At around 10 AM, just outside Middletown PA, Ewell received a message from
AP Hill that set the stage for the next phase of the battle. Upon learning  that Hill was
marching to Gettysburg and had encountered enemy cavalry there, Ewell re-directed two
of his divisions south, to that place. Rodes would turn south on the Middletown Road,
while Early was to move via Heidlersburg. Johnson, with the remaining division and the
trains, was too far to the east to turn around - he would continue on to Cashtown and then
come up via the Pike there. Ewell, continued on with Rodes' Division. Messengers were
sent with word of the move to both Lee and Hill.
 
    Three miles south of Middletown, Rodes' men ran into Union skirmishers
and left the road. Just to the west loomed an imposing, wooded Ridge - Oak Hill. After
a quick recon, Rodes determined that "by keeping along the wooded ridge, on the left
side of which the town of Gettysburg is situated, I could strike the force of the
enemy with which General Hill's troops were engaged upon the flank, and that, besides moving
under cover, whenever we struck the enemy we could engage him with the advantage in
ground." (Rodes' Report, OR)
 
    Rodes deployed his division in two lines - Doles on the left in the open
plain east of Oak Hill, O'Neal in the center, and Iverson to the right. Daniel and
Ramsuer formed a supporting line behind this front. Despite the dominating presence of Oak
Hill, the position was an awkward one - the woods and rough ground made it difficult to
command a line of any length and made co-ordination diffucult between  brigades.
Despite these drawbacks, both Ewell and Rodes regarded their position on the
flank of the Union line facing Hill's Corps as ideal, and made no mention of the
difficulty of the ground on the approach. While Rodes was deploying, Ewell posted Carter's
ArtilleryBattalion on the Ridge facing southeast, to engage Union infantry on the
plain below.

    Ewell had some fears of being flanked himself. While Rodes was moving
south, Union troops were moving north from the town. The Union 11th Corps had
arrived, intending to take the very ridge Rodes was now on: Carl Schurz, now in
temporary command of the Federal 11th Corps while Howard took charge of the field upon
Reynolds' death, was ordered to form on the Union 1st Corps' right.

    By the time Schurz arrived, however, these orders were unrealistic. Not
only was Oak Hill swarming with Rebels, but reports placed more Confederates coming
from the northeast, which would place them directly in his rear if he tried to seize
Oak Hill by force. Faced with a conundrum, Schurz halted in place and tried to deploy as
best he could: facing north at roughly right angles to the 1st Corps Line west of
town. Only two 11th Corps Divisions were available to hold this position: the 2/11, under
Von Steinwher,was left back on Cemetery Hill as a reserve. This detachment left Schurz's
command thin on the ground, with only about 5500 men and three batteries of artillery
available.
 
    Ewell saw only the threat, however. Rodes detached Doles' brigade to
guard his own flank, and sent O'Neal's skirmish battalion - under Blackford - forward
to help screen Doles' line. Initially, Doles' 1300 men plus the 150 or so Alabamians
under Blackford faced the 11th Corps. Rodes' four remaining brigades contiunued to
advance south towards the Union 1st Corps.
 

    Having dealt with the threat to the East, Rodes' division prepared
to attack to the South. Rodes brought Daniel's North Carolina Brigade into
line east of Iverson, in effect lengthening his line to the west to replace
Doles in the battleline. These movements took time, and it was about 1:30
before Rodes was ready to advance.

    Couriers had brought word of Rodes' arrival to Doubleday, now
commanding the Union 1st Corps troops whose exposed flank the Rebels
were working toward, and Doubleday in turn shifted troops northward to
deal with that threat. Baxter's Federal Brigade of the 2/1 Division was
shifted into the woodline along the crest of Oak Ridge south of the
Mummasburg Rd. Most of the Federal Brigade found good cover and
concealment facing west, along a series of stone walls, while at least one
regiment bent back 90* to face north along the road itself. While Baxter's
actual position was not very secure, the fact that his men were essentially
hidden in the trees would confuse Rodes' Rebels a great deal. Two other
Union commands were also north of the Chambersburg Pike: Cutler's
Brigade was in the woods south of Baxter, while Paul's Brigade was
moving around behind Cutler and Baxter's line to act as reserve and
support the threatened Union flank.

    Rodes initial effort was badly managed. A simultaneous assualt
proved impossible, mostly due to the nature of the ground. O'Neal's men
attacked first, but only in partial strength - of his 5 regiments, only three
went forward. The 5th Alabama had been retained by Rodes to fill the gap
between Doles and the rest of the division, while the 3rd Alabama did not
get O'Neal's order to advance. The result was that only the 6th, 12th, and
26th Alabama went forward, and were repulsed by the Union defenders in
the vicinity of the McLean farm.

    Iverson's was the center Brigade, and it advanced into the open
fields west of Oak Ridge in good order. Because of the nature of the
Union line, while O'Neal found Federal defenders almost immediately,
Iverson found few. to Iverson's right, Daniel's brigade advanced due south
towards the Federal troops along the Chambersburg Pike, out around the
McPherson Barn.

    With O'Neal stopped on his left, and Daniel moving further south
on his right, Iverson's command began to angle to the southeast in order to
try and stay connected to both ends of the line. Additionally, the men of
the brigade were either unaware or only vaguely alerted to the fact that a
large number of Federal troops lay to their left front, facing west - the bulk
of Baxter's Brigade behind those walls.

    Iverson himself did not advance with the brigade, but stayed up on
Oak Hill where he could observe the action clearly - a decision which
ultimately cost him his command and tarred his reputation. Deployed in a
single line of four regiments without skirmishers, the brigade had little
ability to discover enemy positions. It was in effect ambushed, to deadly
effect. As the line got about 100 yards from the Union defenders (Iverson's
men were advancing at an angle in relation to the Federals, so that
Iverson's left flank was only about 80 yards from the Union line, while his
right, reaching towards Daniel, was about 150 yards from the Yankees.)
Baxter's men opened fire with a devastating volley. Hundreds of North
Carolinians were felled in the initial fire, and the rest dropped to the
ground in the open field, where they were pinned down by the massed fire
coming from the stone wall.

    Under heavy fire, pinned in the open, Iverson's losses were
devastating. At one point, two Federal regiments advanced towards
Iverson's line and captured a fair portion of it. Overall, out of about 1400
men, the Rebel Brigade lost 903, and did not see action for the rest of the
battle. Convinced of his perfidy, the brigade refused to serve under
Iverson any more, and a staff officer from 2nd Corps took over temporary
command. The best that was said of Iverson was that he was careless, and
many accused him of being drunk, or even of hiding behind a tree on the
hill while his brigade advanced to the slaughter. In any case, his career
with the ANV was finished

    Carl Schurz did little to intervene in the fighting between Rodes
and the Union 1st Corps. Not only was he short a division, but Shurz' 11th
Corps had a flank problem of its own. Moreover, the overall 11th Corps
deployment was poor, made worse by the willful advance of one of the
division commanders, Francis Barlow.

    The 3/11 Division was deployed awkwardly. One brigade was in
little more than a reinforced skirmish line, strung out between Oak Ridge
and just east of the Carlisle Road, a line of about a mile length. The other
brigade remained near the College, massed in reserve. Two batteries, 10
guns, deployed behind this line and dueled with Carter's Rebel artillery
battalion on Oak Ridge.

    1/11 advanced dramatically forward, all the way to Blocher's
Knoll, a chunk of high ground overlooking the Harrisburg Pike, where
reports placed another Rebel division arriving. Barlow, the division
commander, concentrated his division in a tight, semi-circular line around
the knoll, supported by one battery of 6 guns. This advance put Barlow
forward almost a mile from the town, and out of immediate supporting
range of the one brigade Schurz retained in reserve. Worse yet, Schurz had
to stretch his line even further to reach Barlow's flank.

    Why both Schurz and Howard let Barlow advance this far is a
mystery. Howard inspected the lines between 1  and 2 pm, before the
Rebels attacked but after Barlow advanced, and did not order Barlow
back. In isolation, the knoll made a good position, but it was vulnerable to
flanking from the west without enough troops to hold the ground in
between - which was the dilemma 3/11 found itself in.

    In any case, the arrival of Early's Confederate Division about 2:00
pm, made the question moot - the 11th Corps would have to fight it out
where it stood.  Early deployed his artillery battalion to engage the Federal
guns of Wilkerson's Battery on Blocher's (soon to be renamed Barlow's)
Knoll, and deployed his division for an attack. Early had only three
brigades with him: Gordon's Georgians, Avery's North Carolinians, and
Hays' Louisiana troops. Smith's Virginia brigade was initially in reserve
about 1/2 mile north. Vague reports of Federals coming in behind Early's
line would keep Smith out of the fighting for the day.

    Five of Gordon's six regiments formed Early's front line, about
1500 men. Gordon's mission was to attack straight towards the center of
Barlow's line atop the hill. Hays and Avery were in support. At about 3:00
p.m., Early sent Gordon forward against Barlow's line, partly in an effort
to prevent a perceived flanking move against Doles' Confederate Brigade
out on Carlisle Road.

    George Doles could see most of this from his position facing
Schurz. Doles watched Barlow's advance, and Early's arrival: he was in
fact the linking force between Early and Rodes, and expected to make
sure that no Yankees slipped between the two Rebel Divisions. Doles  For
most men, holding a line successfully with one brigade while facing a
Union Corps would have been mission enough: Doles decided to attack.

    Gordon's troops struct first, and shattered the Union center. The
forward Union line was in the woods at the foot of the Knoll, and soon
overwhelmed by Gordon's five regiments. The 153rd Pennsylvania, in line
atop the hill, was overlapped on both flanks and gave way after several
minutes of heavy fire.

    Doles' men now came in on the flank, striking the Union 107th
Ohio. His four Confederate regiments were too much for the Union
defenders, and after a bloody volley, the Union line gave way from the
west, as well. Barlow's entire position had been compromised.

    Schurz' only response was to belatedly send forward his remaining
brigade, Krzyzanowski's, deployed in reserve near the college. It was too
late to help Barlow, whose division was routed by the twin blows of
Gordon and Doles, but Schurz hoped to restore some semblance of a line
on his right.

    The fight had not been one-sided, however. Gordon's losses: 500
men out of the 1500 he charged with, indicated the stubbornness of the
Union defenders. Doles, facing fewer yankees, suffered less. Accordingly,
Gordon halted to let the second line brigades move forward in turn, while
Doles pivoted to face the approaching Yankees under Kzryzanowski.

    This Federal Brigade was not in battleline, but instead deployed in
columns of division, a formation more suited to rapid movement than to
combat. The brigade advanced under long range shellfire from both
Carter's artillery on Oak Hill, and some of Early's guns to the northeast,
knocking down fences as they went. They struck Doles' right-hand
regiment first - the 21st Georgia - and pushed it back.

    In response, Doles wheeled his other three regiments to face
southwest. They met Krzyzanowski's brigade head on, and a murderous
frontal firefight developed. At this point, Two of Gordon's regiments were
close enough to engaged the Union troops, and opened a deadly flanking
fire from the right. The 12th Georgia of Doles' brigade overlapped the
Union line on the other flank, developing a crossfire that brought down
hundreds. The intensity of fire from three directions proved to be too
much: Krzyzanowski's Brigade broke and fled. Now three of Schurz' four
available brigades were smashed, and retreating towards the town.

    While the Union 11th Corps was crumbling north of town, The rest
of Rodes' Division renewed the attack on the Union Defenders north of the
RR Cut. With Iverson shattered and O'Neal faltering, Daniel's Brigade was
forced to advance unsupported. Originally the right flank brigade, Daniel
had started to advance due south, towards the Federal Brigade of Col. Roy
Stone, 2/3/I. Stone's position was also an awkward one: his men defended
the line just south of the RR cut around the McPherson Barn, and Daniel's
men were advancing directly on his flank.

    This was possible because of the hasty nature of the Union
defense. Stone's position out on Chambersburg Pike was several hundred
yards in front of the Union line on Oak Ridge, creating a difficult angle.
Stone's men were forced to deploy in two directions: The 143rd and 149th
PA fronted generally north, facing Daniel, while the 150th PA faced west,
against the still quiet Rebel 3rd Corps troops to the west. While the
disjointed nature of the Federal position brought grief to Iverson, it was to
make Daniel's job that much harder.

    The farther south Daniel advanced, the more his own flank was
exposed to those same Federals who devastated Iverson. With Iverson's
command removed from the tactical equation, Daniel was forced to divert
troops to face east. The first was the 53rd North Carolina, which moved
around the 3rd Alabama (one of O'Neal's wayward regiments) to try and
come to Iverson's succor. Shortly afterwards, the 53rd was joined by the
43rd and 45th NC Regiments as well. Almost half of Daniel's strength was
peeled away to the east, then, before his brigade even reached Stone's
position. Worse yet, Daniel's advance was over a 1/4 mile of open ground,
with a flank exposed to enfilade fire from at least one Union Battery on
Seminary Ridge.

    Daniel made it as far as the infamous Railroad Cut, where Davis'
Mississippians had faltered that morning. The trench proved deceptively
inviting to the North Carolinians as well, for they piled in, only to find
that getting out was not so easy. The banks were to steep to climb, and
manuvering out and around the cut would entail lengthy - and bloody -
manuvering in the face of a determined defense. To complicate matters,
the cut offered no protection from the enfilading artillery fire. All in all,
it is not surprising that the attacked faltered at that point.

    This time it was the 149th PA who charged the cut in a spirited
counterattack ordered by Stone. They drove the the disorganized
Confederate line back a considerable distance, and then returned to their
line along the Pike. Daniel fell back and set about rallying his brigade. In
an impressive voice that boomed out over the noise of battle, he reformed
the 2nd Battalion and 45th North Carolina, the principals of the Cut
fiasco, he gathered up his other regiments and prepared to attack again.

    The second attack, pressed home with four regiments instead of
two, was more successful. Despite brutal close-range volleys from the
149th PA, the Rebels reached and crossed the Pike, compromising Stone's
line. Both the 143rd and the 150th PA assayed counterattacks to relieve
the 149th. The 150th PA, under Col. Wister, was especially hard-pressed:
his command divided into wings, and at one point all but routed the 32nd
North Carolina in a charge. The result was, for the moment, a tactical
deadlock.

    Two other actions were to undermine that stalemate. The renewed
attack by the rest of Rodes' Division on Oak Hill and Heth's assaults on the
Union line south of the Cashtown Pike both acted to make Stone's position
untenable.

    After O'Neal's attack miscarried, and Iverson's men all but
slaughtered, Rodes took a firmer grip on his division. The initial attacks
had been opposed only by one brigade of Robinson's Federal Division, that
of Baxter. Now, in response to the fight, both sides brought up reserves.
Robinson brought forward Pauls brigade, adding another 1500 defenders
to the line of Federals on Oak Ridge, while Rodes committed his last
Rebel Brigade, Ramseur's North Carolinians.

    This next Rebel attack also stalled, as both sides' fresh troops
maintained the balance. The Union position was yet another awkward one,
however, due to the 90* angle the line was forced to adopt at the north end
of the ridge, where the Mummasburg Road descended into town.

    Finally, the Rebels got moving en masse. O'Neal and Ramseur co-
ordinated yet another attack, O'Neal's third of the day, Ramseur's second.
Worse yet, Baxter's Federal Brigade, out of ammunition, was withdrawn
towards the Seminary, leaving Paul's Brigade alone on the nothern
extremity of the ridge, facing the bulk of Rodes' Rebel Division.

    This final attack cracked the Union line. Paul's men had no
supports, and were likely outnumbered almost 2-1. Under this pressure,
the Union line bent into an inverted V, with the 16th Maine holding the
center near where the Road crested the Ridge. Elements of 12 Confederate
regiments hit Paul's five units, and not surprisingly, Paul's men finally
gave way. The collapse began on the right flank first, where the 14th
North Carolina, overlapping the line of the 13th Mass. got into the Union
rear just east of the ridge.

    The 16th Maine, holding the center, was just about to withdraw
when orders from General Robinson arrived instructing him to advance
"as far north on the ridge as possible" and cover the retreat of the brigade.
These orders were a virtual suicide mission, since by advancing north the
regiment would place itself more deeply then ever into the pocket
threatening to form around the brigade, and worse yet, the 16th barely
numbered 200 men to stand off more than 10 times that number of rebels.

    While Paul's Brigade got away, it was not without severe loss. Three
regiments lost more than 100 men in prisoners alone, including the gallant 16th Maine.
Paul himself was badly wounded, and the brigade lost so many ranking officers
command changed six times in the course of the fight. Overall, of the 1537 men
carried into the fight, 1026 were casualties, and of those about 600 were captured. Worst of
all, with the 11th Corps retreating into the town in the fields below, now the entire Union
line was collapsing.
 

    Up to now, the troops of A.P. Hill's Confederate 3rd Corps had not
been in action since the morning fight. Hill, Lee, and the troops of Heth
and Pender could see the advance of Ewell's men, and now Lee gave Hill
permission to engage the rest of the Union line. Heth's men were
committed against the Union troops on McPherson's Ridge. Only two of
Heth's Brigades were really ready for heavy fighting: Pettigrew's large
North Carolina command, and a small brigade of Virginians under
Brockenbrough. Archer and Davis were assigned supporting roles, given
thier heavy losses that morning.
 
    Awaiting them were four regiments of the Iron Brigade in Herbst
woods. The men of Doubleday's 3rd Division - now commanded by
Thomas Rowley due to temporary promotions - flanked the westerners:
Stone's three regiments held the line along the Cashtown Pike and largely
engaged Daniel's Rebels, as described above, while Chapman Biddle's
Brigade was formed in the open fields south of the woods. Most of the
Union artillery remained back on Seminary Ridge, supported by two
regiments: the 6th Wisconsin held the railroad cut, and the 151st
Pennsylvania stood ready near the Seminary.
 
    The initial clash resulted in a brutal, close-range firefight.
Pettigrew's men crossed Willoughby Run and encountered the Iron
Brigaders in the woods. At 800 men, Pettigrew's largest regiment - the
26th North Carolina - was almost as big as two of the western regiments,
and Pettigrew's entire line was large enough to also engage Biddle's men
further south.
 
    Brockenbrough came up in support on Pettigrew' northern flank,
but entered the woods instead of making directly for Stone's Federal
Brigade along the Cashtown Pike. This was a tactical error on the
Confederates' part, because it allowed Stone's three Pennsylvania
regiments to devote their attention almost completely to Daniels' attacks,
and ignore what should have been a real threat to their own flank.
 
    The battle became a question of numbers. The Iron Brigade
numbered approximately 1200 men, deducting the morning losses and
accounting for the detached 6th Wisconsin. Biddle's regiments added
another 1350 Pennsylvanians to the fight, giving the Union forward line
about 2600 men. Against that, Pettigrew's command alone numbered
2600, and Brockenbrough's Virginia regiments contained anouther 1000,
though they did not become fully engaged.
 
    Outnumbered, the Federals conducted a fighting withdrawl back to
Seminary Ridge, where the Union gun line stood. The losses were brutal:
more than half of those engaged here fell, carpeting the open fields in
front of Seminary Ridge with the dying and wounded of both armies.
 
    Finally, the Federals rallied on the ridge, heartened by the presence
of the cannon of three Federal batteries, and by the hasty breastworks
constructed earlier in the day by the Federals of 2nd Division, before they
were sent off to Oak Ridge. There, however, the fight was about to be
renewed: Hill's other division under Dorsey Pender was coming forward to
replace Pettigrew's exausted men. No such relief was available for
Doubleday's troops.

        Pender's Division had spent most of the day in reserve, first back
on Wisler's Ridge and then on Herr Ridge. Fully deployed, Pender's four
brigades occupied about a mile and a half of frontage as they advanced to
deliver the final attack on the battered Federals.

    The final Union line was much compressed. Stone, Merideth and
Biddle formed between the Cashtown Pike and the Fairfield Road. The
length of the line - about 600 yards - was testimony enough to the losses
the 12 regiments occupying it it suffered. Fortunately, Buford's cavalry
deployed as a flank guard along the Fairfield Road, facing northwest, and
provided a stong anchor to the Federal southern flank. Buford's men
contributed significantly to the Union line, for not only would their
firepower become significant in the final attack, but the Federal activity
south of the Fairfield Road had already materially weakened Pender's line
before it engaged.

    As Pender's men stepped off of Herr Ridge, Union Cavalry
skirmishers near the Henry Meals farm worried the Rebels. In response,
Lane's North Carolina Brigade was moved from the center of Pender's
advancing line to the very south end, in order to screen that flank. This
move meant that Lane's men lagged far behind the main advance, and they
never really became fully engaged in the subsequent attack on Seminary
Ridge. Lane's men suffered about 100 losses on July 1st, out of the 1700
or so men in his command.

    The next weakening of Pender's attack is even less explainable:
Thomas' men were left behind on Herr Ridge to support the Rebel artillery
line that had been established there. Why Pender felt the need to leave this
brigade behind is obscure, as most of Heth's Confederate division was
available for that mission. Certainly Heth's men were tired and had lost
heavily, but as they retired to let Pender's men carry forward the fight, they
were certainly capable of providing support for Rebel batteries that were,
after all, far to the rear of the actual combat.

    These deployments reduced the combat power of Pender's Divison
by half. Pender himself seems to have ordered Lane south, but Thomas'
men were retained by Hill, suggesting a less then optimal command
arrangement in the Confederate 3rd Corps on July 1st. Pender's loss the
next day precluded any report from the divisional commander, and so we
do not know if he regretted the fragmenting of his command, but it was a
fortunate decision for the Federals.

    In any case, the final attack Pender's two remaining brigades -
Scales and Perrin - delivered was devastating enough. Passing through the
lines of Pettigrew and Brockenbrough on McPherson Ridge, Pender's men
charged the Union men and cannon at about 4:00 p.m. The attack
succeeded, but at heavy cost: about 1000 men in the two attacking
brigades fell. They did, however, crack the final Union line, and
Doubleday had no choice but to order a retreat to Cemetery Hill. Now the
entire Union line had been compromised and in full retreat.