through the town in dire confusion about 5pm. Our loss is
terrible. That of our regiment we can form no idea of. We went in with 420
muskets and this morning we have 78. Our loss, however, cannot be as great
as these figures show. We did splendidly. We broke the enemy by a
well-directed fire of some fifteen minutes' duration and then charged upon
them across a field, carrying our colors within their lines farther than
any others went. In that place we took many prisoners and up to that time
all went well. But, alas, they flanked us on both sides - getting us, as it
were, in the centre of a horse shoe with only one way of exit..
Then "sauve qui peut" (note from Ben - "save yourself, who can")
was the cry and out we went in inglorious confusion. To rally was
impossible. On three sides of us a superior force hurled in murderous fire.
Back through the town we streamed, poor fellows dropping all about - many
from fatigue - and many were taken prisoners. How I escaped is miraculous.
Once a man's neck saved me - his blood spouted all over me. Twice, horses
intervened between me and wounds or death. But, thank God, I came through
untouched and am ready to fight again today with good heart. I was in
command of the company, the Captain and 1st Lieutenant being absent.
Colonel Root was stunned in the early part of the fight by an explosion of
a shell under his horse and was afterwards, I heard, wounded in the leg and
taken prisoner. Capt White was wounded in the foot, Lieut Mesler in the
knee, Ed Williams arm was broken, John Glaire is probably killed, and old
Mike Donohue was left on the field killed or wounded.(a).
Today we have immense reinforcements and I have high hopes. We are
held in reserve. Of Company "D" there is no one with the regiment this
morning but Sergeants Crawford and Donohue, Corporal Ludlow, and Privates
Conover, Chadderdon, and Flanigan.(b) The rest are scattered and many must
be prisoners. I saw George Bourne very nearly through the town.(c) I think
he is alright..
I have lost everything but the clothes on my back and my warlike
implements. Be as little anxious as possible about me. Do not think I was
killed if you do not hear from me for some time, for I may be taken
prisoner..
WT Chester.
NOTES.
(a) Captain Horace G White, Co "F" 94th NYV - A 32-year-old native of Ira,
NY, White had been mustered into the 94th as 2nd Lieutenant on December 9,
1861; he rose to Captain's rank October 29 of '62. Wounded and captured on
July 1st at Gettysburg, he was able to escape as the rebels marched their
prisoners south. Captain White was discharged during March of 1865.
I believe Sickle's Corp arrived on Cemetary Ridge about 6pm on July 1st.
He certainly had plenty of time to think about occupyping Little Round
Top. Shouldn't he have sent at least a brigade there even if he still
felt the thing to do was advance to the Peach Orchard. Advancing his
corps ahead of the rest of the army was one mistake, but not leaving a
detachment on LRT is an even bigger mistake IMHO..
From: SELieberum@mail.biosis.org
I believe that at the time Sickle's Corp was "NOT" the left of the
line. Since I am at work -- I do not have my books handily, I am sure
that if Sickle thought he was on the left he would have occupied the
"HIGH" ground to his left.
jpike (your email does not give your name. jpike seems a bit clumsy) wrote:.
> I believe Sickle's Corp arrived on Cemetary Ridge about 6pm on July 1st.
> He certainly had plenty of time to think about occupyping Little Round
> Top. Shouldn't he have sent at least a brigade there even if he still
> felt the thing to do was advance to the Peach Orchard. Advancing his
> corps ahead of the rest of the army was one mistake, but not leaving a
> detachment on LRT is an even bigger mistake IMHO..
Here is what Meade said about it:.
Here is what Sickles (HISTORICUS) said about it:.
...The critical moment had now arrived. The enemy's movements indicated
their purpose to seize the Round Top hill; and this in their possession,
General Longstreet would have had easy work in cutting up our left wing. To
prevent this disaster, Sickles waited no longer for orders from General
Meade, but directed General Hobart Ward's brigade and Smith's battery
(Fourth New York) to secure that vital position..." [HISTORICUS, OR, 27].
Sickles testified (first) before the Joint Commission on the Conduct of
the War and stated that he had received no orders but his left flank managed
to get into position "on Round Top". [R.Sauers, GETTYSBURG: THE
MEADE-SICKLES CONTROVERSY].
If you want to get really ill, this is what John Watts De Peyster said about
it in an address before third Army Corps veteran's organization in 1886:
So...to answer your question - yes he should have occupied it. He
maintained he did by placing Ward's on Houck's ridge. There is lots to read
on this subject. Saures's article is a good start. All of the testimony
before the Joint Commission is available and the HISTORIOCUS letters are in
the OR..
Bill
I was glad to see a couple of postings on Sickles decision
to move his third corps out to the Peach Orchard and Wheatfield.
The ground that Sickles occupied had a strategic advantage, he
hadn't placed his corps in a hole. By getting out of my car and
looking from where Smith's two guns were placed behind Devils Den
I really noticed how much elevation that ground in front of me
had. I did turn around and notice the steep rocky climb up to
Little Round Top and wonder why this position was not occupied
instead of the advance position. So I remembered the posting
that stated that the Pennsylvania Memorial was now open for the
climbing. So I took in the spectacular view from atop the
Pennsylvania Memorial (I highly recommend taking in this stunning
view). From that vantage I noticed that Devils Den and the Peach
Orchard are really much closer to the copse of trees that figured
so prominately in the third days battle. But I also noticed that
Cemetery Ridge is not as well defined as the higher ground that
Sickles occupied from Little Round Top, out to Devils Den and
through to Emmitsburg Rd.
It seems to me that Sickles was concerned that the enemy
would occupy the "heights" to his immediate front and decided to
hold that line. IMHO with enough manpower this forward line
could have been held, it had strategic advantage. But Sickles
line was too thin and so it was pushed like dust from a counter
top.
Matt Tavener Matt wrote:
Wow! Someone defending (well at least a few kind words) Sickles. I love
it. I feel like a kid in a candy store!
Let me address the "hole" issue first. There is no argument here. I
think I am the culprit who used the term "hole" and I was referring to the
fact that Sickles felt he was in one while in his original position (Grant
Troop is correct in his assertion that it stems from his Chancelorville
experience). He did not like the position he was directed to assume by
Meade and he placed Ward's Brigade and Smith's Battery above Devil's Den in
an attempt to reach "higher ground".
Yes, the Peach Orchard and the line of Emmittsburg Road are both "higher
ground" but he violated about umpteen Principles of War in moving there
(Hunt told him that it would "stretch the defenders to the limit, expose a
salient to enemy attack, and leave both flanks in the air..."). The AOP had
to fight as one cohesive unit and Sickles acted on his own volition,
separating his corps from Hancock's and creating an enormous gap in the
Federal line. He absolutely refused to send a brigade to Little Round Top
when specifically asked to do so by Brig. Gen. Warren's frantic aide,
Mackenzie. He clearly did not have enough resources to support the line he
occupied so he busied himself trying to piecemeal the 5th Corps under his
command (to use the modern vernacular, he "ripped off" Crawford's division
without Sykes' permission). He wrote (and testified before Congress) that
he "occupied" LRT by the placement of Ward and Smith. As you indicated in
your post, all you have to do is stand at Smith's Battery and execute an
"about face" and see that you can't protect the Union left flank by
occupying a position several feet lower that the strategically important
ground on LRT.
If he had anchored his line on LRT as he was directed to do (he was told
to occupy the position vacatied by Geary. Geary had two regiments on LRT.
Sickles quibbled forever that "Geary had no position"), he would have been
in a defendable position supported correctly on his right. It is true that
he would not have the advantage of high ground on the southern end of
Cemetery "Ridge" but the answer was not to act on his own, separate his
corps from Hancock's and spread his corps in a dangerously thin serpentine
line running from Devils Den to the Emmittsburg Road.
Bill
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Ground
Thanks for a very useful post on "ground". It is a "keeper". There was a
lot of abuse of the park early on. Did you know that, "On July 3, 1922,
Marines from Quantico, Va., under the command of Brigadier-General Smedley
D. Butler, repeated Pickett's Charge as it was made in 1863, and on July 4th
conducted it as such a charge would be made under present warfare conditions
with modern equipment and maneuvers. President Harding, General Pershing,
and many other prominent in the State and Nation enjoyed the display."
I didn't until I stumbled on it last night in an old book. My goodness.
Can you imagine doing that today? I knew about Camp Colt but this smacks of
"goofing around". Times have changed.
From: semperfi@siu.edu (Patrick King)
Greetings,
Patrick King
From: fibered@earthlink.net Tom Swantko
Subject: The Ground Had It's Impact
From: CDFX96A@prodigy.com (MR ROGER E WATSON)
From: lawrence (Dennis Lawrence)
Subject: Lovely Ground
I have opened a new file called Lovely Ground in which I will
archive the comments on the ground once we have finished discussing the
terrain.
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Lovely Ground
Moderator's Note: The Letter is reprinted below,
From: alexander.cameron@smokeys.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Condition of LRT
For Lisa Mucha:
Thomas L. Schaefer is a professor at PennState and is THE
expert on the conditions of LRT. He has lectured on the subject and I
corresponded with him when I was working on an article. I thought you
might enjoy part of his letter. "LRT has alway been a beacon to me, and
I've spent an inordinate amount of time up there. My recent interest
has been focussed on the changes that have occurred since the battle,
specifically the physical changes, the changes in people's perception,
and the National Park Service's subsequent responses (i.e., preservation
policies) to these changes.
From: lawrence (Dennis Lawrence)
Subject: Re: Fall 1995 ALBG Seminar Report
Phipps showed that General Buford was not about to mount-up
ride away to the 1st Corps, if he was strongly pressed,
as some modern historians suggest. Buford would have
barricaded the streets, in order to save the Gettysburg
road net for the AoP (along with the "lovely ground" south
of G'burg).
Phipps doubts if Lane's Brigade formed or had
time to form any cavalry square west of Seminary Ridge.
Until Buford was outflanked on the far left of the 1st
Corps line on Seminary Ridge after 4:30 P.M., his men
held a line dismounted behind stonewalls south of the
Fairfield Road. When it was known that the 1st Corps
Seminary Ridge line had collapsed, Buford finally
mounted his command to withdrawal from that defensive
position. Buford continue to cover the flank of the
retreating 1st Corps with his division mounted. Phipps
showed the participants this position visible east of the
National Guard armory off of Confederate Avenue. Where
Buford's division was formed-up is now a housing
development and softball fields. This position had an
elevation almost equal to that of Cemetery Hill. The
location of this position can be seen on the Warren
maps indicated as the Adams Co. Fairgrounds, northeast
of Cemetery Hill. If Lane's brigade ever formed a
cavalry square, it was after the complete Confederate
possession of the Seminary Ridge position. If a cavalry
square was ever formed, it was when Buford's horsemen
were threatening a mounted attack from the Fairgrounds
position east of Seminary Ridge....
Dennis
From: STEVEN CASSEL
Subject: ALBG Fall Seminar: Buford @ G'burg
This is the first opportunity I have had to answer your reply,
regarding my ALBG Fall 1995 Seminar Report. Oh, how I hate
catching-up after returning from vacation!!!!
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Buford holds the town.
>Buford was in G'burg long enough to have noted the presence of the
>"lovely ground" south of town. Being a professional, I am sure that he would
>have recognized the importance of Culp's Hill, Cemetery Hill and Cemetery
>Ridge. What is not clear, is if the saving of the hills and ridges south of
>Gettysburg was his main goal on July 1, 1863. [Does anyone know if Buford
>wrote that his main goal was to save the high ground south of Gettysburg,
>or in the preserving the strategic road net for Meade's army???.
I do not think that Buford wrote that his main goal was to save the high
ground. It is not in his Gettysburg report and he didn't live long enough
to engage in the glut of post war writing. He is given credit for doing it
in a secondary source. He was under orders from Pleasonton to "hold
Gettysburg at all costs until supports arrive" and it is believed that he
discussed the town's strategic significance with Reynolds on June 30. The
specific notion that Buford was defending in depth north and west of the
town in order to hold the strategically valuable hills south of the town
comes from an unpublished manuscript titled "John Buford at Gettysburg
Wednesday July 1st 1863" signed "Anchor" ("Anchor" was believed to have been
a member of Buford's staff). Arron Jerome, Buford's signal officer also
gives credit to Buford in an unpublished manuscript and wrote a letter to
Hancock bemoaning the fact that Buford had been "nearly disregarded"..
From: STEVEN CASSEL
Subject: RE: Buford Holds the Town.
Thanks for the reply. It clears up some uncertainty in my mind, plus your
post gives valuable food for research. Your post also further shows that
General Buford did a GOOD job the first day at Gettysburg..
Steve Cassel
From: semperfi@siu.edu (Patrick King)
Subject: Chambersburg gauntlet.
Enjoyed the postings on Buford. Captain R.K. Beecham of II Wisconsin
Blackhats talks about trying to get away during the move from the Seminary
Ridge battle. Does anyone know how reliable his book is...its good reading
from one
who was there? Book is "Gettysburg: The pivotal battle of the Civil War.".
and rest under the shade of the trees."
Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson
semperfi@siu.edu
Patrick King
From: benedict@ns.moran.com (Benedict R Maryniak)
Subject: fire on three sides.
Gettysburg, Penn
July 2 1863.
2nd Lieutenant Charles V Mesler, Co "I" 94th NYV - A 2nd Lt in the
105th NYV when it was consolidated with Root's regiment, Mesler was
promoted to 1st Lieutenant November 26, 1863. He was captured August 19 of
'64 at the Weldon Railroad but paroled by March of '65. He was mustered
into the 94th as a Captain on March 13 and was discharged with the 94th
during July of 1865. He was likely neither wounded or captured at
Gettysburg.
Pvt Edward Williams,Co D 94th NYV , age 27, was a Buffalo-born
painter who enlisted in the 94th on August 26 of '62 and mustered in as a
Private in Co E on the next day. He was wounded at Gettysburg but rejoined
the regiment later, receiving his discharge during June of 1865.
Pvt John Glaire Jr, Co D 94th NYV - A 19-year-old farmer born in
Aurora NY, Glaire joined the 94th on November 19 of 1862 at Amherst NY. He
was wounded during Gettysburg's first day and died of his wounds on July
3rd. Glaire is buried in the Gettysburg Natl Cemetery.
"Old Mike Donohue" - Pvt Michael Donohue, Co D 94th NYV , age 40, was
a laborer born in Ireland who had been enrolled at Persia NY on November 5,
1862, and mustered in the next day. The NYS Adj General's Report lists him
as having been killed in action at Gettysburg on July 1, 1863.
(b) Sgt Porter Crawford, Co "D" 94th NYV enrolled at Collins NY on October
29, 1862, for three years as a Sgt. A printer before he enlisted,
Pennsylvania-born Crawford was 28 years of age at Gettysburg. He was
returned to the ranks early in '64 but had regained his Sgt's stripes by
9/1/1864. He rose to First Srgt 2/15/1865. Mortally wounded in action at
Five Forks, he is named in the 94th's "Roll Of Honor."
"Srgt Donohue" - Cpl Michael Donohue, Co D, 94th NYV - 21-year-old
Rochester-born Buffalo clerk who enlisted at Buffalo on January 15, 1862,
and was mustered February 13. He rec'd his promotion to Corporal by
September 30 of that year. From reference in this letter, Donohue was
already an acting Sgt, but he was promoted to a First Sgt's rank during
September of '64. Records show no injury or capture at Gettysburg.
Cpl Myron M Ludlow, Co E 94th NYV was 18 and employed as a clerk
when he enlisted at Buffalo as a Private on August 8 of 1862; he was
promoted to Corporal September 30. Rising to Sgt during April of '64, he
was discharged in November to accept a commission with the 154th NYV. He
did not join the 154th, however, and rejoined the 94th. He was mustered in
as a 2nd Lieutenant on May 7, 1865, and was discharged with his company
during July of that year.
Pvt Albert Conover, Co D 94th NYV was later killed in action at
Hatcher's Run.
Pvt James K Chadderdon, Co D 94th NYV would eventually become a
srgt in January of '65.
Pvt Martin Flanigan, Co D 94th NYV was a 35-year-old farmer who had
been born in Ireland. Enrolled at Aurora NY by JF Ernst, he was mustered on
December 23 of 1862. Promoted to Corporal's rank as of June 4, 1865,
Flanigan was discharged with his company during July of that year.
(c) Cpl George C Bournes, Co D 94th NYV was a 22-year-old printer born in
England when he enlisted on January 1, 1863, at Wales NY. He evidently was
"alright" as this letter suggests, since his records show nothing for
Gettysburg. He was later captured at Weldon Railroad in 1864 but was back
with the 94th and promoted to First Srgt during June of '65.
From: jpike@mailcsi.alpinecsi.com
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 95 13:04:00 EST.
Subject: Re: Why didn't Sickles occupy LRT.
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Why didn't Sickles occupy LRT. "I had sent instructions in the morning to General Sickles, commanding the
3rd corps, commanded by General Hancock, and I had indicated to him, in
general terms, that his right was to rest upon General Hancock's left; and
his left was to extend to the Round Top mountain, plainly visible, if it was
practicable to occupy it. During the morning I sent a staff officer to
inquire of General Sickles whether he was in position. The reply was
returned to me that General Sickles said there was no position there. I
then sent back to him my general instructions which had been previously
given. A short time afterwards General Sickles came to my headquarters, and
I told him what my general views were and intimated that he was to occupy
the position that I understood General Hancock had put General Geary in the
night previous. General Sickles replied that General Geary had no position,
as far as he could understand..." [G. Meade, Testimony before the Joint
Commission on the Conduct of the War]
"Near this important ground was posted the valiant Third Corps, and its
commander, General Sickles, saw at once how necessary it was to occupy the
elevated ground in his front toward the Emmitsburg road, and to extend his
lines to the commanding eminence known as the Round Tops, or Sugar Loaf
hill. Unless this were done, the left and rear of our army would be in he
greatest danger. Sickles concluded that no time was to be lost, as he
observed, the enemy massing large bodies of troops on their right {our
left). Receiving no orders and filled with anxiety, he reported in person
to general Mead, and urged the advanced he deemed so essential. "O," said
Meade, "generals are all apt to look for the attack to be made where they
are."... .
Anyone who blames Sickles, alleging that he left his left flank in air,
forgets that it was Meade's proper business to see to the dispositions of
his own battlefield. Any general fit to be at the head of a great army
could not fail to recognize the importance of the Round tops.
From: Matt2917@aol.com
Subject: Sickles
Rowan College of NJ
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
Subject: Sickles
> I was glad to see a couple of postings on Sickles decision
>to move his third corps out to the Peach Orchard and Wheatfield.
>The ground that Sickles occupied had a strategic advantage...
Matt,