REYNOLDS A>R>R>I>V>E>S>>>>>>>>

Buford’s time in this battle was drawing to a close. He had set the stage for the largest armed conflict in North America, now it was up to others to determine if that battle would indeed be fought.

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It was the morning of July 1^st, 1863 at Gettysburg, Pa.

It was now the place and time of John Fulton Reynolds. Events were emerging from the wings, in this case the left wing of the AoP.

June 30^th, 1863 had been a busy, if quiet day for John Reynolds. The new AoP commander, George Gordon Meade, had placed Reynolds in command of the left wing of his army on that date. This command consisted of:

First Corp-Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday (Succeeding Reynolds, who assumed wing command).³

Third Corp-Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles ⁴

Eleventh Corp-Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard ⁵

Artillery Brigade-Maj. Thomas W. Osborn

First Calvary Division-Brig. Gen. John Buford

Reynolds took charge at a time when the new Commander (Meade) had asserted that he intended to "meet the enemy whenever and wherever he could find him." It was for this purpose that he gave Reynolds the newly minted left wing. ⁶

Meade had communicated to Reynolds that "a general engagement was imminent…..the issues involved immense."  ⁷

Given this charge, it is easy to conclude that Meade intended Reynolds to find Lee and bring his army to bear, the Pipe Creek Circular notwithstanding.

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If the war was in its third summer, John Reynolds was in his third summer of campaigning. In an athletic environment, he would be described as being on top of his game. Having recently turned down a promotion, he had become the go to guy of the AoP. There was a reason why Meade had Reynolds out on the Left Wing, and that reason was competence.

That faith would soon be validated. Reynolds was not long on the scene. As we shall see though, the decisions he made in the name of his commander during his brief presence shaped the coming conflict and laid the outline of eventual victory. Had he remained longer, it is very possible that the coming victory may have been even more decisive.

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Despite his early awakening, Reynolds felt no real pressure to move hastily. He told one of his subordinates that most likely they were just moving up to support Buford, who was "most likely" moving out forward. ⁸  Reynolds breakfasts and talks with some troops-just another day on the road. He clarifies orders to Sickles and Howard (Sickles on deployment at Emittsburg and Howard on deployment to Gettysburg) and takes the significant step of interfering in the order of march for the day. Bypassing Doubleday, who had just assumed command of I Corp from Reynolds, he gives direct orders to the commander of I Corp Ist Div. Commander, Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth to take his division in the lead. ⁹ This means that Cutler will arrive first with his Second Brigade to the relief of Buford, followed by Meredith’s Iron Brigade (First Brigade).¹⁰ Even at this early stage, before Buford’s engagement actually begins, the stage is being set for the actions at the railroad cut, Herbst Woods and the valiant stand of the 147^th NY.

The lead elements of I Corp get on the road at about 7:30 that morning, Cutler’s Brigade followed by Meredith’s. It was 6 miles to Gettysburg.¹¹   It was a well-spirited march, by accounts, with a certain leavening as weary and terrified civilians passed them going the other way. At this point, there was certainly no urgency or any indication of the desperate hours and days immediately ahead. On this march, there were even breaks to prevent the products of certain cherry orchards being liberated by the threatening rebels. The peaceful course of the march came to a halt about half way through it.

Some of Reynold’s staff had thought that Reynolds was unusually silent during the march. Right after the break, Reynolds decided to ride on ahead and met a hard-riding staff officer from Buford, bearing a the news that Buford was "sharply engaged." Reynolds acted on this immediately, sending word to Howard and Doubleday to move forward immediately to Gettysburg and to Wadsworth to bring up his Division smartly. A Sitrep was sent to Meade. ¹²  Reynolds staff estimated that this was about 10:00.  ¹³

Having done what he needed to do, Reynolds then proceeded into Gettysburg where he met with Buford.¹⁴   This meeting is important for several reasons. Reynolds got a good feel for the course of the battle and for the ground surrounding the town. While the decision to support Buford was almost automatic, the decision as to where to support Buford was not. During his inspection of the line with Buford, Reynolds simply exhorted the calvarymen to hold the line as long as they could while he hurried up the I Corp. There was no commitment though to support the defense where Buford had established it. Reynolds was reluctant to give up to the town to the Confederates, but he was even more keen on retaining control of the heights to the east and South of the town. His next message to Meade reflected this, as he cited the importance of these heights and stressed his concern that they be retained. Reynolds then promised to fight in retreat "inch by inch" and to barricade the street of Gettysburg if need be to retain them.¹⁵   Indeed, Reynolds ordered Howard and Sickles to come forward at once and for Howard to occupy the heights on Cemetery Hill as a reserve.¹⁶   He also spent a few minutes giving orders to the now nearby Wadsworth to come up and form in the area of the Seminary, which raises questions as to his ultimate intentions. ¹⁷

    Soon after that, the vanguard of Cutler’s column appeared, following the puffs of smoke visible to the west of town. Reynolds himself, with what appears to be the smoothness that comes with long practice, waited their approach at the Codori farm and personally pointed out the places he wanted the infantry deployed to.

    Hollywood could not have staged a more stirring relief. Both of Buford’s Brigades, commanded by Devin and gamble respectively, were hard pressed. Their "line" was in danger of becoming two isolated pockets, about to be engulfed by elements of Heths Brigades, commanded by Archer and Davis. Reynolds adroitly maneuvered the 76^th NY, 56^th PA and 147^th NY into line across West McPherson ridge and the RR Cut, facing Davis. He deployed the 95^th ny and the14^th Brooklyn (84^th NY) in a line to the left, from the RR Cut across the Chambersburg road, facing Archer. When Meredith came up a little later, they were directed in a line to Cutler’s left, but running at an angle down west McPherson Ridge, towards the Southwest. They faced Archer. Reynolds also deployed a battery commanded by Captain Hall to set up in a fairly exposed position on the same ridge. ^{18  19}

    The 76^th NY and the 56 PA got shot up pretty good, and effectively were routed. At least they withdrew a real long ways before they were located and returned. Somehow, in the middle of all this, the 147^th NY gets forgotten and never receives the order to withdraw. More confusion in Cutler’s unit. Wadsworth notices that he has a unit out there being shot up and sends a staffer out to order them to withdraw, which the staffer does so quite bravely, at great personal risk. The 147^th leaves, but not without great dispute involving some of the closest fighting of the battle.²⁰   It was about this time that hall withdraws, and if not for the 147^th, the entire battery would probably have been lost. ²¹

Cutler has had some problems by this point, but the opposing Confederates are even harder pressed. They are heavily engaged for several hours with no relief and have suffered severe losses, especially among the officers. Sooooo, they get down into the RR cut for a flanking maneuver. The 95^th ny and the14^th Brooklyn (84^th NY) (aided by the 6^th WI of the Iron Brigade) plunge across the Chambersburg Road and assault them, pretty much eliminating them from the order of battle.

Meanwhile, Reynolds has discovered that Archer and his men are lurking in the Herbst Woods. He grabs the Iron Brigade on the way by his position and deploys them as previously noted. While so doing, he is killed, effectively ending his participation in the battle. ²²

Except for the capture of Archer (close to the old springs hotel), that’s about all that happened in the morning. The Iron Brigade sweeps down from West McPherson Avenue towards Willoughby run and there he is, hanging out twisting in the wind. He’s rounded up and hustled back to the Union rear to renew some old acquaintances.

This pretty winds up the action for the morning, and an interlude occurs. Lines are straightened and everybody waits. The rest of I Corp shows up and is ably, if not adroitly, deployed by Doubleday, who assumed command upon the death of Reynolds.

The waiting begins.²³

The next takes place on Oak hill, and that is a story for the next narrator. There are several points that I think are important to make here though.

• Meade outgeneraled Lee the minute that he created a left Wing and deployed Reynolds as it’s commander. Meade grasped the situation and reacted accordingly. Meade had a plan, Lee did not. (But then. Lee was Meade’s objective, Lee’s objective remains a matter of conjecture.
• Meade’s philosophy was imbued in the AoP, as first Buford and then Reynolds, acting independently of Meade, acted in line with his concept of the battle.
• Despite the smoke of the Pipe Creek Circular and the Council of War held later that night, Meade was looking for a fight with Lee, and was out looking for it.
• Meade proved that you can divide your force in the face of the enemy and make it work.
• The AoP had achieved a level of professionalism that exceeded the ANV at that point in the war.
• Stuart was like Halsey. The war had just passed him by. The world wondered.
• Reynolds decisions set the stage that Buford had built. Other men would act out the scenes, but Reynolds, acting independently, after having eschewed independent command, made the decision that caused the battle, and determined it’s shape.
• There are a couple of other things to examine here. Doubleday seems to be an example of the Peter Principle validated. He simply did not have the moxie to command an independent (in effect) army. Remember Reynold’s promise to fight through the streets? I doubt that Reynolds would be caught short later by7 Ewell, especially with the intelligence he was getting.
• No commentary on Gettysburg would be complete without talking about Sickles. Sickles was under Reynold’s command and managed to divide his forces in the rear.
• If Sickles would have "found" the "lost" order and marched when he was told to, would there have been a different battle later that afternoon, or would Lee or Ewell simply folded.

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1. The times used by various parties in this article vary widely. For purposes of this description, I use the timelines found in Appendix IV of   Gettysburg July 1 (Green Jacket) by David G. Martin. Martin has Buford deploying his forces at 8:00 in the face of Heth’s advance. Heth stops his skirmishers at 9:00 to form his line and resumes his attack at 9:30.  Reynolds arrives at 10:00 and is killed at 10:30, though may have happened as late as 11:15. All times you see on dispatches such as this one by Buford are approximate, as are the ones Martin uses. Don’t let it confuse you. What happened is the important thing, when is secondary, though the subject of endless and enjoyable debate. q.v.

2. Contrast this with the behavior of J.E.B Stuart, who simply didn’t get it. He could inspire troops, but had no idea as to where to lead them, at least in this battle.

3. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command : “Official Rosters”

4. Sickles is a whole nuther book. He managed to misinterpret, not receive orders, procrastinate and split his command to the point that he could be accused of “fightin ‘em where they ain’t. Later developments indicate that he might have been saving it up for his main efforts of the next day. Or maybe he only accepted orders from Boss Tweed. In any event, he is not a player in this segment, except as otherwise noted. It is interesting to note that although Sickles was part of Reynolds’s command, he managed to remove himself so thoroughly from the 1st days actions that Martin completely ignores him in the order of battle of that day.

5.  Howard is a player in this segment, but not deeply involved.

6.   “Where Reynolds fell”, J.G. Rosengarten, aide-de-camp on the staff of Gen. Reynolds; GDG archives.

7. “Howard and Eleventh Corps Leadership”; A. Wilson Greene. from The First Day at Gettysburg,  Edited by Gary Gallagher.

8. Conversation with Col. Wainwright, 1st Corp artillery commander, Martin, pp. 92.

9.  This decision almost has unpleasant unintended consequences. Doubleday had already received orders from Reynolds to prepare his forces for march. Reynolds subsequent change in the order of march delays the march of the rest of I Corp by up to an hour. Fortunately, Doubleday was able to close this gap up to 15 minutes by the time I Corp was actually able to arrive at Gettysburg. Martin. Chapter IV. “Reynolds To The Rescue.”

10. Ibid. pp92-93
 

11.  Cutler’s Brigade marched in the following order:
76th NY
56th PA
147th NY
95th NY
14th Brooklyn (84th NY)
Meredith’s Brigade marched thusly:
2nd WI
7th WI
19th IN
24th MI
6th WI
Ibid. pp93-94

12.   According to Martin, Reynolds probably sent Buford a message also. In any event, Buford sends Meade a massage at 10:00 that Reynolds is advancing. PP 95-96. Note the time discrepancies. Martin.

13.   It is important to put this into perspective. This is part of a series of decisions that Reynolds made that day. He didn’t have a chance to make all that many, but those that he made were decisive. This series of messages comprise a melange of Command, Control, Communication and intelligence. Every one of these things is items are represented in this repertoire. Today, these things are considered the core of battlefield command. Reynolds didn’t learn this from any student of Mahan. He just understood them. That he did is remarkable and speaks volumes of his capabilities. He understood his place in the command structure and acted appropriately to make sure that Superiors were informed and subordinates were apprised and directed. Contrast this to some of the more notorious personalities that surfaced (or sank) in this battle. Reynolds was a man of remarkable military talent.

14.  That Reynolds met with Buford is indisputable. Where they met is up in the air. The standard theory, based
mostly on  a report by Lt. Jerome of Buford’s signal staff, is that they met at the Seminary and went up in the
Cupola together and surveyed the field. Several  historians suggest that this meeting actually took place
Elsewhere, Esteemed GDG member Eric Wittenberg has found heretofore unpublished evidence that the
meeting actually took place in the Blue Eagle hotel in the town itself. Whatever the location, this meeting led to
Reynold’s decision to fight the battle at Gettysburg. q.v.

15. Meade’s response to this message is more telling. “Good, that is just like Reynolds, he will hold on to the bitter end!” Later events in the town would make these series of comments ironic indeed.

16.  Howard said he never got the orders but decided to occupy Cemetery Hill all by himself. Sickles just said he never got the orders. Reynolds, of course, was dead and wasn’t in any position to argue. Based on his claim, Howard was voted the thanks of Congress in 1864 for picking Cemetery Hill all by himself. Good man, Howard. Sickles got his reward on the second day.

17.  My own guess is that Reynolds was hedging his bets. He was going to use I Corp to relieve Buford and Sickles as a swing force, depending on how the battle went. I suspect that he had ideas about gobbling up a good portion of Hill’s force, if the battle went well. Consider that if Sickles were deployed along the Fairfield Road, Hill would have faced a Cannae, and Ewell would have been a rescue Mission.
 

18.  This later caused some ill feeling between Wadsworth and Hall. When the infantry was withdrawn later, Hall was left alone and exposed. His battery was shot up pretty badly and he barely withdrew the remnants. He encountered Wadsworth a few minutes into this route and strong words were exchanged. Wadsworth, who by then was worried about his entire command and not a single battery, gave short shrift to the fired up Hall. Later, when they had time to discuss it, Wadsworth told Hill that, since Reynolds had placed him, Wadsworth thought Reynolds was taking care of Hall. Poor Reynolds. After his death, he became everyone’s story.  Come to think of it, the army is still that way. It’s always the last guys fault.
 

19.  As the I Corp units were placed, the Calvary withdrew through them, in much the same manner that they do today. Their job was not ended though. They were used as a line of vedettes that monitored the progress of Ewell’s units towards the battle.

20. The 147th always felt slighted after the war. They knew what they had been through, but were always thrown in with the route of the 56th PA and the 76th NY. They wanted a monument over on the North of the RR Cut, but were forced to put their monument on the South side of the Chambersburg Road.

21.  Martin considers this some of the most impressive fighting of the battle. I doubt if the guys in the 1st MN would have agreed. But the hardest fighting is always the fight you are in.
 

22.  There are different theories as to the cause of Reynolds death. There are as many different claims to being the cause of Reynold’s death. My own personal theory is that he his death was caused by the interjection of metallically induced kinetic energy into intermandibular/scapular area. Or, as in the words of his great nth degree grandson, Gene Reynolds (also of Ohio), “We don’t think they ever did figure it out. We think he was shot in the neck.”  As far as I’m concerned, this is like focusing an optical instrument. If you over focus or under focus, things just get fuzzy. I accept Mr. Reynolds description. It’s focused. q.v.m.f.

23.  There is one especially sorrowful little episode during this brief interlude. I’ve heard this story before, in several places, on several battlefields. It is possible that this is the actual story. One of the Confederate balls is still rolling down in the hollow between East and west McPherson Ridge. A soldier, not realizing how much energy even a slow cannon balls contains, playfully sticks his foot out as to stop it, and promptly finds that his foot has been taken off. This is one of those great urban legend kind of stories; still, I have heard a LBG (not Wayne) refer to this area of the field as the bowling alley. I don’t know if there was a connection, there might be. Might be because this area is where one would suspect cannoneers would like to bounce balls through.