by
Jim Cameron
Army of Northern Virginia
Army of the Potomac
The two armies which marched up from Virginia,
into Pennsylvania in the
summer of 1863 were perhaps the most dangerous on the planet. Two
years of
grim war, encompassing some of the most closely fought battles in
the history
of land warfare, had left them experienced, well trained, and battle
tested.
Inept leaders had been winnowed out, the weak had died or gone home.
The
war-weariness of the later years had yet to set in. They were still
in large
part volunteer forces, the ranks not yet filled with unwilling conscripts
or
paid substitutes, and morale was generally high. Officers and men
alike were
well versed in the art of war as practiced on the mid-19th century
battlefield.
Civil War armies of both the Union and Confederacy
were organized in much the
same way, reflecting the common military heritage
of both sections.
An army was composed of three main combat arms; infantry, artillery,
and
cavalry. It would have additional elements, including engineers,
signal
corps, and ordnance, plus the obligatory commissary and supply services,
but
the fighting power of the army was concentrated in the three main
combat arms.
Of these, the infantry formed the bulk of the
army. The artillery supported
the infantry, and, to a lesser extent, cavalry, which in turn performed
the
scouting and screening functions so vital to successful operations.
The basic building-block of the army was the Regiment.
An infantry regiment
Regiments usually mustered into service at or near full strength,
but then
Regiments were grouped into brigades. In theory, a brigade had two
regiments
Brigades were in turn organized into Divisions. Typically, a division
would
Divisions were grouped into the largest formation within an army,
the Corps,
Two or more Corps, with attached supporting elements, formed an army.
At Gettysburg, The Army of the Potomac had seven infantry corps,
the Army of
The cavalry of both sides was organized in a generally similar manner
on the
While the regiment formed the basic unit of the infantry and cavalry,
the
At Gettysburg, the artillery of the Army of the Potomac employed
a brigade
In the Army of Northern Virginia, batteries were similarly grouped,
although
Weapons:
An understanding of the types and characteristics of the weapons
used by the
The weapons used at Gettysburg can be broken down into three main
categories.
Small Arms:
Musket: A full length infantry shoulder arm. Barrel length typically
about
Rifle: Shorter than a musket, with a 33 inch barrel. Usually two
rather
Rifle Musket: A full length, three band infantry shoulder arm. Combines
the
Carbine: A short, usually breech loading, rifled shoulder arm designed
for
Infantry Weapons:
The muskets carried by the infantry in the first half of the 19th
century
Rifles were well known, but were considered specialists weapons.
The main
This began to change during the mid-1850's with the invention of
the
Production of the new rifled arms was initially very limited, hardly
more
By mid-1863, domestic arms production had expanded tremendously,
particularly
The two armies at Gettysburg were very evenly matched in terms of
small arms,
The primary infantry weapons used at Gettysburg were the Springfield
Model
Other rifled arms were present in varying numbers. Both sides used
large
A number of troops carried .69 Rifled Muskets, mostly Model 1842
smoothbore
The effective range of these rifle muskets against an individual,
man-sized
It should be noted that most of the rifled arms used at Gettysburg
were the
While rifled arms were in the majority, a significant number of troops
on
A few very infantrymen, almost all in the Army of the Potomac, carried
breech
In addition to the above, issue weapons, a very small number of privately
Cavalry Carbines:
The armament of the cavalry at Gettysburg was considerably different
from
Foremost among these was the Sharps carbine. By 1861 this had gone
through
These carbines varied considerably in design, but were all single
shot,
At Gettysburg, most of the Union Cavalry had Sharps carbines. Other
types
Present as well, although in limited numbers, was a harbinger of
the future,
The situation in the Confederate cavalry was much different. Equally
mindful
As a result, Confederate cavalry, even as late in the war as Gettysburg,
Pistols:
All cavalrymen on both sides, officers and men alike, carried pistols,
As an aside, the terms "Army" and "Navy" had nothing to do with which
service
Confederate use of pistols was similar. Captured pistols could be
used far
Officers on both sides, regardless of branch of service, routinely
carried
Edged Weapons:
Most if not all cavalrymen carried a saber in addition to their carbine
and
All officers carried swords. As with pistols, these were both weapon
and
Bayonets comprise the last class of edged weapons. Most of the ones
used at
A smaller number of weapons, those being some older model rifles,
took what
Artillery Weapons:
The Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia brought
to
The artillery of the two armies may be broadly divided into two types,
The smoothbore was typified by the 12 pounder "Napoleon" gun-howitzer.
The
Rifles were of two basic types, the 10 Pounder Parrott and the 3"
Ordnance
Perhaps more important than the types of guns themselves, in determining
The oldest and simplest was the solid shot. Despite the wide variety
of
All artillery pieces fired explosive projectiles. These came in two
basic
Regardless of fusing, shells depended more on fragmentation than
blast effect
Case Shot, the other explosive projectile, was an attempt to increase
The last, and most deadly, artillery round was Canister. Canister
was simply
The Napoleon was more effective firing canister than the rifles were.
This
Also present with the Army of Northern Virginia at Gettysburg were
two breech
All artillery firing was on a direct, line of sight basis. The guns
had only
All things considered, the most useful and all around deadly artillery
piece
Tactics:
The first installments of this part of the overview have covered
the
One thing that was just as important in 1863 as it is today was firepower.
In
During the Civil War, troops armed with muzzle loaders were able
to fire no
The characteristic shoulder to shoulder lines of battle associated
with Civil
The greatest problem with these dense formations was simply that
of
Forming line of battle was time consuming, and would generally only
be done
There is a tendency, because of the very term "Line of battle" to
picture a
Artillery would be interspersed among the lines infantry units. The
exact
When no actual attack was in progress, the artillery would attempt
to prevent
Once battle was joined, particularly an action between maneuvering
Tactics, continued:
Infantry arriving on the field did not simply takes its place in
the line of
Not often realized is that except when an attack was actually in
progress,
While it may seem an odd statement, the line of battle was, in a
way, very
It has often been written that the rifle musket allowed enemy formations
to
The under 200 yards ranges of most engagements explains why, in many
I have refrained thus far from discussing Cavalry tactics, for the
reason
Cavalry generally avoided direct engagements with unbroken infantry.
When it
was typically composed of 10 companies, each with a paper strength
of about
100 officers and men. With staff and senior
officers, a full strength
structure. Regular Army regiments in the
Union army had a somewhat different
structure than Volunteer units, Cavalry regiments had a different
organization from infantry, and there were some nonstandard units
such as
battalions here and there, but for the purpose of this seminar it
is
sufficient to know that the regiment was the basic unit of each
army, and the
one the common soldier most identified with. Ask a Civil War veteran
what
unit he had served in, and he almost certainly say "40th New York,"
"5th
Texas," or whatever regiment he had been in. (By way of comparison,
ask the
same question to a World War Two veteran, and he'll probably say
"29th
Infantry Division" or "8th Air Force.")
began immediately to loose men to disability, disease, desertion,
and once
they got into action, casualties. By the time of Gettysburg the
typical
regiment was down to well below half strength, anywhere from 250
to 350 men.
In the Union army the situation was worsened by the pernicious habit
of
allowing veteran units to dwindle, with new regiments continually
being
formed rather than existing ones being kept up to strength. The
Confederacy
was better about making sure existing units received at least some
replacements. Confederate regiments thus tended to be somewhat larger
than
Union ones, but few regiments at Gettysburg, on either side, fought
at
anything near full strength. As a rough approximation, consider
an infantry
regiment at Gettysburg as having about 350 men, maybe a bit less
if Union, a
few more if Confederate.
and consisted of 2,000 men. In practice, the reduced size of the
typical
regiment meant that several had to be put together to keep brigades
at a
reasonable size. At Gettysburg, a typical brigade would have 4 or
5
regiments. A good rule of thumb is to figure a brigade at about
1,500 men.
As with regiments, a Confederate brigade might tend to run somewhat
larger
than a Union one.
If the regiment was the basic organizational unit of the army, the
brigade
was in many ways the basic combat unit. Regiments would almost always
go
into action as part of a brigade formation, and commanders would
look to the
number of brigades they had available, not the number of regiments.
have three brigades. Some, however, only had two, while others,
particularly
on the Confederate side, might have as many as four, or even five.
Here the
disparity in unit size really tended to favor the Confederates.
A large
Confederate division might well approach the size of a small Union
corps.
Again as a rule of thumb, a typical three brigade division would
have roughly
5,000 men.
which almost always had three. Here again, a Confederate corps tended
to be
larger than its Union counterpart.
Confederate armies tended to be named after the geographic area
in which they
operated, such as The Army of Northern Virginia. Union armies tended
to be
named after important local rivers, which is why we have the Army
of the
Potomac.
Northern Virginia, three. As an example of the disparity in formation
size,
though, the Army of the Potomac's 11th Corps had a total of only
6 infantry
brigades in its three divisions.
Rodes' division of Ewell's corps of the
Army of Northern
Virginia, which it fought on the first day of the battle,
had five infantry
brigades.
regimental, brigade and division levels. In the case of the Army
of the
Potomac at Gettysburg, the cavalry was further organized into a
Corps
structure similar to that of the seven infantry corps. While in
the case of
Stuart's command the Confederate cavalry was formed into a division,
other
Confederate cavalry brigades operated on an independent basis during
the
campaign.
battery was the basic organization of the artillery. Many artillery
batteries were, in fact, part of artillery regiments, the batteries
being in
effect the regiment's companies. These regiments were, however,
administrative units only and did not serve as field formations
in the way
infantry and cavalry regiments did. Early in the war batteries tended
to be
attached to specific infantry brigades. This made it difficult or
impossible
to concentrate the power of the artillery effectively, and by the
time of
Gettysburg both sides had adopted broadly similar structures which
grouped
individual batteries into battalions or brigades.
A typical Union battery had six guns, generally all of the same
type and
caliber. Confederate batteries tended to be smaller, often only
four guns,
which were in turn likely to be of different types.
structure, with each brigade having an average of five batteries.
One
brigade was assigned to each Corps. Each of these corps artillery
brigades
contained at least one Regular battery, to serve as an example to
the
Volunteer units. This was a very effective measure, and by 1863
the Union
artillery, Regular and Volunteer batteries alike, functioned at
a high degree
of professionalism.
Five additional brigades, one composed entirely of Regular batteries,
the
other four of Volunteer organizations, formed the Artillery Reserve.
These
brigades supported the Corps batteries in the line of battle as
needed.
the resulting formations were designated battalions instead of brigades.
While in the Army of the Potomac each corps had an artillery brigade
attached, in the Army of Northern Virginia each division had an
attached
artillery battalion. And while there was no army wide artillery
reserve, as
in the Army of the Potomac, each Confederate Crops had its own reserve
artillery of two battalions. While the Confederate artillery battalions
and
Union artillery brigades each had about the same number of batteries,
the
Union formations were more effective due to the larger number of
guns per
battery, more uniform equipment, and better quality ammunition.
two armies at Gettysburg is essential for an understanding of why
the battle
was fought the way it was. The nature of the weaponry directly influenced
the virtually every aspect of the fighting. It does not go to far
to say
that if one does not understand how it weapons worked, it is almost
impossible to fully understand how the battle worked.
Small arms, which covers all hand carried firearms, including muskets,
rifles, cavalry carbines and handguns. Artillery, which at Gettysburg
includes the various field pieces in use by the two sides. And lastly,
edged
weapons, in which is included both swords and bayonets.
Just as the infantry was the largest component of each army, small
arms
formed the bulk of the weapons used at Gettysburg. Before getting
into the
specifics of the weapons used in the battle, it is useful to know
a bit about
the evolution of military small arms prior to 1863.
First, a few brief definitions:
42 inches, with three retaining bands securing it to the stock.
Smooth
bored, caliber usually .69. Fired either a single round ball, or
"buck &
ball," which was one full-sized ball plus three buckshot pellets.
than three barrel bands. Rifled bore. Caliber usually smaller than
a
musket, typically .54, sometimes .58.
length of barrel of the traditional musket with the rifled bore
of a rifle.
Barrel typically about 40 inches, caliber usually somewhat smaller
than a
smoothbore musket, .58 being typical. Modern collectors sometimes
make a
distinction between Rifle Muskets, those being arms originally made
with
rifled bores, and Rifled Muskets, those arms originally made as
smoothbores
but later rifled. I personally regard this as a somewhat artificial
distinction, and tend to used both terms interchangeably.
use by cavalry. Assorted calibers, .52 being about average.
differed little from those used in the Revolutionary War. These
were
smoothbore, flintlock arms firing a cal. .69 round ball. Accuracy
against
man-sized targets was uncertain at any range, and all but nonexistent
at
anything more than about 50 yards. They were designed for use by
soldiers in
shoulder to shoulder, double rank lines of battle against a similarly
deployed enemy. When so used, volley fire against enemy formations
could be
effective at 100 to 150 yards. The 1840's saw a change from flintlock
to
percussion cap ignition, but aside from increasing reliability somewhat
this
did not, in and of itself, increase the accuracy or effectiveness
of these
weapons.
reason for this was that rifles loaded too slowly to be used by
troops on the
line of battle. A smoothbore musket used a relatively loose-fitting
round
ball, easy to ram home rapidly. A rifle ball had to be a tight fit,
to take
the grooves in the barrel. This made it much slower to load than
a musket.
As a result, use of rifles was limited to troops specially trained
and
employed as skirmishers. The slowness of loading was less of a handicap
to
them, since they could take advantage of cover and concealment and
pick their
shots. The troops on the battle line needed the rapidly loaded smoothbore
to
generate the volume of fire needed to break up enemy formations.
Accuracy
was of secondary importance to rate of fire.
expanding bullet, better know as the "minie ball." Actually the
product of
several different inventors, the minie ball had a hollow base which
expanded
on firing. This allowed a rifled arm to be loaded with a loose fitting
projectile, in the manner of a smoothbore, yet still achieve rifle
accuracy
as the expanding base gripped the rifling. Troops on the battle
line could
now be armed with rifled arms with long range accuracy greatly in
excess of
that possible with smoothbores. The United States adopted rifled
arms for
general issue in 1855. The US initially produced both a Rifle and
Rifle
Musket version of the Model 1855, but by the time of the Civil War
it was
realized that there was no particular advantage to making both,
and the Rifle
Musket replaced both the Rifle and the older smoothbores.
than enough to arm the small Regular Army. When the Civil War broke
out, the
rapidly expanding armies on both sides quickly used up the few rifled
arms
available. Fortunately, the arsenals on both sides contained large
numbers
of the older smoothbores. These were promptly issued the newly raised
regiments, while both sides scrambled to increase domestic production.
At
the same time, buyers were dispatched to Europe to purchase foreign
weapons.
in the North, and vast numbers of weapons had been imported from
Europe.
Still, while the majority of the infantry was armed with rifled
arms, so
great were the demands of war that many troops retained the older
smoothbores.
particularly in the infantry.
1861 rifle musket, the somewhat simplified for war production version
of the
Model 1855, and its English counterpart, the Enfield Pattern 1853
rifle
musket. These were both single shot, muzzle loading rifled arms.
Calibers
were close enough, .58 for the Model 1861, .577 for the Enfield,
that they
could both use the same ammunition. The Springfield (so called,
as many were
made by contractors) had a 40 inch barrel, the Enfield (again so
called, most
being made by contractors, not at Enfield) was a bit shorter at
39 inches.
There is a tendency to thing of the Springfield as the Union gun,
and the
Enfield as the Confederate one, but the North imported more Enfields
than the
South did, while the South in turn used large numbers of captured
Springfields. Both types were in wide use by both armies at Gettysburg.
numbers of the Austrian Lorenz rifle musket. This .54 weapon has,
over the
years, come in for a good deal of criticism as being defective and
poorly
made. Some of the first ones imported, early in the war, had indeed
been
beaten up in the Austrian service, and this may have left a poor
first
impression, but by 1863 most of the ones coming in were newly made
contract
pieces. While not as smoothly finished as the Springfield, or the
better
quality Enfields (which themselves tended to vary in quality), they
were
soundly made, serviceable arms, and appear to have been well liked
by the
troops.
muskets upgraded by rifling the bore and adding a rear sight. While
heavier
than the '61 Springfield or the Enfield, they were for all practical
purposes
equally effective as rifled arms.
target was about 250 yards. They were sighted for longer ranges,
500 in the
case of the Springfield, 800 for the Enfield, and some skilled shots
might
better that figure, but troops rarely opened fire at ranges in excess
of 250
yards.
musket length Rifle Muskets. Very few of the shorter rifles were
by this
time in use by the Army of the Potomac. The Army of Northern Virginia
probably had somewhat more, since they couldn't be a picky as the
North about
what they used, but there was a definite preference for the longer
rifle
musket. The reason is that rifle length arms were not well suited
to use by
troops in line of battle. The shorter, 33 inch barrel made it hard
for the
men in the rear rank to get the muzzles of their pieces out past
the heads of
the men in front. At the same time, the longer rifle musket was
just as
accurate as the rifle, and the extra length proved no practical
disadvantage
on the skirmish line. As a result, Northern infantry weapons production
concentrated almost entirely on rifle muskets. The South did continue
rifle
production to some extent, in some cases using captured machinery
and gauges.
both sides still carried smoothbores. In the Army of the Potomac,
10% of the
infantry regimens at Gettysburg were armed in whole or in part with
smoothbores. The figure for the Army of Northern Virginia is harder
to
establish, but appears to have been higher. As will be discussed
later,
while this would seem to have placed these men at an extreme disadvantage,
this was not necessarily the case, and troops armed with smoothbores
could
and did fight very effectively even against rifle-armed opponents.
loaders. Most of these were the Sharps Rifle, the new Model 1859,
a .52
single shot weapon. Of these, most were members of the two United
States
Sharpshooters regiments, although a few were found in other regiments.
The
Bucktails had some, as did the 1st MN. A very small number of Merrill
rifles, also breechloaders were also used. Most infantrymen considered
themselves fortunate to have a Springfield or Enfield.
While the Sharps rifles present were effectively employed, particularly
by
the Sharpshooters, their overall impact on the battle was minimal.
owned civilian target rifles were employed by some sharpshooters.
These were
usually heavy barreled weapons, often with scopes, used for long
range
sniping. While some good shooting was doubtless done with them,
their
numbers were too limited to have more than a negligible impact on
events.
that of the infantry. Likewise, the weaponry used by the cavalry
of the two
armies differed much more than that of the two infantry of the two
forces.
While infantry could and did make do with muzzle loaders, breech
loaders were
clearly the better weapon for cavalry. The Federal Ordnance Department,
very
reluctant to consider infantry breechloaders, was by comparison
far more open
to consideration of such weapons for the cavalry. By the time of
the Civil
War, a number of designs were competing for adoption.
several modifications, and was a relatively mature design. The Ordnance
Department bought all it could get. (One of the main, and in my
opinion very
valid, objections to buying Sharps rifles for Berdan's Sharpshooters
was that
doing so disrupted very critical carbine production for several
months.)
Sharps production was limited, so numerous other designs were also
accepted.
Some, such as the Burnside, were quite good, others ran the gamut
from
acceptable to mediocre.
breech loading weapons, externally primed, with short barrels. Calibers
ranged from .50 to .54, and most used their own unique ammunition.
All were
patented designs, manufacturer by private concerns. None were made
by the
government itself.
While most of these carbines had long range rear sights, adjustable
for
anything from 500 to in some cases an optimistic 800 yards, their
effective
range against a single, man-sized target was realistically only
about 150
yards or so. While they had a greater rate of fire than a muzzle
loader,
they lacked the range and stopping power of the Rifle Musket.
present in varying numbers included the Burnside, Smith, Merrill,
and
Gallagher. While the Sharps was the best, and the Burnside probably
a close
second, there was little to chose between the various types in terms
of
tactical effectiveness.
the Spencer Rifle. This seven shot repeater fired a .56 caliber,
self
contained, rimfire cartridge. Contrary to popular opinion, no Spencer
carbines were used at Gettysburg, and certainly not by Buford's
cavalry on
the first day, for the simple reason that none had been made yet.
Two of
Custer's Michigan cavalry regiments used Spencer Rifles on the second
and third
days of the battle. While they turned in a good performance, as
is often the
case with specialized weapons used in limited numbers, they had
little more
than localized impact on the fighting.
of the advantage of breechloaders, the Confederacy had a much harder
time
placing them in the hands of its cavalry. The Union carbines were
all
private, patented designs, and no southern arms factory had experience
making
them. Aside from a rather crude copy of the Sharps, the South was
at a loss
to produce breech loading carbines domestically. Carbines were obtained
by
capture, but apart from the Sharps, which could be loaded with any
.54 rifle
ammunition, the unique cartridges most other types uses rendered
the guns
useless as soon as whatever ammunition was captured with them was
used up.
often had to make due with muzzle loading infantry weapons. Carbine
and
rifle length versions of the Enfield rifle musket were sometimes
imported and
issued. These rendered good service, especially in the dismounted
fighting
so common during the Civil War. In fact, rifle armed dismounted
cavalry
could be a serious problem for Union troops armed with less accurate,
shorter
ranged carbines. Older rifles, such as the 1841 "Mississippi," were
sometimes carried, as were older musketoons. (A musketoon was essentially
a
very short, carbine length version of the smoothbore musket. Obsolete
by
1861, many were pressed into service when the war broke out.) Some
men
carried civilian shotguns, effective at close range but hardly the
thing for
any sort of long range firefight.
specifically, revolvers.
In the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg, the most common pistol
was the Colt
Model 1860 New Model Army revolver. This was .44 caliber, six shot
weapon,
powerful and accurate at normal pistol ranges. Some men had the
.36 Navy
version of the Colt, while others had either .36 or .44 Remington
revolvers.
The .44's were better man-stoppers, but the .36's were also adequate
and
quite popular.
used which caliber. Or, with whether sailors were easier to kill
than
soldiers. When Colt first came out with .44's, the cylinders of
the
revolvers had a land battle scene engraved on them. The .36 revolvers
had a
naval battle scene. People began to call the .44 the "Army" and
the .36 the
"Navy" revolver. The terms became generic, to the point that any
.44 was the
considered an "Army" revolver, and any .36 a "Navy."
more readily than carbines, and there was also a fair amount of
domestic
manufacture.
pistols both for self defense and as a badge of rank. These were
usually
privately purchased, and while the most common types mirrored the
issue
weapons discussed above, almost any design might be found in use.
Many
officers, particularly in the North, favored the lighter Colt pocket
or
police revolvers. Navy Colts were very popular as a good balance
between
weight and stopping power.
revolver. Various designs were in use, but are typified by the Union's
Model
1860 Light Cavalry Saber. This had a curved blade designed for both
cutting
and thrusting. Despite the advances in firearms technology, and
the common
resort to dismounted fighting, hand to hand melees with sabers still
took
place, and the saber remained a vital weapon.
badge of office. Models varied with rank, there being different
designs for
foot officers, staff and field officers, generals, and even surgeons
and
chaplains. There were even simpler swords for noncommissioned officers
and
musicians. Most of these were rarely used to draw blood, but there
are some
instances at Gettysburg of officers using their swords in close
combat.
Gettysburg were angular socket bayonets. These were simple devices
what
slipped over the muzzles of muskets and rifle muskets. The blades
were
offset about 2 inches to clear the muzzle, then made a right angle
and
continued out 18 inches to a point. They had no cutting edges, but
were
purely thrusting weapons.
were called sword, or saber bayonets. These were heavy, brass handled
weapons with long, curved sword blades. They were not popular, badly
unbalancing the rifles when fixed and making aiming and shooting
very
difficult. The men used to joke that they were called sword bayonets
because
they were equally useless as either swords or bayonets. They were
essentially obsolete, but a number were still in use at Gettysburg.
Gettysburg a substantially identical set of artillery. The basic
organization of the artillery was similar in each army, with individual
batteries grouped into battalions or brigades, which were in turn
attached to
either division or corps formations, or in the case of the Union
army, formed
into an Artillery Reserve. The Confederate army actually had more
batteries,
but the larger number of guns in a Union battery gave the Army of
the Potomac
the advantage in the overall number of guns. The Army of the Potomac
also
benefited from its batteries having uniform equipment, and from
generally
better quality ammunition, in particular, more reliable fuses.
smoothbore guns, and rifles. Smoothbores comprised something over
40% of the
pieces in each army, rifles, the rest.
12 pounder part of the designation referred to the weight of a solid
round
shot fired from the piece, "gun-howitzer" to the effect that it
had an
intermediate length barrel, longer than a howitzer but shorter than
a gun.
(Artillery pieces are broadly characterized by length of barrel,
from
shortest to longest howitzers, gun-howitzers, and guns. As a rule,
the
longer the barrel, the higher the velocity and greater the range.)
They had
a maximum range of about 1,860 yards, and, of more practical importance,
an
effective range of about 1,200 yards. The Army of Northern Virginia
did also
have a number of the shorter howitzers with it.
Rifle. Both were of nominal 3" bore size, and fired a roughly 10
pound shell
to an effective range of about a mile.
Both armies also had a smaller number of 20 pound Parrotts, somewhat
heavier
versions of the 10 pounder firing, as the name implies, a 20 pound
shell.
Range and accuracy were similar to the lighter piece.
Guns heavier than 20 pounds were too heavy to keep up with the armies
on
campaign, and were left behind.
effectiveness, was the ammunition they fired.
explosive ammunition available, solid shot remained an important
projectile.
At Gettysburg, it's use was confined mainly to the 12 pounder Napoleon.
It
was considered effective when fired at troops concealed in woodlots,
and
could be devastatingly effective when used against massed formations.
A shot
down the length of a line of infantry could be horrifyingly effective.
Solid
shot was also effective in counter battery fire, where a direct
hit on a gun
carriage could dismount an enemy piece. It could also be deadly
to the
horses, which unlike the men, couldn't take cover. Solid shot was
used in
substantial amounts by both sides at Gettysburg.
types, Shell, and Case Shot, sometimes known as Shrapnel.
Shell was simply a round shot, or in the case of a rifle, elongated
projectile, which was hollowed out and the cavity filled with gunpowder.
In
the case of the smoothbore Napoleons, shell was normally set off
by a time
fuse. This was a simple, powder train device, which burned at a
known rate.
It was cut to a length which corresponded to the time of flight
to the
target. The flash of the propelling charge ignited the fuse on firing.
Rifle shells used both time and impact fuses, which as the name
implies
detonated the shell on impact. Impact fuses were not generally practical
for
round shells, as there was no way to tell which way the fuses would
be facing
when they hit the target.
to produce casualties. The black powder explosive charges had nowhere
near
the destructive power of modern high explosives. Unfortunately,
the powder
charge tended to break the shell into a relatively small number
of fairly
large fragments. If one hit you, it was lights out, but the number
of
fragments from a given shell was too limited to cause extensive
casualties.
While there were instances of a single shell causing a large number
of
casualties, this was the exception rather than the rule.
lethality. The shell's cavity was filled with musket balls. A small
bursting charge, set off by a time fuse, ruptured the shell casing
and
released the musket balls. The momentum of the projectile carried
the musket
balls on to the target, much like a blast from a shotgun. To be
effective, a
case shot had to go off just above, and in front of, the target.
Since the
target was apt to be an advancing infantry line, or charging cavalry,
getting
the fuse setting right was as much art as science. Case shot achieved
its
effect almost entirely from the load of musket balls it carried.
The
bursting charge was too small to cause more than incidental damage,
in and of
itself.
Case Shot was sometimes called Shrapnel, after the British officer
who
invented it. There is a tendency to think of anyone hit by a piece
of an
exploding artillery shell as having been hit by shrapnel, but the
term really
only refers to the balls carried inside the shell. Pieces of the
shell
casing itself are more properly called shell fragments.
a tin can, the diameter of the bore, filled with iron balls about
an inch in
diameter. The can was torn apart by the force of discharge as soon
as it
left the muzzle, turning the piece into what was in effect a giant
shotgun.
Against troops in the open, within up to 300 yards of so, it was
in the
highest degree murderous. If needed, at close range, double canister
could
be loaded.
was due partly to its larger bore diameter. A canister round from
a Napoleon
contained more balls than one for a 10 pounder or a 3" Ordnance
rifle. The
spin imparted by the rifling tended to spread out the shot patterns
of the
rifled pieces, reducing their effectiveness even further the greater
the
distance from the muzzle.
loading Withworth cannon, imported from England. These were long
range
rifles, with a unique hexagonal bore. They fired a matching hexagonal
"bolt"
which made a very distinct noise as it passed. They had a range
greatly in
excess of any other piece on either side, in fact, more range than
the
artillery techniques of the day could make good use of. The bolts
were solid
shot, and barring an unlikely direct hit were ineffective. The guns
themselves, despite the breech loading mechanism, were of no particular
advantage over muzzle loading pieces. Civil War artillery lacked
recoil
mechanisms. The entire gun recoiled on firing, often several feet.
The time
required to manhandle the piece back into position and re-sight
it limited
rate of fire more so than the time required to load it through the
muzzle.
rudimentary sights, and as noted above, no recoil mechanisms. Fire
had to be
adjusted from the battery position itself, there being no such thing
as
forward observers. Smoke conditions often hampered long range firing.
Under
these conditions, even the one mile range of the rifled pieces was
often more
than the gunners could take full advantage of.
at Gettysburg as the Napoleon. Its range, while less than that of
the rifled
pieces, was adequate for most situations. A skillfully handled battery
of
Napoleons could actually slug it out with a rifled battery, and
stood a good
chance of coming out on top. And they were far more deadly at close
range,
firing canister.
organization of the armies, and the weapons they carried with them
to Gettysburg. We now come to how these armies fought.
today's armies, firepower is obtained by the use of rapid firing,
automatic
weapons. Soldiers may be yards apart and still be able to saturate
the ground
to their front with accurate, sustained fire.
more
than two to three shots per minute. The only way to develop firepower
was,
therefore, to concentrate the men carrying the muskets as closely
as possible.
Infantry in line of battle fought literally elbow to elbow, in a
double ranked
formation. The manuals of the day allowed 2 feet per man, which
translates to
one gun barrel for every foot of line. Even with each individual
weapon only
able to fire two to three times per minute, a line of battle could
throw a
daunting, and deadly, amount of lead at an enemy formation.
War tactics were not employed because they were picturesque, or
easy to
control. They were used for the sole purpose of getting all the
massed
muskets into a formation in which every single weapon could be brought
to
bear on the enemy at the same time.
There have been few things invented more difficult to control than
a Civil War
line of battle. Line up a hundred people single file, one behind
another, and
you can walk for miles with everyone in their place and going in
the same
direction. Line those same people up next to each other, and you'll
be lucky
to
get a hundred yards before bits and pieces of the line are going
off at
different angles. Civil War regiments drilled endlessly to perfect
both the
ability of the men to march in line, and, of the officers to control
them.
The dense linear formations were in a sense forced on the armies
by the very
nature of the weapons they used. It would not until breechloaders,
with their
greater rate of fire, became items of general issue that formations
could open up and
still develop adequate firepower. And as long as one side fought
in these
formations, the other side had to as well in order to be able to
mass enough
fire to defeat them. These formations dominated virtually everything
the
armies did on the battlefield.
controlling the movements of the vast numbers of men they contained
in such a way as get them where they needed to be, without creating mass
chaos and confusion.
Troops could not march from place to place, even for limited distances,
in
line of battle. They marched in column, four abreast. Getting units
from column
of march into line of battle, and back again, filled entire drill
manuals.
Units which could not perform these evolutions quickly, flawlessly,
almost
instinctively, under fire did not long survive on the battlefield.
The movements a regiment would go through to form line of battle
are beyond
the scope of this overview. Suffice it to say a unit had to be able,
on
reaching the field in column of march, to deploy into line to its
front or to
either flank. Once in line it had to be able to shift that line
to face
threats from any direction, rear included, to advance, and if need
be,
retreat, all without loosing cohesion.
if action was imminent. Units not expected to be engaged in the
immediate
future would often be held in massed formations on reaching the
field. This
allowed them to march quickly to any point needed and only then
deploy into
line.
deployed army as just that, an unbroken line of men and guns. In
actuality,
there were often gaps between adjacent formations, as individual
units took
advantage of terrain features such as high ground, fences or stone
walls,
sunken road, or anything else that would work to their advantage.
These gaps
would be covered, to the extent possible, by fire, or reserve formations.
The line of battle was also more than a single line. Both attacking
and
defending lines would be deployed in depth, line backing line. An
attacking
brigade might have three regiments in its front line, each of which
might
itself be in two lines. Behind that brigade might be another, similarly
deployed, and perhaps another in support, its regiments still in
column,
ready to deploy into line as needed. Reports will often speak of
the enemy's
attacking "columns," a reference to the successive lines of battle
that
characterized a major attack. A defensive line might likewise have
only a
fraction of its troops in the first line. A second line of battle
often
awaited the attacker just behind the first, with reserve formations
massed
behind that, out of immediate range but close enough to deploy quickly
to any
threatened point.
spacing depended on available battery positions, which had to provide
both
suitable ground and room for the guns and caissons, and a good field
of fire.
As a rule, the batteries of a corps artillery brigade, or in the
case of the
Confederate army, divisional artillery battalion, supported their
parent
formation. Reserve batteries would bolster the line as required,
augmenting
the gun line to resist an attack, and if need be replacing damaged
batteries.
A battery was considered to have enough firepower to protect its
own front,
but it was customary to provide batteries with infantry support
as protection
in the event of close contact with enemy infantry. A battery forced
to
protect itself against enemy infantry could not perform its primary
duty of
supporting the line of battle.
that of the other side from gaining favorable positions. This counter
battery fire would occasionally flare up into artillery duels. These
were
unavoidable, but unless there was a serious threat the artillery
commanders
tended to discourage them as being wasteful of ammunition.
formations, a Civil War battle involved far more than just two lines
of men
firing away at each other. The line of battle assured that a unit's
muskets
were all directed to its front. The disadvantage to this was that
a
formation in line of battle was very vulnerable to any enemy on
its flank.
As a result, contending formations would be constantly maneuvering
and
counter-maneuvering to both gain the enemy's flanks, and at the
same time
protect their own. This constant shifting of lines, with units deploying
and
redeploying, advancing and giving ground, is often overlooked and
all but
lost in the neat battle maps with their carefully charted lines.
A battle
was a fluid affair, the lines of battle rarely as precise as they
look on
paper, with confusion the order of the day.
battle and await developments. It normally deployed skirmishers.
Often
taken for granted and overlooked in accounts of the fighting, the
action on
the skirmish lines was some of the most sustained and important
of the battle.
the infantry on the line of battle was usually not doing any firing.
Most of
the firing going on at any given time was being done on the skirmish
lines.
vulnerable. As previously noted, formations on the line were often
massed.
Artillery men had to stay near their pieces. There were large numbers
of
horses, and mounted officers made attractive targets. This made
it
absolutely essential that rifle armed enemy skirmishers be kept
well away
from the line, a minimum of several hundred yards if at all possible.
As a
result, it was typical for about 10 percent of the force in line
to be
deployed forward as skirmishers. This force might come from detachments
from
several different regiments, or at times, an entire regiment might
be sent
out to cover a brigade or division front.
The terrain at Gettysburg was generally very open, and as a result
the
skirmish lines tended to be deployed well out from the line. 400
yards or
more was not at all unusual. Depending on available cover and concealment,
opposing skirmish lines would probably average about 200 yards apart.
This
assured that the line of battle was fairly safe from effective aimed
rifle
fire, although with active skirmish lines there tended to be a continual
give
and take, and even the best screened line of battle was not immune
to losses
to long range sharpshooting. Unlike troops on the battle line, skirmishers
were expected to take advantage of cover and concealment, and generally
fired
at will as targets presented themselves.
be take under killing fire at up to a quarter of a mile, and the
impression
is often given that opposing formations routinely opened fire at
500 yards or
more. Most of the rifle muskets in use were in fact sighted to at
least that
far.
In actuality, when an attack was in progress, the lines of battle
generally
engaged each other at ranges of less than 250 yards. At Gettysburg,
it is
difficult to document more than isolated instances of troops on
the line of
battle opening fire at more than about 200 yards.
There were numerous reasons for this. First of all, the troops on
the line
had to wait for their own skirmishers to get out of the way. A skirmish
line
would normally give ground gradually in the face of an enemy advance,
delaying it as long as possible but ultimately falling back on the
main line.
By the time this happened, the enemy advance was likely to be well
within
500 yards. The high, curved trajectory of the relatively low velocity
minie
ball made hitting at extended ranges very difficult. At anything
more than
200 yards or so, misjudging the range by even a few yards could
result in the
round landing short or sailing harmlessly over the target's head.
Smoke
conditions often obscured targets. Also, if fire was opened at long
ranges,
muskets would foul and the rate of fire slow by the time the enemy
came into
really effective range. Another factor sometimes overlooked is that
many
officers, and indeed some enlisted men, considered opening fire
at excessive
range not only a waste of ammunition, but, a sign of unsteadiness
under fire.
Veteran troops often prided themselves on withholding their fire
until the
enemy was close at hand.
respects, troops armed with the older smoothbore muskets were not
at as great
an disadvantage as one might think, at least while part of the line
of battle.
While a rifled arm was certainly an advantage on the skirmish line,
smoothbore muskets loaded with buck & ball (one full size ball
and three
buckshot pellets) were effective, in massed fire, to very nearly
that range,
and the closer the enemy got, the more effective they became. Going
up
against a line of troops armed with smoothbores, with every shot
sending out
four projectiles to a rifle musket's one, was a grim prospect. Officers
tended to treat troops armed with smoothbores no differently, in
terms of use
in the line, than they did those armed with rifled arms.
that this discussion has concentrated primarily on tactics used
on the main
battlefield. On campaign cavalry's main role was scouting and intelligence
gathering, while at the same time screening the army to prevent
the enemy
cavalry from accomplishing those same goals. The boundary between
two
maneuvering forces was apt to the scene of a constant series of
forays and
clashes as the respective cavalry forces sought advantage and information.
did need to fight infantry, it most often did so dismounted. A mounted
man
was simply too large a target. Despite the greater rate of fire
of a
breechloading carbine, cavalry generally could delay, but not usually
stop, a
serious infantry advance. Not only were their carbines out ranged
by
infantry rifle muskets, but dismounted cavalry fought in a single
line, with
one man in every four back holding the horses. Infantry fought in
a double
rank and of course, needed no horse holders. The usual, and most
effective
tactic, was for the cavalry to put up enough of a fight to force
the infantry
to deploy into line, a time consuming process. When the advancing
line got
too close, the cavalry would fall back, and force the enemy to repeat
the
process all over again at the next hill of bend in the road.
When fighting other cavalry, the action could be either dismounted
or
mounted. When dismounted, carbines or other shoulder arms predominated.
Mounted actions were more likely to rely on pistol and saber.