Emmitsburg Road/ECH by  Jim Cameron   M ajor General Alexander A. Humphreys' 2nd Division of Sickles' 3rd Corps  held  the line of the Emmitsburg Road, from its juncture with Graham's brigade at  or near the Trostle Lane, north to a point about three hundred yards south of  the Codori Farm buildings. His division formed the right half of Sickles'  "Peach Orchard Salient", the controversial advanced position of the 3rd Corps  on July 2.  Humphrey's initial plan seems to have been to hold the line of the road with  Carr's 1st Brigade, with Brewster's "Excelsior Brigade" in support.  The  Excelsior Brigade had been Sickles' own, earlier in the war.  Carr's brigade  was deployed with the 26th PA on the right, a few hundred yards south of the  Codori house.  To its left was the 11th MA, near the Rogers' house.  Seeley's  Battery K, 4th US Artillery, went into position between the Rogers and  Klingle buildings, followed by the 16th MA infantry to Seeley's left rear.  Turnbulls' Battery would later be brought forward from the artillery brigade  to give additional support to Humphrey's line.  To the left of the 16th MA,  the 12th NH and 11th NJ comprised the left flank of the brigade.  A gap  remained between the 11th NJ and the right flank of Graham's brigade, near  the Wentz house.  Humphrey's was forced to deploy the 71st and 72nd NY  regiments, of Brewester's brigade, to the left to Carr's 11th NJ, to link up  with Graham at or near the Trostle Farm lane.  Brewster's 70th, 74th and  120th NY regiments initially formed a reserve line behind Carr, however, the  74th was soon shifted to the right of Carr's 26th PA in order to extend the  right of the Emmitsburg Road line closer to the Codori farm.  The remaining  Excelsior brigade regiment, the 73rd NY, was supporting Graham's brigade, at  the Peach Orchard.  Forward of Carr's main line, the 1st MA infantry of his brigade established  at strong skirmish line about 200 yards west of the road, joined on its left  by the 1st United States Sharpshooters (Berdan's Sharpshooters), detached  from Ward's brigade of Birney's Division.  Mirroring the problems of Birney's 1st Division, Humphrey's lacked the  manpower to adequately man his assigned line.  In particular, his right was  "in the air", forward and to the left of, and separated by several hundred  yards from, the left flank of the next Corps in line, Winfield Scott  Hancock's 2nd Corps. Humphreys' problems were exacerbated by the fact that his third brigade,  Burling's, had been drawn off to support Birney.  This left Humphrey's with  only the small reserve - two regiments - he was able to hold back from the  Excelsior Brigade. That Humphreys was not happy to loose the services if Burling's brigade is  putting it mildly.  As he put it in a letter to his wife, shortly after the  battle: "Had my division been left intact I should have driven the enemy back but the  ruinous habit (it doesn't deserve the name of system) of putting troops into  position and then drawing off its reserves & second line to help others who  if not similarly dispossessed would need no such help is disgusting."  Humphrey's line along the Emmitsburg Road was not a bad one, purely in terms  of defense against as frontal attack from the Confederate line along Seminary  Ridge, to the West.  Much of the line along the road ran along somewhat high  ground, although the rolling terrain between the road and Seminary Ridge did  allow enemy formations to advance to relatively close range while protected  from Union fire.  But Humphrey's line remained very vulnerable, its left  flank subject to being turned or driven in should Birney's line not hold, or  if the apex of the Union salient at the Peach Orchard failed.  Further, his  right flank remained unsupported and isolated by several hundred yards from  support by the 2nd Corps.  Humphrey's Division's portion of the line was generally opposite that of R.H.  Anderson's Division of A.P. Hill's Corps of Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern  Virginia. The five brigades of this division outnumbered the two brigades available to  Humphreys, and Anderson's line extended well past the open right flank of the  Union line along the Emmitsburg Road. Anderson's right flank brigade, Alabama troops under Cadmus Wilcox, was  position in Pitzer's Woods and in open fields nearby.  Wilcox's brigade had  earlier been involved in a brief but nasty skirmish with a Union  reconnaissance party consisting of elements of the Berdan's 1st United States  Sharpshooters and the 3rd Maine Infantry.  For many years after the battle,  and indeed, to some extent, to this day, this skirmish was credited with  having delayed Longstreet's attack just long enough to save the Union  position on Little Round Top.  In fact, Longstreet's troops were nowhere near  the area when the skirmish took place, and the action had no impact on the  timing of his advance. To Wilcox's left, Perry's small brigade of Florida troops was posted in  Spangler's Woods.  David Lang commanded the brigade in place of the absent  Perry.  Next in line along Seminary Ridge was a brigade of Georgia troops under  Ambrose Wright, followed by the Mississippi brigade of Carnot Posey.  Anderson's left flank brigade, that of William Mahone, was stationed on  McMillans Woods.  Anderson's left flank overlapped the right flank of William  Pender's Division, with Mahone's brigade in the rear of Thomas' brigade of  Pender's Division. As the afternoon of July 2 progressed, and Hood's and McLaws' Divisions  opened Longstreet's attack along the southern half of Sickles' front, heavy  skirmishing continued all along Humphrey's and Anderson's lines.  Berdan's  Sharpshooters, here contending with Wilcox's skirmish line in the fields west  of the road, demonstrated their well earned reputation as deadly marksmen,  while to their right, the 1st MA doggedly held the skirmish in advance of the  rest of Carr's brigade.  Further north, a protracted and increasingly vicious  series of fights swirled around the Bliss Farm buildings.  Posey's Brigade,  in particular, was heavily involved in the Bliss Farm fighting, which would  eventually have a significant impact on the outcome of the day's fighting.   The attack on Birney's division by Hood and McLaws seriously threatened  Humphreys' left and rear.  In particular, the crushing of the apex of the 3rd  Corps salient at the Peach Orchard by Barksdale's Mississippi brigade exposed  and turned the left flank of Humphrey's line.  As the 21st Mississippi drove  through the Peach Orchard itself, and pursued of Bigelow's battery toward the  Trostle Farm, Barksdale's remaining three regiments wheeled to the left at  the Sherfy Farm and began a drive up the road, toward Humphreys' left.  With  Burling's brigade drawn off and scattered to support threatened portions of  Birney's line, Humphreys had scant reserves of his own with which to respond.   He was forced to refuse (pull back) the left of Carr's brigade in an effort  to confront Barksdale, and committed the two remaining Excelsior Brigade  regiments.  Despite this, Barksdale regiments continued to make steady  progress. As Humphreys struggled to shore up his flank, Anderson's division attacked  Humphreys' front.  With Barksdale rolling up his flank, and first Wilcox and  them Perry attacking his front, Humphreys was forced inexorably back from the  road, back across the fields toward Cemetery Ridge.  Humphreys was able to  bring his division back in relatively good order, his men repeatedly firing,  pulling back, and turning to fire again, but with his flanks turned and in  the air, and few reserves, he could do little but give ground and hope for  support. Reinforcements were quickly sent forward, mostly from Hancock's 2nd Corps, to  support Humphreys.  Two regiments, the 82nd NY and 15th MA, took position  along  just north of the Codori buildings, to provide some support for  Humphreys' right.  Weir's and Brown's batteries took positions in the fields  east of and on either side of  Codori farm buildings.   Back on the ridge  itself, the veteran 1st MN and 19th ME regiments stood ready, in support of  Thomas' battery. Adding to the support provided by these regiments and batteries, Willard's  brigade of NY troops was detached from Hays' division and hurried to the  left.  While one regiment, the 39th NY, detached from the brigade to help  retake the guns of Watson's Battery, overrun by the 21st Mississippi east of  the Trostle Farm, the rest of the brigade struck the remainder of Barksdale's  brigade at the Plum Run Swale, and at the same time, engaged the right flank  of Wilcox's Brigade.  Both Barksdale and Willard fell during this action. As Willard's brigade struck Barksdale and fired into Wilcox's right, the  advancing Alabama troops were also taking damaging fire from Thomas's  Battery, to their front, and had already sustained significant losses in  pushing back Carr's regiments.  As the brigade entered Plum Run Swale,  Hancock spotted their advance, toward a now relatively unprotected section of  the Union line.  He quickly order the nearest infantry regiment not yet  engaged, the 1st MN, to charge the advancing line.  The Minnesota regiment  charged into a heavy fire, stopping Wilcox at the swale, gaining lasting fame  at the cost of 82% casualties.  Following up on the Minnesota regiment's  valiant charge, the 42nd NY and 19th MA charged into the Plum Run Swale,  adding weight to the Union forces blocking Barksdale and Wilcox. To the left of Wilcox, Perry's (Lang's) small Florida brigade, despite having  absorbed considerable punishment at the hands of Carr's men, pushed the right  of Humphrey's line back toward Cemetery Ridge.   The 19th ME struggled to  maintain its formation as Humphrey's men retreated through its ranks.  As the  Floridians approached the base of the ridge, however, the Maine regiment's  front cleared and a blast of musketry staggered the Florida troops at close  range.  Thomas's battery also had the Florida brigade's range.  Not a large  brigade to begin with, the Floridians were unable to advance further.  Anderson's attack, initially successful in driving Humphreys back from the  Emmitsburg Road, was now beginning to falter.  Unlike Longstreet's divisions  in their attack on Birney, Anderson's Division attacked in a single line.  As  Wilcox and Lang began to show the effects of fatigue and casualties, and to  encounter increasing resistance as 2nd Corps units came to Humphrey's aid,  there was no second line to come up and add depth and momentum to the  Confederate assault.  Neither Wilcox nor Lang, or Barksdale's regiments to  their right, were able to reach Cemetery Ridge. Out past Humphrey's right flank, Wright's brigade enjoyed greater success.  Driving back the two 2nd Corps regiments north of the Codori buildings, the  brigade was able to advance across the Emmitsburg Road, up to the Union line  on Cemetery Ridge just south of the soon to be famous "Clump of Trees" at the  Angle.  To this day, controversy exists as to whether or not Wright's troops  actually penetrated the Union line.  In this writer's opinion, the Georgians  did reach the Union line, and may have effected a brief lodgment in it, but  to call it a penetration probably overstates the case somewhat.  In any  event, Wright's advance marked the furthest advance of any of Anderson's  troops on July 2. Past Wright's brigade, the Confederate attack began to unravel.  As stated  above, Posey's brigade had become heavily involved in the fighting at the  Bliss Farm.  While his right flank regiments did advance in support of  Wright's brigade, they did not go far beyond the Emmitsburg Road.  His  remaining regiments remained mired in the Bliss farm action, which by this  time had attracted considerable strength to the Union skirmish lines.  Mahone's brigade, for reasons which remain unexplained to this day, did not  enter the action.  Efforts by Dorsey Pender to bring his brigades into the  fight, and continue Longstreet's and Anderson's attack into his sector, came  to naught when Pender was wounded by Union artillery fire.  The Confederate attack was now stalled all along Anderson's front, with  darkness now approaching, and no reserves at hand to regain the lost momentum  of the advance.  His brigades east of the Emmitsburg Road had no choice but  to withdraw to their original positions.  Humphrey's battered division,  moreover, despite heavy losses, was able to take advantage of the time bought  by Willard's brigade, the 19th ME, and the 1st MN, and as the Confederate  fell back the 3rd Corps troops advanced back to the Emmitsburg Road.  From  the 1st Corps, troops from Stannard's brigade of Vermont troops, 90-day men  taking part in their first battle, advanced with them, recapturing lost  cannon and capturing numerous prisoners. The Emmitsburg Road line was untenable for either side, and as the day ended  both armies reestablished their lines of battle in Seminary and Cemetery ridges.  The Confederates positioned some artillery on the high ground in the  Peach Orchard area, while Union skirmish lines covered the road further  north, but the Confederate assault had failed to dislodge the Union Army from  the Cemetery Ridge line.  Although Longstreet's "en echelon" attack up the Emmitsburg Road had failed  to dislodge the Union line from Cemetery Ridge, as the day ended the Union  position on Cemetery Hill itself remained in danger. While the main Confederate attack had stalled as it progressed to the area of  the Bliss Farm, substantial forces remained arrayed against the northern end  of the Union line on Cemetery Hill.  Robert Rodes, of Ewell's Corps, had  shifted three brigades of his division from their positions in the town of  Gettysburg, south to new positions along Long Lane.  From these new  positions, just to the left of Pender's Division, Rodes was poised to launch  a direct attack on the western slope of Cemetery Hill. On the other side of the hill, two Confederate brigades under Harry Hays and  Isaac Avery had spent an exposed and uncomfortable day along Winebrenner's  Run, between East Cemetery Hill and the southern end of the town.  (East  Cemetery HIll is that portion of Cemetery Hill to the east of the Baltimore  Pike.)  Hays' brigade of Louisiana troops was on the right, along the run.   Avery's brigade was to Hays' left, in the area of the Culp Farm.  Like Rodes'  brigades to the west of the hill, they were poised to strike the Union  position as part of Ewell's efforts to support Longstreet's attack. Cemetery Hill was, at the time of the battle, far more open than it appears  today.  It commanded extensive fields of fire in all directions, including  the approaches from the town itself, and was the key to the Union line.  By  the evening of July 2, it had been converted into a formidable artillery  platform, with numerous batteries in and around the cemetery grounds on  Cemetery Hill proper, and across the Baltimore Pike from the cemetery, on  East Cemetery Hill.  Supporting the artillery, the battered but still  effective 11th Corps held positions in the cemetery, along the Taneytown Road  and at the base of the hill, fronting the town of Gettysburg, and along  Brickyard Lane, at the base of East Cemetery Hill.  The troops posted along  Brickyard Lane, the two brigades of Adelbert Ames' (formerly Francis  Barlows') division were further supported by Steven's Battery, posted on a  knoll to their right, east of the Baltimore Pike.   Throughout the day, the men of the 11th Corps, particularly those of Smith's  brigade, in the fields south of the town and in and around buildings on the  outskirts of the town itself, had engaged in particularly heavy skirmishing  with their Confederate counterparts.  Stevens was wounded by Confederate  sharpshooter fire, while at the same time repeated artillery duels erupted,  ran their course, and soon broke out again. Ewell had been ordered to attack in support of Longstreet's assault on the  Union left. As the late afternoon faded into dusk, he ordered Hays' and  Avery's Brigades forward.  Hays' troops had a relatively direct path toward  the hill, while Avery's were forced to wheel to the right as they advanced in  order to maintain contact with Hays' left and swing in toward the hill  itself.              Ames' two brigades had, between them, only about 1800 men.  Another regiment,  the 33th Massachusetts, from Smith's brigade, supported their right flank,  further along Brickyard Lane.  The line of Harris' brigade, Ames' left flank  unit, was somewhat weakened by the last minute shifting of the 17th CT to the  right of the brigade line, forcing the left regiments to shift to cover the  gap.  This readjustment was still in progress when the Confederate attack  struck. Darkness and smoke provided come concealment to the advancing Confederates,  however, Steven's battery was able to pour a destructive fire into Avery's  left as it wheeled in toward the Union line.  Union batteries on East  Cemetery Hill, behind Ames' line, were unable to depress their muzzles enough  to fire on the Confederate advance as it neared the base of the hill. Ames' infantry opened fire as soon as their skirmishers were out of the way,  and they could see to shoot, but by this time the advancing Confederates had  already closed well up on the Union position.  Hays' brigade quickly broke  through the northern end of Ames' line, driving Harris's Ohio regiments up  the northern slope of the hill toward the batteries on the crest.  Von  Gilsa's brigade, to the right of Harris, was struck largely by Avery's  brigade.  Avery himself was shot from his horse, a bullet through the neck.   He was just able, before he died, to scrawl a last note asking that his  father be told that he had dies with his face to the enemy. Although some of Von Gilsa's troops were able to maintain their position  along Brickyard Lane, most of the brigade was, like Harris's driven up the  slope into the Union gun line.  Fighting became hand to hand as artillerymen  joined the infantry in a desperate fight to safe the guns. Although the actual number of Confederates who had penetrated the battery  positions was limited, and they were in considerable disorder due to the  unavoidable confusion of a night attack, the situation was precarious for the  Union.  Help, however, was soon in coming.  Three regiments of Carrol's  Second Corps brigade were sent by Hancock, double-timing through the Cemetery  toward the sound of battle on East Cemetery Hill.  From within the First  Corps itself, the 58th and 119th NY regiments, of Krzyzanowski's brigade, as  well as the remnant's of Coster's brigade, rushed across the Baltimore Pike  toward the embattled batteries. Arriving at about the same time, the reinforcements advanced across East  Cemetery Hill, clearing the Confederates out of the battery positions, and  retaking the Union line along Brickyard Lane.  Unsupported (Rodes had called off his advance once he realized the strength  of the Union position on Cemetery Hill, and Gordon's brigade remained back by  Winebrenner's Run), Hays was forced to order his men back.  Union batteries  on East Cemetery Hill, now back in the hands of their gunners, fired canister  at the retiring Confederates, but darkness helped protect them from further  heavy loss. Carrol's regiments would remain on East Cemetery Hill to stiffen Ames' line,  but apart from the ever-present skirmishing, the Confederate withdrawal  marked the end of heavy infantry action on this part of the line.