James Epperson- moderator
Esteemed moderator Jim Epperson ,correctly IMHO, mentions the Missouri
Compromise as somewhat of the "first shot" shot in the secession war. There are
a couple of other points I would like to make about this compromise.
1. It was originally introduced in the Senate by Senator Jesse Burgess Thomas of
Illinois but was ultimately successful because of its sponsorship in the House
the legendary Henry Clay of Kentucky. This compromise set up the famous "Mason
Dixon Line" The theory behind this compromise was that congress could determine
the status of newly formed territories. In 1854 Stephen Douglas pushed through
the "Kansas Nebraska Act", which did away with the Mason Dixon line for the new
western territories. His rationale was that this would allow faster growth in
the west-cynics however believe he did it to gain support for his presidential
run from the Southern States.
2. The death knell for the Missouri Compromise(and IMHO one of the primary
catalyst's for the Civil War) was the Dred Scott decision, handed down in 1857.
the status of Mr. Scott was really a sideshow to what was the real impact of
this decision(Scott went free anyway). What "Dred Scott" ruled was that the
federal Government had no right to determine the "slave" or free status of
territories. Thus Kansas Nebraska and the Missouri Compromise and 30 years of
similar accommodation between the regions were nullified in one fell swoop. IMHO
the war was inevitable after 1857 as the court had removed any vehicles for
further compromise on the issue of slavery.
Robert W Lawrence
lawrence@arthes.com
HI FOLKS,
Dennis recently wrote:
>Esteemed moderator Jim Epperson ,correctly IMHO, mentions the Missouri >Compromise as somewhat of the "first shot" shot in the secession war.
I've always thought of the Missouri Compromise, not to mention the actions of the Continental Congress as "Dodging the Bullet", not the "First Shot". Its funny how we used similar phrases, but from the opposite perspective.
John Leo
I'd like to hear opinions from the experts on the following. After the Dred Scott decision, is it possible that the Taney Court might have ruled that slave property could be taken into any state (as well as territory) whether "free" or not, without the master losing ownership? Presumably, that would have abolished the idea of "free state" at a stroke. Was that among the fears that impelled the majority of Northerners to vote Republican in 1860?
By the way, what happened to Taney during the War?
Norm Levitt
According to my memory of Allan Nevins's book, the use of the Dred Scott "logic" was indeed feared as a weapon to turn the free states into slave states. When we get to that part of the lectures, I hope to be able to quote chapter and verse on that issue.
During the War Taney was still Chief Justice, rendering the Merryman decision about the restriction of habeas corpus and otherwise writing prospective decisions in opposition to Lincoln administration policies that he (Taney) hoped to some day be able to rule on in court. He died during the war and was succeeded by Salmon Chase, Lincoln's Secretary of the Treasury.
According to Jeffrey Hummell's book, Lincoln actually issued a warrent for Taney's arrest, but never followed through on it.
Jim Epperson
Touissaint Louverture's revolt in St. Domingo in 1794 filled the South with fear that a slave revolt was to be imported from the Caribbean. Gabriel's failed revolt in Richmond in 1800 was followed by debates in Virginia and other southern states about emancipation and colonization of slaves as was the bloody revolt of Nat Turner in 1830.
The threat of revolt hung over the south. Such primary accounts as Mary Chesnut detail both the fears of slave violence and incidences of such.
By the time John Brown swung across the Potomac into Harper's Ferry, the south was rightfully paranoid about northern inspired slave insurrection.
Given this - secession was seen as a necessity to protect one's life.
Dennis
Greetings:
To northerners, Taney's decision represented the end of the third branch of the federal government as an impartial arbitrator of the Constitutional questions. Taney clearly used this case to destroy the work of the legislative branch and usurp their power to make compromises.
A northerner in 1860 would have already seen the demise of Congress as a deliberative body with the attack on Sumner in the Senate chamber. The actions of Buchanan and Pierce over the Kansas Territory would be viewed by northerners as the end of the office of the presidency as a representative of both sides in the dispute over slavery.
A northerner would have seen that the three branches of the federal system had been corrupted by slave interests and quite reasonably would have voted for the one party that seemed willing to draw the line on the destruction of the Union from within.
As I noted previously, the view from the southern side of the border would have been of a northern populace bent on destruction of the South. Quite naturally, there would be few supporters of a presidential who had to proclaim that John Brown was no Republican during the campaign.
BTW, Taney had freed his own slaves before 1825.
Dennis
> Esteemed member Jim Epperson contributes:
>
>
> Triva fact: Dred Scott is buried in the same St. Louis Cemetery as
> William Tecumseh Sherman.
>
Jim,
Yes, Calvary Cemetery by name...not too far from my home. I also believe
the case was tried here in St. Louis at, what we currently call "The Old
Courthouse".
I'm a little slow in getting on board...but, hope to add more soon...
Kate
PS - I know this is off topic and downright nosy, but, just out of
curiosity, where in Western Kentucky were you raised? As Laurie
says...Inquiring minds want to know...
> Esteemed member Dennis Lawrence contributes:
> >>>SNIP<<<<
> The nullification crisis was in itself an act of secession from
> the federal laws of the land. Yet, this storm passed away. If tariffs
and
> nullification were legitimate secession issues, why did they not provide
> the impetus for secession in 1830?
>
> The secession of 1860 was NOT tied to earlier secession threats on
> nullification or tariffs. Those issues had proven to be far to weak to
> push the South away from the Union. The underlying issue - the threat to
> the institution of slavery - would finally lead to the secession of
1860.
>
Dennis,
2. The continued efforts to limit slavery in developing territories, which
the South viewed as equally as much their land as the non-slave states.
3. The increasing amounts of "Internal Improvements" benefiting the North
and Northwest, using the tariff monies from Southern pockets.
4. The continued disagreement between the two sections on the
interpretation of the Constitution in regard to the "right" to nullify and
secede, as well as "property" rights. (i.e. slaves).
5. By the admittance of new states into the Union, the south was losing
its historic majority in the political arena. The loss of control was the
death blow to maintaining the balance that the South needed to prevent the
North from enacting policies detrimental to their current economical and
social structures.
6. The vilification of the Northern states against slavery with no
suggestions of a united solution to the "Peculiar Institution".
What are your thoughts?
Kate
In a message dated 97-03-17 23:45:28 EST, you write:
<<
The nullification crisis was in itself an act of secession from
the federal laws of the land. Yet, this storm passed away. If tariffs and
nullification were legitimate secession issues, why did they not provide
the impetus for secession in 1830?
The secession of 1860 was NOT tied to earlier secession threats on
nullification or tariffs. Those issues had proven to be far to weak to
push the South away from the Union. The underlying issue - the threat to
the institution of slavery - would finally lead to the secession of 1860.<
>>
I aagree completely here. Tarriff issue is an example of a potential
seccession issue that was resolved without civil war - and in my mind
indicates that the only insoluable problem was Slavery.
It should be noted here that seccession was threatened by both the North and
the West at one time or another, albeit not very seriously on the West's
part. EVERY section of the country that felt dealt out of the game talked
about secceeding. The South, with what amounted to almost a death-grip on the
national political process (note the congressional power, the dominance in
the presidency, etc) never felt disenfranchised enough unitl the mid 1800s to
worry about it. Once the North and West assumed a degree of Political Unity,
however, the South saw it's political dominince fading, and with it the
defense of slaves.
If there is any 'secondary issue" regarding seccession, it would be the
political power shift - but even that is inextricably bound into the
portection of Slavery as an institution.
Dave Powell
I must disagree with Kate Boden's assessment of slavery as the "straw
that broke the camel's back". It seems to me that every one of the
issues that she mentions, including the tariff question, is ancilliary
to the slavery issue. The quarrel about tariffs, for instance, is a
quarrel between an economic system that simply cannot exist without
the resource of slave labor, and a moderninizing, increasingly
industrial system. The participants in the various "Crises",
1820-1860, were in no doubt that the central issue was the slave
system and its social consequences; we shouldn't doubt it either.
To take one obvious example, the South was a champion of nullification
insofar as that could be used to defend the slaveholding interest. It
objected violently when northern states tried to use "nullification"
to make the Fugitive Slave Act unenforceable. And, as I suggested a
couple of days ago, there was at least the hope among southerners, and
the fear among northerners, that "federal supremecy" might be used to
nullify the free status of the free states.
If southern apologists from time to time stressed "other" issues as
the source of sectional discontent, this merely reveals the deep
unease that even southerners felt at having to defend explicitly a
practice that most of Christian civilization, in Europe and Canada,
as well as the North, had come to view as repugnant and evil.
Norm Levitt
At 04:02 AM 3/18/97 -0600, you wrote:
>Esteemed member "Kate Boden"
>>
>
>Dennis,
>
> Although the nullification issue and the tariffs in 1830 were not enough
>to lead any state to succession at that time, by 1860, these factors
>COMBINED with others were enough to bring the Southern States to the point
>of succession. The other factors, IMO, were:
My point was that whatever issue is bought up as a cause of secession,
slavery was bound up in it. Four of your six points include slavery. The
other two just aren't borne out by the primary sources from the ante-bellum
period.
>
> 1. The growth of the "rabid" anti-slavery movement in the North. I use the
>word "rabid" as from a 1850's Southern standpoint, not necessarily my own.
>This was very much evident by the saint-making of John Brown.
>
> 2. The continued efforts to limit slavery in developing territories, which
>the South viewed as equally as much their land as the non-slave states.
>
> 3. The increasing amounts of "Internal Improvements" benefiting the North
>and Northwest, using the tariff monies from Southern pockets.
>
> 4. The continued disagreement between the two sections on the
>interpretation of the Constitution in regard to the "right" to nullify and
>secede, as well as "property" rights. (i.e. slaves).
>
> 5. By the admittance of new states into the Union, the south was losing
>its historic majority in the political arena. The loss of control was the
>death blow to maintaining the balance that the South needed to prevent the
>North from enacting policies detrimental to their current economical and
>social structures.
>
> 6. The vilification of the Northern states against slavery with no
>suggestions of a united solution to the "Peculiar Institution".
>
>The South, as I see it, felt, by 1860, and the election of Lincoln, backed
>into a corner, so to speak. That the time of compromises had ended. This
>opinion wasn't merely based the slavery issue, but, from decades of seeing
>their interests falling into the minority. I see the slavery issue as the
>proverbial straw that broke the camel's back rather than the only factor
>leading to the decision to secede.
Well, my point is that these weren't separate issues that built up
until slavery came along and broke the camel's back. These issues were
always tied to the root cause of secession, slavery. Try looking for the
issues of internal improvements, tarring and nullification in the states
declaration of causes of secession on Jim's Causes page - they just aren't
there. The issue of slavery is.
BTW, I make no moral judgements about the south here as the
northern economy was also dependent upon the southern economy and therefore
tacitly approved of slavery. That is why they would compromise on the issue
of slavery rather than face the issue.
>What are your thoughts?
>
>Kate
>
My thoughts are I am glad to hear from you and hope to converse about this
more!
Take Care
Dennis
Just a brief comment on the tariff issue.
While the Republican Party did support a Whiggish view of internal
improvements and tariffs, it should be noted that tariff rates had
steadily =declined= in the years prior to the Civil War, the last change
being voted on in 1857, I think, with broad and enthusiastic Southern
support (including Robert Toombs ;-) While it is true that the South
would have disapproved the tariffs that the Republicans wanted to impose
in the wake of the 1860 election, it is also true that the South could
have prevented the passage of those tariffs by staying in the nation.
(Of course, they could also have protected slavery better by staying in
the nation; rationality was not commonplace back then.)
But to sum up: there was not steady diet of rising tariffs or increasing
internal improvements in the decade of the 1850's. There is no doubt
that the South would have disapproved if there had been, but it wasn't there.
Jim Epperson
Dennis, et. al.
At 10:43 PM 3/17/97 -0600, you wrote:
> The nullification crisis was in itself an act of secession from
>the federal laws of the land. Yet, this storm passed away. If tariffs and
>nullification were legitimate secession issues, why did they not provide
>the impetus for secession in 1830?
I doubt that the same pressures existed in 1830, and that radicals at both
ends of the issue had not yet developed their followings. Too, there may
well have been a feeling in 1830, that there was still plenty of room for
growth. That the South could still throw enough weight around to insure that
they maintained the political clout they needed to maintain their "economy"
(which in the end is the root of most issues).
>
> The secession of 1860 was NOT tied to earlier secession threats on
>nullification or tariffs. Those issues had proven to be far to weak to
>push the South away from the Union. The underlying issue - the threat to
>the institution of slavery - would finally lead to the secession of 1860.
I cannot remember where I read once (if anybody knows this source, direct me
so I can find it again) that the radical movement in the South, actively
worked to split the Democratic party in 1860. They had reached a point where
they wanted secession so badly, that they actually saw the election a
Lincoln as their trump card in attaining this. The split of the Dems would
insure that it would happen. Certainly, by that time, many southerners
believed that their lifestyle / economy was numbered, if they remained in a
union where the political power was moving in a direction they did not wish
to go. They probably did not constitute a majority; but, they did constitute
the power in the south.
Just some observation, all IMHO of course. Am enjoying these posts. Very
interesting.
Regards,
Doug
Good morning, Dennis & fellow fringe!
I, too, have gotten the impression that fear of slave revolt was
very real in the South, but in spite Haiti & Nat Turner, was that fear
founded on any real threat? The remarkable lack of response to John
Brown's insurrection might be a case in point. I've rather put these
apprehensions in the same category with another seemingly common fear, that
the Black Repuplicans' secret goal was to somehow coerce the unwilling into
interracial marriage. That's always puzzled me.
Diane
Hello Fringers:
I too have often wondered, when I read of the developing storm (mostly in
the 1850s), about the paranoid nature of some of the fears. It is true that
the response to John Brown's raid should have calmed fears that slaves could
easily be called to arms and organized in some manner to create a rebellion
(at least at that point in time).
Was there an almost paranoid fringe in the south, which was able to bring
strong political influence to bear? I'm just speculating on my reactions to
items I've read, and not suggesting anthing that I have any knowledge or
evidence of.
Greetings Fringe! Since there has been not a peep out of either
gfringe or GDG for hours I am not offering any insights, nuggets of
wisdom, penetrating analysis, etc. only to find that the major is on
strike. If he's on duty, I would like to commend Jim Epperson for his
well-organized, succinct and right-to-the-point introductory
presentation of this most complex subject. Good job Jim!
Sylvia
Hello,
The answer to whether or not the fear of a slave revolt was
unfounded is both yes and no. Certainly John Brown's scheme was a hair
brained attempt that was marked for disaster; however, read _The Secret
Six_ Brown was funded by powerful rich white abolitionist who had come to
believe that they could free the slaves through a violent slave revolt
funded by them. If not this time. Maybe the next.
Also, as many as 12,000 slaves were shipped to the south after the
Santo Domingo revolts and they were certainly regarded with fear. Most
states passed laws against letting them in. Not Virginia which had a
series of revolts in the first part of the nineteenth century.
It is true that Nat Turner failed to spark a larger revolt, but he
killed approximately 60 whites in one night. If a trusted slave could do
this in Southampton County, Virginia, surely the same could happen anywhere
in the South. Denmark Vesey and Gabriel were found out before the revolt,
but the fear that others were plotting the same thing was very valid.
Douglas Egerton's _The Virginia Slave Conspiracies of 1800-1802_ is an
excellent source for the political climate in which literate artisan slaves
like Gabriel and Vesey believed revolt was possible.
Also, we have learned more about the lives of the individual slaves
in this generation than perhaps any before. I had the luck to work with
archaeologists in Virginia two years ago on slave sites. What they have
learned is that many slave cabins had hidey holes in the floor in which
knives and gun parts have been found. Weapons of which their masters had
no idea their loyal servants possessed.
Finally, the day to day life of most slaves was one of defiance.
Small acts of laziness, disobedience and vandalism were part of the slaves
inexorable assault on a system that enslaved them.
No, I don't think revolts like Brown or Turner would have swept
across the south, but I do think that isolated guerilla attacks by leaders
like them could have thrown the system of slavery into chaos. Ironically,
secession made the above scenario more possible than staying in a Union.
It is a mistake to think that slaves were not aware of the
political climate. Revolts were often planned and executed by literate
artisan slaves. Disunion would surely have signaled a chance for freedom
to all slaves harboring ideas of revolt. And there were more than what we
may realize that did.
Take Care
One off the interesting results of the Missouri Compromise was the effect it had
on the boundaries of the Great State of Texas. if you look at a map you'll see a
narrow strip of land just above the Texas panhandle that belongs to Oklahoma.
When Texas came into the union they gave up this land since it was above the
mason Dixon line. They could either give it up and be a "slave" State or keep
and it become a "Free" State.
Even more ironic is that the Mason Dixon line was mis-surveyed in this
region-the survey was led by a young army Lt. by the name of George McClellan!
One must wonder if a "physic" "Little Mac" was attempting to force Texas onto
the side of the Union!
Robert W Lawrence
lawrence@arthes.com
Those wanting more evidence of the ties between fear of slave revolts
and secession will do well to read _Crisis of Fear_. I dont have the
authors name or the full title. Its been several years. Anyway, he
examines the development of secession in South Carolina, and ties it to
the fear of slave rebellions.
The problem with saying that slavery was the cause of the war, as I see
it, is that the basic research hasnt been done. For example: each
Southern state had a secession convention. Those conventions were
elected. As far as I know, no one has analyzed exactly who did the
voting, and who was elected, and why. You can analyze all the political
speeches you like, but until you know who voted for secession, who voted
against it, and who did not vote at all, you cant say you know anything
meaningful about the process.
In addition, secession happened at a specific point in time. Some
states obviously seceeded for certain reasons, others for other
reasons. It seems perfectly clear to me that the border states would
not have seceeded if the US had not called up troops to invade the
South.
Jim, the following is not a personal comment, just a point of view. You
say in your intro that the most convincing argument for you is that if
the US had let the states seceed, anarchy would prevail. Other states
would have seceeded for flimsy reasons. i.e: not liking Jefferson as
President. Well, the fact is that secession did not occur over the
election of TJ, over the Embargo, or any other issue. In short, there
is no concrete reason for this fear. It is a product of A) fear itself,
and B) being a product of the zeitgeist second half of the 20th Century
in the US. WE have been brought up to believe as you do. In every
aspect of our culture it has been drilled in to us that secession was
not a reasonasble alternative, and that the central government must and
should have a strong set of powers to that it can deal with a wide
variety of issues from poverty to racism.
My point is that the perspective you outline is, to my way of thinking,
simply the orthodox one that we are taught from day one. There may be
other ways to look at it.
Also, a basic phenomena that everyone who deals with these issues is
what historians used to call "presentism". We often project our
contemporary values and points of view on the past, without really
looking at the conditions at the time. The fact is that the morality of
owning another person is so repulsive to us that we find it hard, indeed
often impossible, to understand the thinking of those who did, or even
to get past that and see that there were other things going through
their minds. In your introduction you outline the argument. The very
next section is labeled "Sectional Politics Prior to 1860", but in the
first paragraph you jump right into slavery, as if there was nothing
else. Your first sentence, "If we insist...." simply dismisses the
possibility that secession was anything other than an excuse for
slavery. IN fact, you then go on talk abaout northern emancipation, the
Miss. Compromise, etc., all within the framework of the debate over
slavery. Is it possible that your point of view leads you to interpret
everything within this framework, thereby leading you to the inevitable
conclusion that the sole important issue was slavery?
Dennis,
Thank you for the great post about slave revolt fears. I have some
further thoughts that I want to address the group with on this subject,
but, they require a trip to the library this evening after I feed my
family. So, hold the phone...I will have more to come.
So much to do...so little time...
Kate
Esteemed member Diane asks
>that
>the Black Repuplicans' secret goal was to somehow coerce the unwilling into
>interracial marriage. That's always puzzled me.
> Diane
Diane,
Lincoln had different answers to that depending upon the audience.
When during the Lincoln Douglas debates, Douglas charged he was for mixed
marriages, Lincoln replied to the crowd that he did not think Blacks were
equal nor should they be allowed the vote, hold office or intermarry.
"...I as much as any man am in favor of having the superior position
assigned to the white race. I do not understand that because I do not want
a negro woman for a slave I must necessarily want her for a wife. My
understanding is that I can just let her alone. I am now in my fiftieth
year and never have had a black woman for either a slave or a wife."
During his presidency, however, when a group of Black leaders
approached him in the White House and asked him for his position on
miscegenation he replied something to the effect that as long as it
produced good Republican voters he was all for it. Then he went on to ask
them why they all wouldn't just go back to Africa. Or something like that,
Brother Bob has my good F. Douglass book so I am a little shaky on this one.
Take Care
Dennis
>
> The problem with saying that slavery was the cause of the war, as I see
> it, is that the basic research hasnt been done. For example: each
> Southern state had a secession convention. Those conventions were
> elected. As far as I know, no one has analyzed exactly who did the
> voting, and who was elected, and why. You can analyze all the political
> speeches you like, but until you know who voted for secession, who voted
> against it, and who did not vote at all, you cant say you know anything
> meaningful about the process.
Actually, Rich, there has been much good work done on this topic. On
North Carolina, which obviously I am most familiar with, let me
recommend:
Mark W. Kruman, _Parties and Politics in North Carolina, 1836-1865_ (LSU
Press, 1983).
For the whole Upper South as a whole see Daniel Crofts, _Reluctant
Confederates: Upper South Unionists in the Secession Crisis_ (UNC Press,
1989). Crofts is particularly senstive to the issue of "presentism,"
which, as you remark elsewhere in your post, infects most discussions of
"causes."
> The problem with saying that slavery was the cause of the war, as I see
> it, is that the basic research hasnt been done. For example: each
> Southern state had a secession convention. Those conventions were
> elected. As far as I know, no one has analyzed exactly who did the
> voting, and who was elected, and why. You can analyze all the political
> speeches you like, but until you know who voted for secession, who voted
> against it, and who did not vote at all, you cant say you know anything
> meaningful about the process.
Oh, but this research has been done. Some of it is in McPherson's BATTLE
CRY OF FREEDOM, and there is a small book by Ralph Wooster, THE SECESSION
CONVENTIONS OF THE SOUTH. McPherson shows a very high degree of
correlation between counties with high slave ownership and secessionist
sentiment, I think primarily in Virginia. Wooster also looks at the
make-up of the conventions, but it has been a while since I looked at
that book.
Besides, it is very easy to say things about the process based on the
documentation of the process itself. We should not spend too much time on
this right now, as the seminar has not yet reached the time frame of the
secession crisis, but four of the secession conventions (SC, MS, GA, TX) gave
direct reasons for their actions, a fifth (LA) gave an indirect
statement, and all of these are over-whelmingly concerned with slavery.
I think at some point we are allowed to take these people at their word.
> In addition, secession happened at a specific point in time. Some
> states obviously seceeded for certain reasons, others for other
> reasons. It seems perfectly clear to me that the border states would
> not have seceeded if the US had not called up troops to invade the
> South.
Hmmm. Read Tennessee's legislative resolutions of January, 1861. (They're
on my Web site.) As I read that document, Tennessee was going to join the
Confederacy once it became clear that something like the Crittenden
Compromise was not going to be passed. I can't speak for AR or NC, as I have
no documentation. Virginia is a mixed case, and hard to decipher.
> Jim, the following is not a personal comment, just a point of view. You
> say in your intro that the most convincing argument for you is that if
> the US had let the states seceed, anarchy would prevail. Other states
> would have seceeded for flimsy reasons. i.e: not liking Jefferson as
> President. Well, the fact is that secession did not occur over the
> election of TJ, over the Embargo, or any other issue. In short, there
> is no concrete reason for this fear.
That is not the point. The point is that the founders were trying to
create a nation. Would they have created a nation that could so easily
have self-destructed? I don't think so, and the Madison quote is a
strong support for that argument.
[snips]
> Also, a basic phenomena that everyone who deals with these issues is
> what historians used to call "presentism". We often project our
> contemporary values and points of view on the past, without really
> looking at the conditions at the time. The fact is that the morality of
> owning another person is so repulsive to us that we find it hard, indeed
> often impossible, to understand the thinking of those who did, or even
> to get past that and see that there were other things going through
> their minds. In your introduction you outline the argument. The very
> next section is labeled "Sectional Politics Prior to 1860", but in the
> first paragraph you jump right into slavery, as if there was nothing
> else. Your first sentence, "If we insist...." simply dismisses the
> possibility that secession was anything other than an excuse for
> slavery.
No, it does not. It states a simple fact, that I did not want to write a 20
volume history of the antebellum US as the first lecture
> IN fact, you then go on talk abaout northern emancipation, the
> Miss. Compromise, etc., all within the framework of the debate over
> slavery. Is it possible that your point of view leads you to interpret
> everything within this framework, thereby leading you to the inevitable
> conclusion that the sole important issue was slavery?
Certainly that is possible, but I do not think it is true. To turn it around
a bit, just because it does fit within a conventional framework does not make
it wrong, does it? Perhaps the conventional framework is seen as
conventional because the preponderence of evidence supports it. Feel free to
bring up anything that you think is relevant to the sectional politics of the
day. The only thing that even approaches having a sectional content, other
than slavery, was the tariff, and the sectional component there is very weak.
(And the connection with slavery is strong.) If we accept the notion that
secession was the result of some kind of sectionalism, we have to then look
at what drove the sectionalism. I will entertain anything on this issue from
soup to nuts -- that is the point of having the seminar, right? -- but
slavery clearly was a major sectional issue, and if it turns out to be the
only one out there, then I think some conclusions are warrented.
Jim Epperson
> Esteemed member "James F. Epperson" contributes:
>
> But to sum up: there was not steady diet of rising tariffs or increasing
> internal improvements in the decade of the 1850's. There is no doubt
> that the South would have disapproved if there had been, but it wasn't
there.
>
Jim,
Thanks for the clarification on the tariff issue, but, although the
tariffs themselves were not increasing prior to secession, couldn't the
difference in viewpoints on the very principle of tariffs still be
considered a factor, although not a direct "cause" in the South's
discontent? Drastic actions are rarely taken for single causes. Usually
there is a build up of grievances, of varying import, which lead to a major
change, such as secession.
I am taking the liberty here of inserting some of Dennis' comments on the
tariff issue so I may more easily address the issue in a less piecemeal
fashion.
Dennis Says:
>>>SNIP<<<
Robert Tombs even traces the tariffs to abolitionists
"There were thousands of protectionists in Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, New York, and in New England who were not abolitionists. There
were thousands of abolitionists who were not free traders. The mongers
bought them together upon a mutual surrender of their principles. The free
trade abolitionists became protectionists; the non-abolition protectionists
became abolitionists. The result of this coalition was the infamous
Morill bill - the robber and the incendiary struck hands and united in a
raid against the South."
If southerners of the time couldn't separate the tariff from the
issue of slavery, how can we do so now?
>>>>SNIP<<< Dennis continues: Well, my point is that these weren't separate issues that built up until slavery came along and broke the camel's back. These issues were always tied to the root cause of secession, slavery. Try looking for the issues of internal improvements, tarring and nullification in the states declaration of causes of secession on Jim's Causes page they just aren't there. The issue of slavery is. ~~~~
The "Declaration of Causes of Seceding States" from Georgia, which I
found on Jim Causes page (Thanks for the great site, Jim) brings up the
very issue of tariffs and internal improvements, and like Toombs, describes
a coalition, so to speak, of Northern interests (abolitionists and the
protectionsists) to obtain their desired separate economic and social ends
at the expense of the South. The joining of these forces does not mean that
slavery and protectionism are the same. I am not saying, by any means, that
there are no links between nullification and tariffs and the slavery issue,
but, they are different.
Jim Epperson states in his excellent posting to the webpage on the Causes
that:
"However, it needs to be noted that there was significant anti-tariff
sentiment in the Northeast, due to the concentration of shipping interests
there. After all, protectionism hurt the shipping industry by discouraging
imports."
Therefore, in my opinion, the South's stance on protectionism is only
linked to slavery to the extent that slavery was a factor (whether major or
minor...this is not the issue, at this point) in the South's agrarian
economy. The South did not like tariffs because they had slaves; they did
not like tariffs because of the negative impact on their economy.
Am I beating a dead horse here?
I too have often wondered, when I read of the developing storm (mostly in
the 1850s), about the paranoid nature of some of the fears. It is true that
the response to John Brown's raid should have calmed fears that slaves could
easily be called to arms and organized in some manner to create a rebellion
(at least at that point in time).
Was there an almost paranoid fringe in the south, which was able to bring
strong political influence to bear? I'm just speculating on my reactions to
items I've read, and not suggesting anthing that I have any knowledge or
evidence of.
Doug,
But think of the opposite view, in that Brown confirmed all the worst
suspicions of Slavery leaders - proof that some radicals wanted to instigate
exactly the kind of holocaust that the South feared. Almost as if proof were
offered up that the CIA _did_ kill Kennedy...
Fear of slave revolts seems endemic to slave-holding societies. I don't think
the any special paranoia was needed to explain this fear among Southerners.
Dave Powell
In a message dated 97-03-18 09:28:41 EST, you write:
<<
If southern apologists from time to time stressed "other" issues as
the source of sectional discontent, this merely reveals the deep
unease that even southerners felt at having to defend explicitly a
practice that most of Christian civilization, in Europe and Canada,
as well as the North, had come to view as repugnant and evil.
Norm Levitt
>>
It is also useful to try and notice the tenor of arguments made before and
after the war. Before, every Southern secessionist talked Slavery as a
fundamental issue - Stephens defined it as the cornerstone of the CSA, state
secession conventions made it the centerpiece of thier charters, etc. After
the war, other issues were moved to the forefront of the discussion because,
simply put, slavery didn't play as an issue politically.
Reading the pre-war liturature of the time (as opposed to the post-war
justifications, which are sometimes hard to distinguish from this distance)
it seems clear to me that the one issue that every secessionist was adamant
about was slavery.
It should also be noted that - as Norm has pointed out - if the South were
opposed to things like nullification on principle, the Southern political
caucus would have maintained a more consistant position on such issues. If
States Rights were truly at the heart of their worries, why then were they
content to use Federal Power to intervene in states' rights issues when it
came to protecting slavery? Clearly, Southern politicians opposed such rugged
individualism when it came from Northern climates.
Dave Powell
In a message dated 97-03-18 13:45:58 EST, you write:
<< I too have often wondered, when I read of the developing storm (mostly in the 1850s), about the paranoid nature of some of the fears. It is true that the response to John Brown's raid should have calmed fears that slaves could easily be called to arms and organized in some manner to create a rebellion (at least at that point in time).
Was there an almost paranoid fringe in the south, which was able to bring
strong political influence to bear? I'm just speculating on my reactions to
items I've read, and not suggesting anthing that I have any knowledge or
evidence of.
>>
But think of the opposite view, in that Brown confirmed all the worst
suspicions of Slavery leaders - proof that some radicals wanted to instigate
exactly the kind of holocaust that the South feared. Almost as if proof were
offered up that the CIA _did_ kill Kennedy...
Fear of slave revolts seems endemic to slave-holding societies. I don't think
the any special paranoia was needed to explain this fear among Southerners.
Dave Powell
I knew this would happen, and don't really want to stifle debate or
commentary, but I would like to keep to some kind of chronological time
frame, one which reflects the most recent lecture. We have rather
quickly jumped forward to the secession crisis itself without a lot of
discussion of the intervening years. Could we try to keep a little
focussed on the pre-1850's period until I get the next lecture up?
Jim Epperson
Esteemed member "James F. Epperson"
On Tue, 18 Mar 1997, Kate Boden wrote:
> Thanks for the clarification on the tariff issue, but, although the
> tariffs themselves were not increasing prior to secession, couldn't the
> difference in viewpoints on the very principle of tariffs still be
> considered a factor, although not a direct "cause" in the South's
> discontent? Drastic actions are rarely taken for single causes. Usually
> there is a build up of grievances, of varying import, which lead to a major
> change, such as secession.
Certainly the difference of principle was there. One of the few
differences between the US and CS Constitutions was a phrase that tried
to prohibit the use of general revenues for internal improvements. But
the fact that all the tariff measures of recent times had passed with
strong Southern support suggest (to me at least) that it was not a hot
issue at the time.
[snips]
> The "Declaration of Causes of Seceding States" from Georgia, which I
> found on Jim Causes page (Thanks for the great site, Jim) brings up the
> very issue of tariffs and internal improvements, and like Toombs, describes
> a coalition, so to speak, of Northern interests (abolitionists and the
> protectionsists) to obtain their desired separate economic and social ends
> at the expense of the South. The joining of these forces does not mean that
> slavery and protectionism are the same. I am not saying, by any means, that
> there are no links between nullification and tariffs and the slavery issue,
> but, they are different.
Careful here. What state was Toombs from? I think he had a strong hand
in writing this document so it is not surprising that it would reflect
his views. Read Stephens's speech to the Georgia legislature (again, on
my site) which contains a rebuttal of Toombs's views on the saliency of
the tariff.
[more snips]
> Therefore, in my opinion, the South's stance on protectionism is only
> linked to slavery to the extent that slavery was a factor (whether major or
> minor...this is not the issue, at this point) in the South's agrarian
> economy. The South did not like tariffs because they had slaves; they did
> not like tariffs because of the negative impact on their economy.
>
> Am I beating a dead horse here?
No dead horses yet
I also think it is good to point out Dave Powell's comment that just
arrived in my mailbox. The secessionists were quite willing to declare
slavery as the main cause of their action before the war and during the
war and even right after the war. (There is a nice statement from SC's
last Confederate governor about this, in a letter from prison after the
war.) It was only when it came time to write their memoirs that they
began to retreat from this position.
Jim Epperson
Esteemed member DPowell334@aol.com contributes:
In a message dated 97-03-18 17:39:21 EST, you write:
Or is that Slavery is such an all-pervasive theme of the ante-bellum period
that it is difficult to see it in any other terms? In fact, it is not modern
writers who make the most compelling case for slavery as a cause, but the
leading men of the period. It is they who viewed slavery as a foundation of
their way of life, made no apologies for it, and spoke freely in defense of
it any chance they could.
In what terms other than slavery would you view the Missouri Compromise?
Dave Powell
Well, I imagine there's an equation to calculate the length of time it would
take to compose an appropriate response to Cap'n Jim's questions he
presented at the end of his lecture, but I can't think in numbers that
large. :-)
To take a stab at it:
>(1) Why did the two sections of the country, North and South, develop
>divergent views on the question of secession and the nature of the Union?
Short answer: Expedience.
Longer answer: The question of secession, I don't believe, was one that was
ever considered well enough prior to the 1850's for many to have a firm
opinion. (And I do mean secession, not rebellion.) Certainly it came up
now and again, but why, where, and how far did it go? The all encompassing
answer is that it didn't seem to have as much to do with region as it did
with who was, from a certain point of view, getting the short end of the
stick from the Federal government.
Then there is the question of national unity. It is a fairly simply matter
for us to sit back in our reclining chairs and type on our ergonomic
keyboards and talk about national unity in the latter part of the 20th
century, but back then the nation barely had an identity. I've spoken with
Europeans who talk of American egotism in even suggesting we have a history,
what with it being barely 200 years old. England, now they have a history.
In the early 1800's the United States were barely an embryo. (Use of plural
verb intentional.)
Combine those two concepts and you have a recipe for crisis. Citizens of
this country were loyal enough to consider leaving the bonds of the nation
as a radical solution to a problem, but the point is, it was still
considered a possible solution. As the South felt the strain of various
elements starting to weigh down on their accepted way of life, it wasn't an
enormous leap for them to think that secession was a viable alternative to
the potential of an altered lifestyle.
>(2) What could have prevented the sectional dispute from leading to Civil War?
The better question is "Could anything..." I don't know if I believe in
destiny or not, but the early history of the United States makes me believe
we were destined to go to war over this issue. It's not that a solution
without war was impossible, just that the men that ran this country were not
the ones to find that solution.
: Brian Hampton
Hi Dennis & Fringe!
Most interesting information & sources, Dennis. However, like any
good answer, it suggests further questions.
On Tue, 18 Mar 1997, Brian Hampton wrote:
> Esteemed member Brian Hampton
>
> At 04:02 AM 3/18/97 -0600, you wrote:
> >Esteemed member "Kate Boden"
>
> >This was very much evident by the saint-making of John Brown.
>
> Just a small point.
>
> IIRC, John Brown wasn't much of a saint until after the war began and he was
> transformed into an icon.
>
> I don't mean to take way from your overall point, which I happen to agree with.
Jim Epperson
At 08:03 PM 3/18/97 -0600, you wrote:
>And I think it is fair to say that this kind of reaction ("Brown was crazy,
but >he gave his life in a noble cause") did not exactly go over well in the
South.
I guess the answer to IIRC is "no." :-)
Point conceded.
I think the memory circuit that fired on that was thinking about the song
and its use.
: Brian Hampton
Hello to one and all,
Just what is going on here = Missouri Compromise, Dred Scott,
Taney Court, slave rebellions, etc. all important, to be sure, but
whatever happened to root causes? We seem to be miles ahead of ourselves.
How about the three C's: Colonialism, the Constitution, and
Control? Am I the only person who thinks that the Civil War was very
much about unfinished business from the colonial period? How can we
possibly understand the Anglophile South unless we understand English
colonialism? What better way to understand the way the Southern planters
treated their slaves, their women, and their poor whites than to view the
way the English treated their ethnically inferior (referring of course to
Cromwell's treatment of the Irish, which included mass murder and the
shipping of able-bodied men on slave ships to the colonies), their women,
and their poor (the Enclosure Movement).
And how about the Constitution - an accomodationist document if
ever there was one - did the way it papered over the cracks make the CW
inevitable? It's pretty clear Jefferson thought so. Before we get to
the Taney Court, shouldn't we discuss the contradictions in the
Constitution, the problems the founding fathers ducked or passed on to
future generations? The whole issue of states' rights vs. federal
primacy was unresolved. Wasn't the Dred Scott Decision - or its
equivalent - inevitable? The war too?
As for Control - the South started with it. All those Virginia
presidents. The original USA wasn't a democracy but a republic. Control
started to slip away from the Southern aristocracy with expansion - which
brings us back to colonialsim.. I have this notion that the South wasn't
the rebel of the piece - rather, it was the North and the Western
frontier breaking with colonialism and its aristocratic/ologarchic rule
and moving toward a truer, albeit rough democracy. North and South
evolved along different lines and at very different paces. The SOuth
found itself the desperate defender of the status quo.
David Wieck
At 05:40 PM 3/18/97 -0600, you wrote:
>Esteemed member "Kate Boden"
>
>Am I beating a dead horse here?
>
Just kidding about the snips. In essence I told you to look at the
secession arguments - you did and found the references to tariffs. If I
had spelled it right when I set the search key off - I would have found
them too. My bag - as the kids say.
I do not think you - or I - are beating a dead horse. I believe
that you can scratch any issue mentioned in Jim's litany of events and find
the issue of slavery lurking to some degree within it.
But, I have posted far too much today. I am off and have
discovered how idle hands lead to multiple posts. Let me lay low for a day
or so and choose my spots. More carefully.
I have enjoyed round one of the discussions and have found myself
more in agreement than disagreement with every post. This can't last!?
Take Care
Dennis
David:
I like this point very much. Basically, the south never stopped functioning
on the economy of a colony, and was stuck in trying to keep this intact. The
slave states maintained a system of social status that included not only
slaves; but , various levels of freed blacks, mulattos, and whites alike,
which "sort of" mirrored the old European aristocracies.
The problem is that the south's old friends (friends they thought they could
still rely on later), england, France, etc., were also moving away from that
economy themselves (at least with the home populations) with increased
industrialization. They were slowly being left behind by the world they had
once been part of.
Esteemed member "Kate Boden"
> Esteemed member "James F. Epperson" contributes:
>
>>>>SNIP<<<> That is not the point. The point is that the founders were trying to
> create a nation. Would they have created a nation that could so easily
> have self-destructed? I don't think so, and the Madison quote is a
> strong support for that argument.
> >>>SNIP<<< Jim,
Your argument assumes that secession would equate to destruction. I
disagree. Also, I notice that Madison's comments were penned in 1832 and
not at the time of the creation of the Constitution, so I cannot help but
wonder how many of the events and dissensions that occurred in that time
period influenced Madison's recollections and perceptions.
Kate
Hello Fringe: I'd like to add that the other half of the Missouri
Compromise was the admission to the Union of Maine. This ensured for
the time being an exactly equal number of U.S. Senators from the North
and from the South, which both sides felt was critical in preventing
one side or the other from getting the political upper hand. As time
went on, this senatorial balance became more critical as the
possibility of more states being admitted became imminent. The
"balance" also contributed to a sort of gridlock, and toward the end,
prevented any sort of workable compromise. Since Senators were elected
by State Legislatures, it put pressure on these bodies to make sure
that the men they chose would maintain either a hard-line Southern or
Northern position.
On the subject of the Gag Rule, State Legislatures were bombarded with
petitions which they were urged to forward on to Congress to be read
into the record. As a nod to those from the GDG who have been talking
about the role of women, we have one spectacular anti-Gag Rule
petition here in the Archives. It is 57 feet long (sheets of foolscap
glued end-to-end) and it was signed by over 3,000 women. It was
circulated around the State via church groups and Ladies Aid
Societies, and it indicates how well organized such opposition could
be!
Sylvia
> Esteemed member Rich Rollins contributes:
>
> Also, a basic phenomena that everyone who deals with these issues is
> what historians used to call "presentism". We often project our
> contemporary values and points of view on the past, without really
> looking at the conditions at the time.
Fringers:
Oh what fun we are having!
Anyway, I could not have asked for a better introduction for the
"Kate's School of Understanding the Inexplicable" ...but, all levity aside,
my personal method of attempting to understand the causes of any behavior,
be it Southern Secessionism or conflicts in Northern Ireland is to imagine
myself in the actual circumstances of the period in question. I try to wipe
out any of my existing notions about right and wrong, good and bad,
hindsights etc. I try to look at events as they might have been viewed
then, through the eyes of the participants, not as they can be picked apart
and examined under a microscope now, with oodles of reference books to
delve into. My reason for feeling that this an excellent starting point is
because without understanding what the participants "believed", rather than
what we, with all our accumulated knowledge believe now, we cannot hope to
understand what motivated them.
Enough said on that...(or at least until someone wants to point out what
a silly approach to the study of history it is...)
Regarding the reality of the FEAR of slave insurrection...Herbert
Aptheker in his book _American Negro Slave Revolts_ states:
"While there is a difference of opinion as to the prevalence of discontent
amongst the slaves, one finds very nearly unanimous agreement concerning
the widespread fear of servile rebellion."
What should be our concern in this matter is not whether the fear was
justified, but, what impact that fear had on the actions of the Southern
populace. Mary Chesnut, in her _Diaries_ gives one the true "feeling" of
the fear, not an examination of the basis for the fear.
Fact: In 1860 the population of the Southern States was 11,133,361. Of
those, 3,838,765, or 34% were slaves. In South Carolina the population was
703,708. Of those, 402,406, or 57% were slaves. In Mississippi the
population was 791,305. Of those, 436,631, or 55% were slaves. I use these
numbers merely to give us a "feel", so to speak, for the Southerner's
circumstances. There was no way they could avoid the realization of the
magnitude of the problem. The picture that it brings to my mind is this:
While taking a strolling down the street in Anywhere, Southern United
States every third person you pass would be a slave. Change that to a
stroll down a South Carolina or Mississippi street and every second person
you pass would be a slave.
Now, in using my far from professional method of viewing history, I
cannot but imagine most Southerners felt strongly enough that any threat of
insurrection would have fearful impact on their families and property.
Include in the fear of such an eventuality, the BELIEF that citizens of
their own Union could possibly wish to unleash such a destructive force
upon them. It does not surprise me then that the South would view the
Northern states, from which so much political and social (abolitionist)
rhetoric flowed, as adversaries.
Kate
> Jim,
>
> Your argument assumes that secession would equate to destruction. I
> disagree.
(BTW, I think an extended discussion on this issue crosses the bounds of
what we want to talk about here, so let's be careful about wandering down
the counter-factual "what if the US had disintegrated" road.)
> Also, I notice that Madison's comments were penned in 1832 and
> not at the time of the creation of the Constitution, so I cannot help but
> wonder how many of the events and dissensions that occurred in that time
> period influenced Madison's recollections and perceptions.
It is fair to wonder, but we must recall that he is considered the Father
of the Constitution because he essentially wrote the darn thing, and so is
an appropriate authority on the intent of the people at the Convention.
In addition, note that he bluntly states that those who try to pull a
right of secession out of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798
are wrong in doing so. But, yes, he might be remembering things wrong or
had his perceptions skewed by the intervening years. (Note that he wrote
that during the time of the Nullification Crisis.) But I think that in
the absence of any evidence of this kind of skewing or mis-remembering
-- and there might well be some that I don't know about -- I think we
have to take this at face value.
Geez, it's 2:30 a.m.! Time to hit the sack!!!!!
Jim Epperson
In a message dated 97-03-19 04:26:06 EST, you write:
<<
You are right about the assumption, but I will stand by it. I think that
once it was shown that one state could leave for "light and transient
reasons," that others soon would follow, and instead of a single nation
between the Rio Grande and Canada there would be 40 or so piddling little
nation-states, like Germany before Bismark, and I think this would have
been very bad. (This is one place where I will heartily agree to Rich
Rollins's previously stated concerns about frameworks driving conclusions.
I'm an American nationalist and unashamed of it.) But I readily admit this
is almost entirely opinion.
>>
I think that disunion would have meant destruction as well. Look how poorly
the Articles of Confederation worked. Complete disunion would have been
worse.
Dave Powell
In a message dated 97-03-18 21:50:34 EST, you write:
<< And how about the Constitution an accomodationist document if ever there was one did the way it papered over the cracks make the CW inevitable? It's pretty clear Jefferson thought so. Before we get to the Taney Court, shouldn't we discuss the contradictions in the Constitution, the problems the founding fathers ducked or passed on to future generations? The whole issue of states' rights vs. federal primacy was unresolved. Wasn't the Dred Scott Decision or its equivalent inevitable? The war too?
As for Control - the South started with it. All those Virginia
presidents. The original USA wasn't a democracy but a republic. Control
started to slip away from the Southern aristocracy with expansion - which
brings us back to colonialsim.. I have this notion that the South wasn't
the rebel of the piece - rather, it was the North and the Western
frontier breaking with colonialism and its aristocratic/ologarchic rule
and moving toward a truer, albeit rough democracy. North and South
evolved along different lines and at very different paces. The SOuth
found itself the desperate defender of the status quo.
David Wieck
Second, it failed to discuss the issue of secession. My own belief is that
this was intentional - the Founders wanted to remove any thougths of
"backsliding" if the going got rough. Remember, they had the Articles of
Confederation fresh in thier memories, and were very dissatisfied with the
virtually inert Federal government that produced.
My own view of the secession and Constitutionality problem is that there
_was_ a procedure for seceeding - amending the constitution, which we as a
nation have done numerous times to fix holes or problems in the document. Had
the South pursued this route, and left the Union legally, there would have
been no problem.
However, the route the South chose was not legal as is - it flew in the face
of established political tradition and the spirit of majority rule. Clearly,
there would never have been a sufficient majority to amend and let the South
leave.
Dave Powel
At 09:14 PM 3/18/97 -0500, you wrote:
>Esteemed member smithr@agate.net (Ned & Diane Smith) contributes:
>
>>Esteemed member Dennis Lawrence
I can answer some of these, but not all. How about if I suggest
some good books for the others. Slavery is an enormously complex issue -
what we know about slave life is surpassed by what we theorize about it.
> Certainly the black man showed his willingness to fight during the
>CW, but I'm curious, & haven't found the figures yet, how many of the black
>men in the Union Army were slaves & how many freemen.
The must reads in this area are Dudley Cornish _The Sable Arms_ ,
James Mcpherson's _The Negro's War_(primary sources, though mostly
truncated) and Rich Rollins' _Black Southerners in Gray_ a collection of
essays on that topic. I haven't read Ervin Jordan's recent contribution but
intend to do so.
> Information on the dig in Va. most interesting! Is potential slave
>revolt the only possible explanation for hidden weapons, though? Was there
>many violent incidents between slaves?
You are correct about the difficulty of interpreting the finds. I
don't want to sensationalize the findings of these digs. Most of what they
find are artifacts such as utensils, pottery, and bones that tell us more
about their daily lives. Archaeology is a slow and uneven route to
definitive conclusions. All the weapons parts tell us is that there may
have been more weapons in the slave community than previously believed.
There is an essay by the director of education at Stratford Hall,
Virginia, Jeanne Calhoun, on the slave experience at Stratford Hall,
Virginia at http://www.arthes.com:1030/africa.html Jeanne also discusses
the difficulties of drawing conclusions from historical archaeology. Be
aware this is Tidewater Colonial slavery - the experience of slavery varied
from plantation to plantation and day to day.
We hope to get some of the direct archaeology reports on line in
late summer on the Stratford Hall web site.
> I question the slaves readiness to rise up because of their
>behavior in the Southern states during the war. I may be unaware of
>incidents, but my impression was that slaves "rebelled" by acting as
>guides, giving information, helping Union prisoners escape, etc.. I don't
>recall any tales of them rising up & kill their masters & mistresses.
There were instances throughout the period of enslavement of
African Americans. Sometimes it is hard to separate real incidents from
rumors in the primary sources. Mary Chesnut repeated some incidents of
slaughter that have the ring of rumor rather than fact.
> Were slave revolts all led by educated, artisan slaves? Is some
>explanation to why educating slaves was discouraged or forbidden?
No - and there weren't that many organized slave revolts to start
with. But artisans who lived away from the plantation had access to more
information about the political climate of the time and less control by
their masters. Many also freely mixed with some of the lower class whites.
Both Gabriel and Vessey attempted to involve only urban slaves in their
revolts, and expected lower class whites to support them. Both were
betrayed by plantation slaves.
The compulsory ignorance laws were strengthened after Turner and
Gabriel. The rationale was as you describe. Black religion also was placed
under more restraint - Turner was a preacher. (I stood in a pulpit he
preached from - at least according to local historians)
You have led me into an area I have some knowledge of - Black
education. I have to limit the conversation here, since I fear this is
straying away from the causes of the war topic. But, I would state that
both the constraints on the education of Blacks and the seeking of
education by Blacks despite these restrictions were often tied to fears of
freedom and later of equality - in both north and south.
Carter Woodson's momentous work in 1912, _The Education of the
Negro Prior to 1861_ is essential for any understanding of the motivation
of self education efforts of slaves and freedmen of that era.
BTW, for those interested in women in the Civil War - and I suggest
most of us are - the best single narrative of slave life for a female,
IMHO, is _Life of a Slave Girl_ by Harriet Jacobs.
> Great stuff, Dennis, & thank you!!
Take Care
At 03:06 PM 3/19/97 GMT, you wrote:
>Esteemed member lawrence@arthes.com (Robert W Lawrence) contributes:
>
>
>Having said this what was the alternative? If an accommodation was not
made for
>slavery there would have been no United States. I am not one to suggest
that the
>end justifies the means-I mean the end result is that we have the greatest
and
>freest country in history but we are still paying the price or our
founders in
>effect "punting" this issue
>
>Robert W Lawrence
>lawrence@arthes.com
>
Greetings:
Little brother is in good company when he suggests without the
compromise there would have been no constitution. Alexander Hamilton said
the same thing. It is easy to look at the Constitution and see the direct
and indirect protections of slavery within it:
1) the 3/5ths clause gave extra representation to slave holding states 2)
allowed slave trade for 20 more years 3) All direct taxes fixed on 3/5th
clause 4) No tax on articles exported from any state (slaves and cotton)
5) fugitive slave law 6) Domestic violence provision 7) the failure to
mention slaves was also a concession
However, the Constitution contained guarantees that the issue of
slavery would always be open for debate. The Bill of Rights itself was a
threat to a slave society. the right of free speech, assembly, petition,
the definitive date for the ending of the slave trade, all made it
inevitable that the question of slavery would always be open for public
scrutiny. As Brother Bob said, the framers punted the issue, but perhaps
with the idea that future generations would oversee the decline and end of
the peculiar institution.
What happened was a series of compromises and challenges eroded the
freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution. The gag rule struck at the heart
of the document that defined a free society. If the right of speech,
petition and to have your views represented in Congress were abrogated,
tyranny would be the result.
The view of many unionists, north and south, was that disunion
would lead to a further eroding of the rights of individuals.
BTW, Frederick Douglass and William Garrison split over their
respective views of the Constitution. Garrison said it was a pro-slavery
document and could never provide freedom for slaves. Douglass said, no, if
read correctly, the Constitution is a guarantee of freedom. And of course,
Abe said, you're looking at the wrong document, the Declaration is the
founding document of this country.
So I can understand why we all might disagree on the above also.
Take Care
(Douglass was right)
> Esteemed member Brian Hampton contributes:
Wasn't it Joe Blow farmer, as well as the Southern "Aristocracy", that
elected the politicians that fanned the flames of discontent? Perhaps,
these politicians were elected because they represented the views of the
majority. Just perhaps.
> Esteemed member "James F. Epperson" contributes:
>
> You are right about the assumption, but I will stand by it. I think that
> once it was shown that one state could leave for "light and transient
> reasons," that others soon would follow, and instead of a single nation
> between the Rio Grande and Canada there would be 40 or so piddling little
> nation-states, like Germany before Bismark, and I think this would have
> been very bad. (This is one place where I will heartily agree to Rich
> Rollins's previously stated concerns about frameworks driving
conclusions.
> I'm an American nationalist and unashamed of it.) But I readily admit
this
> is almost entirely opinion.
>
Jim,
I am not convinced that any state would have left the Union for "light
and transient" reasons. From my knowledge of history, units of government
(as well as individuals, I might add) usually act upon what they perceive
to be their best interest. And, just as the nullification crisis
demonstrated, until 1860 the Southern states did not find it in their best
interest to attempt disunion. Therefore, why would one expect other states
to attempt the same for less important reasons?
> > Also, I notice that Madison's comments were penned in 1832 and
> > not at the time of the creation of the Constitution, so I cannot help
but
> > wonder how many of the events and dissensions that occurred in that >
time period influenced Madison's recollections and perceptions.
>
> It is fair to wonder, but we must recall that he is considered the Father
> of the Constitution because he essentially wrote the darn thing, and so
is
> an appropriate authority on the intent of the people at the Convention.
Yes, just as both Longstreet and Ewell (or am I thinking of Early?) were
participants at Gettysburg, but cannot seem to separate what actually
happened from the way in which the results influenced their perceptions. I
grant you, though, I do not know enough about Madison to say one way or the
other.
> In addition, note that he bluntly states that those who try to pull a
> right of secession out of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798
> are wrong in doing so. But, yes, he might be remembering things wrong or
> had his perceptions skewed by the intervening years. (Note that he wrote
> that during the time of the Nullification Crisis.) But I think that in
> the absence of any evidence of this kind of skewing or mis-remembering
> -- and there might well be some that I don't know about -- I think we
> have to take this at face value.
>
As I pointed out above, in the discussions we have had on events at
Gettysburg we are always admonishing each other to remember that the
viewpoints expressed by authors after the fact are most likely to be
slanted to some extent by later events and influences. We do not take them
at face value...so why should we take Madison that way? Just a minor
point...but, perhaps it may become increasing more so as our discussion
evolves.
You're doing a great moderator's job, Jim. Keep up the good work.
Kate
Esteemed Member Jim Epperson wrote:
>>Oh, but this research has been done. Some of it is in McPherson's BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM, and there is a small book by Ralph Wooster, THE SECESSION CONVENTIONS OF THE SOUTH. McPherson shows a very high degree of correlation between counties with high slave ownership and secessionist sentiment, I think primarily in Virginia. Wooster also looks at the make-up of the conventions, but it has been a while since I looked at that book
>>I think at some point we are allowed to take these people at their word.
Or at least, those who voted in the secession conventions. That may or
may not be “the people.”
>>[I said] Well, the fact is that secession did not occur over the
> election of TJ, over the Embargo, or any other issue. In short, there is no concrete reason for this fear.
>>That is not the point. The point is that the founders were trying to create a nation. Would they have created a nation that could so easily have self-destructed? I don't think so, and the Madison quote is a strong support for that argument.
Further, I cant back this up because I havent the time to do the
reading, but to say that a free people can enter into an agreement like
the Constitution and then not have the right to back out cant have rung
true to pre-CW Americans. They were, after all, only a generation or two
away from the REvolution.
My overall perspective is this: The tension between the states and the
Federal power was, between 1787 and 1861, the single, overriding issue
in all debates. Slavery, as well as the others (and there were others,
among which were the Transcontinental Railway, Land-grants, etc., The
Republicans had an agenda that could not be passed until the South
pulled out of Congress, so if ;you want to see the other issues, look at
what the Republicans did then) were the specifics over which debates
took place. In other words, the war came because the two-party system,
which is the vehicle in our society in which interstate disputes are
ajudicated, could not deal with slavery and related issues. The reason
it could not is because expansion into the territories marked the point
at which an oligarcy that had controlled the central power until this
point would lose power, regardless of the specific issue at hand. The
real question, then, was political power and the rights and powers of
the states vs. the central government.
Not only did all questions ultimately come to this before 1861, but it
continues today. In my state, California, it continues to be the major
issue, only now it centers on the control of the border, immigration,
welfare, affirmative action, etc. Regardless of the specifics, it
always boils down to this: do the individuals, cities, counties,
states, etc., have the right to order their own community, or does the
central power have the right to tell them what to do?
>>Accordingly, I
touched on what I thought were the large issues leading up to the
crucial
decade of the 1850's. If there is something you think I left out, feel
free
to bring it up for discussion and comment.
If you begin with the assumption that slavery was the sole cause, then
you will "touch on" those issues that were tied to slavery, and you will
see everything in that light.
>>To turn it around a bit, just because it does fit within a conventional framework does not makeit wrong, does it?
Of course not. However, if you go back and read the historiography of
the causes of the war, the "conventional wisdom" keeps changing. I dont
have the time to go through all the various schools of thought. My
point here is that contemporary Americans think from a certain
perspective. A major part of that is the assumption that race is a key
issue in all areas of endeavor. This is peculiar to us. If you read
the documents from the CW period, you will see that they were no
obsessed with race as we are. They had other concerns. The race
question influences us to a very large degree. Second, the same is true
with the concept that the central power is the main vehicle for getting
things done. We have grown up with that so ingrained in us that it is
difficult for us to imagine a world without a strong central government.
For many of us, ‘freedom’ has come to mean the protection of the central
power, and living on its largess. I dont know if it is possible for a
person who assumes that freedom = protection of the central power to see
the origins of the war in other terms, or to imagine that the states
should have the power to decide whether or not they wanted to be a part
of the Union. (And this is not to be taken as a personal attack on Jim
or anyone else!)
>>If we accept the notion that secession was the result of some kind of sectionalism, we have to then look at what drove the sectionalism. I will entertain anything on this issue from soup to nuts -- that is the point of having the seminar, right? -- but slavery clearly was a major sectional issue, and if it turns out too be the only one out there, then I think some conclusions are warrented.
I agree that we have to look at what the sectional differences were
based on. I think it was over the philosophy of government, and that
slavery was just one issue (perhaps the one that couldnt be bargained
away.) But it was also a question of political power and its transfer.
In addition, until I have the time to look at the research that has been
done, I will continue to think that the secession process itself must be
carefully examined.
Here's another example of presentism at work. We all think of the South
as the "Solid South." That phrase comes not from the CW, but from
post-1900 politics. In fact, the South before and even during the war
was anything but solid. And I mean it was not wholly in favor of
secession. Significant numbers of southerners during the war still
opposed secession. Yet we continue to believe that all southerners were
secessionists, and pro-slavery.
Esteemed member Richard Rollins
Kate wrote:
>>Anyway, I could not have asked for a better introduction for the
"Kate's School of Understanding the Inexplicable" ...but, all levity
aside,
my personal method of attempting to understand the causes of any
behavior,
be it Southern Secessionism or conflicts in Northern Ireland is to
imagine
myself in the actual circumstances of the period in question. I try to
wipe
out any of my existing notions about right and wrong, good and bad,
hindsights etc. I try to look at events as they might have been viewed
then, through the eyes of the participants, not as they can be picked
apart
and examined under a microscope now, with oodles of reference books to
delve into. My reason for feeling that this an excellent starting point
is
because without understanding what the participants "believed", rather
than
what we, with all our accumulated knowledge believe now, we cannot hope
to
understand what motivated them.
Enough said on that...(or at least until someone wants to point out
what
a silly approach to the study of history it is...)
I couldnt agree more. This is what anyone who is interested in how
people living 130 or more years ago must try to do. As silly as it
sounds!
Jim wrote:
>>(This is one place where I will heartily agree to Rich
Rollins's previously stated concerns about frameworks driving
conclusions. I'm an American nationalist and unashamed of it.) But I
readily admit this is almost entirely opinion.
Aha! The smoking gun!
(published, 1952:
"One cannot pursue this debate through the pages of the 'Annals of
Congress' (not the most acurate of reports, but almost all that we
have) without realizing that the Southern members would have been
happy to chop logic with their opponents through an eternity of
speeches. What angered them was the statement that slavery was
incompatible with the democratic way of life; what terrified them was
the thought that they were losing control of the Republican
[Jeffersonian Democratic] Party; what they endeavored to conceal was
their simple desire to rule the West. In spite of their threats of
disunion and civil war, both sides were willing to compromise; and,
indeed, as far as their economic differences were concerned, a
compromise might have been effected then and at any time during the
next forty years. But slavery admitted of no compromise, and at
heart, everyone knew it. It can still be discerned, like a palimpsest
writing, beneath all these dessicated speeches, imparting, even to
the weariest argument, the presence of an unwearying doom."
The point, I suppose, is that it was pretty much all on the table even
in 1820, and the only thing that might have been added to the mix by
1860 was a stronger sense of national identity, sufficient to make the North
support an all-out war to prevent the dissolution of the Union (if the
South had gone in 1820, who knows what would have happened?) The
remarkable thing is that the crisis had such a long, long fuse.
Norm Levitt
On Wed, 19 Mar 1997, Richard Rollins wrote:
> My overall perspective is this: The tension between the states and the
> Federal power was, between 1787 and 1861, the single, overriding issue
> in all debates. Slavery, as well as the others (and there were others,
> among which were the Transcontinental Railway, Land-grants, etc., The
> Republicans had an agenda that could not be passed until the South
> pulled out of Congress, so if ;you want to see the other issues, look at
> what the Republicans did then)
Rich, you are invited to present any evidence you can find which supports
the notion that arguments over the transcontinential railroad or
land grants were driving the sectional discord. I'm sure it would be an
interesting addition to the discussion.
> were the specifics over which debates
> took place. In other words, the war came because the two-party system,
> which is the vehicle in our society in which interstate disputes are
> ajudicated, could not deal with slavery and related issues.
We continue to get ahead of ourselves, but this is where you err, IMO.
There is no evidence (that I am aware of) that anything other than slavery
could not have been dealt with within the existing political framework.
You are welcome to present it here, that is what the seminar is for.
> The reason
> it could not is because expansion into the territories marked the point
> at which an oligarcy that had controlled the central power until this
> point would lose power, regardless of the specific issue at hand. The
> real question, then, was political power and the rights and powers of
> the states vs. the central government.
But the extent to which this is true is tautological, i.e., the politics
of any system of government will always revolve around the divisions of
power, whether between branches of government, levels of government, or
competing political parties. Since this is always true it sheds little
light on any single poltical crisis. To see what caused a particular
crisis we have to look at the events that drove that crisis.
Jim Epperson
Kate:
I don't know that we ever fully answered before, just who the 'voting
public' was in these States. What were the voting restrictions, what portion
of the public actually voted, and thus who was actually doing the electing?
"The Majority" meant very different things in different states, and
different decades.
At 11:18 AM 3/19/97 +0000, you wrote:
>Esteemed member Richard Rollins
>
>BIG SNIP>
>
>Here's another example of presentism at work. We all think of the South
>as the "Solid South." That phrase comes not from the CW, but from
>post-1900 politics. In fact, the South before and even during the war
>was anything but solid. And I mean it was not wholly in favor of
>secession. Significant numbers of southerners during the war still
>opposed secession. Yet we continue to believe that all southerners were
>secessionists, and pro-slavery.
>
Rich,
I have a little problem with the "We all think" part of your last
paragraph. As I said last week, William Freehling's first chapter pretty
well destroys the myth of a solidified South. Jim pointed out yesterday
that there was a very high degree of
correlation between counties with high slave ownership and secessionist
sentiment. When you say that we continue to believe that all southerners
were secessionist and pro-slavery, I suggest that you are preaching to the
choir.
Dennis
> Esteemed member Dave Powell contributes:
>
> My own view of the secession and Constitutionality problem is that there
> _was_ a procedure for seceeding - amending the constitution, which we as
a
> nation have done numerous times to fix holes or problems in the document.
>Had the South pursued this route, and left the Union legally, there would
>have been no problem.
>
> However, the route the South chose was not legal as is - it flew in the
face
> of established political tradition and the spirit of majority rule.
Clearly,
> there would never have been a sufficient majority to amend and let the
>South leave.
>
Dave,
I'm curious. What would the reasons be, beside possible failure to
obtain a majority, that the South did not pursue the path of amending the
Constitution? Wouldn't it have made sense for them to have attempted this
first, trying to gain support, rather than relying on secession? I'm also
confused.
Kate
On Wed, 19 Mar 1997, Douglas E. Weirich wrote:
> I don't know that we ever fully answered before, just who the 'voting
> public' was in these States. What were the voting restrictions, what portion
> of the public actually voted, and thus who was actually doing the electing?
> "The Majority" meant very different things in different states, and
> different decades.
State apportionment of the state legislatures was much less egalitarian
than it is today. IIRC, Virginia was set up to give the tidewater
counties much more power than the western counties, and in South Carolina,
slaves counted as a full person for determining apportionment, which
really skewed the power to the high slave regions.
Those are the only two I really have heard anything about.
Jim Epperson
Just in case anyone took it the wrong way, the following remark
>>Aha! The smoking gun!
Thanks much. Unfortunately, there is little chance that Ill ever see
these books let alone have time to read them. Can I talk you into
giving us a brieg synopsis?
On Wed, 19 Mar 1997, Kate Boden wrote:
> I'm curious. What would the reasons be, beside possible failure to
> obtain a majority, that the South did not pursue the path of amending the
> Constitution? Wouldn't it have made sense for them to have attempted this
> first, trying to gain support, rather than relying on secession? I'm also
> confused.
Well, I'm not Dave, but I am a lot better looking
To make an appeal to amending the Constitution would have been a tacit
admission that the right was not contained in the document as written,
and no one wanted to do that.
Jim Epperson
Brian Hampton wrote:
>>Did the Southern
people, as opposed to the politicians who always seem to take center
stage in this discussion, support the idea of secession before they were
convinced their homes and lives were threatened? (That's a question. I
know what the Southern "aristocracy" thought, but what about Joe Blow
farmer. Not that Joe Blow farmer really mattered to anyone until his
body was needed to catch bullets, but that's another subject.) Perhaps,
in that light, it is clear that the few who were thinking of secession
prior to the 1850's needed to build on a situation that had enough
emotional impact to sway popular opinion to their side. Until Lincoln,
they didn't have that situation.
Dramatic cases generally draw dramatic responses.
Excellent point. Historians are, in genral, biased towards those who
read and write about public issues (i.e., politics). As far as I know,
and if Im wrong here I really would appreciate the information,)
historians have just assumed that the arguments made by proslavery
advocates were accepted by the rank and file ordinary citizens. No
research has been done to substantiate that.
I think we need to distinguish between our abilities to assess what
happened and why, on the one hand, and our emotional caring about which
way the outcome went. As an historian (well, an amateur one) I am quite
capable of assessing the historical record and reaching intellectually
honest conclusions regardless of how I think I would have wanted the
outcome to go had I been there, and I think that applies to most of us
here and most historians worth reading. So some of the concerns about
"presentism" seem to me to be mis-placed. It is one thing to say that I
would have wanted the sectional crisis to be resolved one way because my
20th Century education and upbringing have formed me in a way that
pre-disposes me to see only that outcome as tolerable. It is entirely
different -- and unsupportable, IMO -- to say that my education and
upbringing would in any way prevent me from rationally interpreting the
historical record.
To illustrate this point with a whimsical example, I very much wanted my
alma mater to win all its basketball games this year and the NCAA
tournament as well. This does not prevent me from noticing that they did
not win all their games, nor does it prevent me from making rational and
accurate and reasonable assessments of why they did not succeed. In fact,
in my experience, we tend to be harder on "our side" because we tend to
know more about it, and to think we know better ways to have done things.
If I may be permitted a somewhat sharp remark, not directed at anyone in
particular, I find suggestions of "presentism" in these kinds of
discussions a lot like accusations of a "liberal bias" in the media or
"the refs were against us" in a basketball game: It's a form of excuse
making. This is not to say that the potential problems don't exist, but
it is a weak way to make an argument, even if true.
Jim Epperson
gfringe@appsmiths.com wrote:
>
> Esteemed member Dennis Lawrence
I might add that another "must read" on this topic is Joseph T.
Glatthaar's _Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers
and White Officers_.
As for the question of what portion of black Federals were slaves, there
is unquestionably room for much research. However, I would be very
startled if the answer is not this: those regiments raised in northern
states were comprised mainly of free blacks; those in southern states of
mainly of runaway slaves; those in the border states a roughly even
mixture that varied by the circumstances of the recruitment of the
particular regiment.
Greg Mast
"When North Carolina left the Union on May 20, almost all North
Carolinians supported that decision. Yet little more than a month
before, Unionist sentiment had dominated the state. Between February 28,
when they voted overwhelmingly for the Union, and April 15, the Unionism
of most North Carolinians endured. In March and early April, North
Carolina did not drift toward secession. During this time, Unionists
looked to the future with a feeling of optimism tinged with some
foreboding. If Lincoln would only pursue the 'let alone' policty that he
had supposedly adopted, the Unionists would triumph in the state. North
Carolina and the rest of the upper South would stay in the Union.
Meanwhile, the seceded states would find that they were unable to
establish a nation and would see that Lincoln posed no threat to them.
They would then apply for readmission to the United States. The nation
would thus be reunited.
"The Unionist perception of a soon-to-be reunited nation resulted
directly from the persistence of the two-party system in the state. The
fact that Whigs had come close to victory after years of defeat
convinced many North Carolinians that the hated Republican party could
be driven out of power in 1864 and that in the meantime the political
system would prevent the Lincoln administration from taking actions
hostile to southern interests."
Greg Mast
>
>
> snip<> BTW, Frederick Douglass and William Garrison split over their
> respective views of the Constitution. Garrison said it was a pro-slavery
> document and could never provide freedom for slaves. Douglass said, no, if
> read correctly, the Constitution is a guarantee of freedom. And of course,
> Abe said, you're looking at the wrong document, the Declaration is the
> founding document of this country.
>
> So I can understand why we all might disagree on the above also.
>
> Take Care
>
> Dennis
> (Douglass was right)
Honest Abe hit that old nail right on top of the head, All men are
created equal. It's what we do with our lives that sets us apart.
Now I need to ask a question, When was slavery indroducted on the
americas, what was the reasoning at that time?
I hope that we will all try to stay with the root causes for a while
because i think that the war was just the end result of a very long fuse
and that much is to be gained by the wisdom of the esteemed members.
I for one am getting a very good history lesson, But my dog ate my
homework.:-)
Jeff
Slavery began in what became the United States in 1619, when a Dutch
slave ship seeking shelter from a storm came into Chesapeake Bay and
ended up unloading its cargo at Jamestown. It was not until after 1680
that the institution began to take off.
Jim Epperson
According to Allan Nevins's book, THE FRUITS OF MANIFEST DESTINY, pages
240-241, Henry Benning wrote the following in the summer of 1849:
"the slavery question rides insolently over every other everywhere --
in fact that is the only question which in the least affects the results
of the elections."
Nevins footnotes this to page 169 of a book of correspondence titled
TOOMBS, STEPHENS, COBB CORRESPONDENCE.
Jim Epperson
I have a piece of an old article I cut out years ago, and unfortunately have
no citation. Essentially it describes (as below) that the first black slaves
arrived in Jamestown in 1619. However, it describes their status as that of
"limited servitude", similar to that of an Identured Servant. Supposedly
their status began to change as the system of indenturing ended, and laws
were passed to limit the rights (and of course intermingling with whites) of
blacks.
Most slaves in this period were headed for the Spanish colonies in Mexico,
South America, and the Carribean. The Dutch were a trader nation, with a
very large (and state of the art) merchant marine. In 1619 they were in the
middle of a long struggle for their freedon from Spain; but, in trade such
struggles often meant little (at least up until the money changed hands).
Point being, the Dutch could have trading their slaves anywhere, feeling
fairly free in these days to thumb their noses at Spain. After the Armada
had been defeated, Spain's influence was on the way down, and British ships
generally protected Dutch shipping.
Unloading a shipload of anything in Jamestown was probably considered good
luck, especially when you were just threatened by the loss of the whole
shipment at sea.
Britain itself did not get heavily involved in the slave trade until late in
the 1600s. Perhaps for the same reasons as stated above?
Someone please correct me if I am wrong on my timelines here.
In a message dated 97-03-19 18:03:25 EST, you write:
<<> I'm curious. What would the reasons be, beside possible failure to
> obtain a majority, that the South did not pursue the path of amending the
> Constitution? Wouldn't it have made sense for them to have attempted this
> first, trying to gain support, rather than relying on secession? I'm also
> confused.
Well, I'm not Dave, but I am a lot better looking
To make an appeal to amending the Constitution would have been a tacit
admission that the right was not contained in the document as written,
and no one wanted to do that.
>>
I think the near certainty that such an amendment would never have passed
had more to do with it than anything else. I think that if the fire-eaters
did follow a constitutional course, and it failed, the general perception
would be one of "sour grapes" if they did pursue the historical course. In
effect, they might have eroded a lot of thier support in the Upper South
States by such a plan.
Dave Powell
Some interesting points being raised:
First, on "presentism." While I don't dispute the fact that it is sometimes a
trap to judge too much of the past by modern standards, the opposite holds
true as well. My own opinion on this is that much "presentism" has been used
to examine secession, but mostly in defense of Southern actions - there is a
current trend to view the struggle in modern political terms, as the
foundation of the struggle between state and Federal Power. As such, a lot of
effort has been expended in trying to show that Slavery was peripheral, not
central to the argument. Modern revisionists trying to cast the crisis in
light of Newt, et. al. gloss over slavery exactly because it is such an evil
by modern standards, and a blemish on the argument of Southern
justification..
However, I certainly think this is "presentism" as Rich describes it. Note
that ante-Bellum Southerners had no such pre-conceptions about the
institution. Many viewed it instead as a positive good. Hence, their writing
is full of references to slavery as the centerpiece of the CSA and the need
for secession. The Constitution of the CSA tells us it was so, Stephens'
'Cornerstone' Speech lays it out in complete detail, and the secession
ordinances spell it out, to name just a few examples. It is only post-war
and Modern writers who have tried to cast the movement in terms other than
slavery. If we do stop to look at it on thier terms, the participants were
telling us quite loudly what it was about.
After all, if States' Rights were the core issue, wouldn't the CSA
Constitution address those issues more explicitly? I mean, they adopted the
Federal Constitution almost wholesale, except for a few changes to protect
one "peripheral" issue - Slavery. Doesn't it follow that if they were willing
to risk war, they might address what they perceived as fundamental flaws? I
submit they did, of course - hence the explicit protections of Slavery.
Also, present-ism and ethnocentrism have thier own pitfalls - taken to their
logical conclusion, they fail to judge a given society by _any_ standards
except those of the society itself. Taken to it's logically absurd extreme,
ethno-centrism says that Hitler followed a moral path - by his own standards,
of course.
Any Historian brings some baggage from his own time to an issue, and makes
his own judgements on the result. Without some sort of anchor, history is
mere recitation.
In a message dated 97-03-19 14:21:04 EST, you write:
<< This is peculiar to us. If you read the documents from the CW period, you will see that they were no obsessed with race as we are. They had other concerns. The race question influences us to a very large degree.>>
Here I must disagree. Race permeated CW society much more significantly than
it does modern society. It was rigid, formalized, and very much linked to the
class system. Simply look at New Orleans, for example, with it's elaborate
classification of folks due to degree of bloodline, etc. Across the nation,
even the hint that Black men might rape White women was enough to precipitate
a riot - it was in some ways, the ultimate crime in that society. Nor does it
end with blacks - racism defined many immigrant groups then that we take for
granted now. The Irish to use one example, also fought a massive backlash of
racist opinion where they settled. In any corner of the country in the 1850s
you can find overt racism - it was a defining element of the society.
Dave Powell
>>
This is peculiar to us. If you read
the documents from the CW period, you will see that they were no
obsessed with race as we are. They had other concerns. The race
question influences us to a very large degree. <<
I think a distinction has to be made between the question of race and slavery. In the nineteenth century most whites in north and south were in agreement on the issue of race - they believed in the superiority of the white race.
Howlever, there were split was over the issue of race;that is, given the inferiority of the Black man, is it therefore moral or immoral to enslave him? This issue was all pervasive. Why else would the issue of slavery dominate an 1858 Senate race in the state of Illinois, a free state? It was because that issue was the hot button issue in the United States.
Take Care
Esteemed member DPowell334@aol.com contributes:
In a message dated 97-03-19 14:21:04 EST, you write:
<<>>Accordingly, I
touched on what I thought were the large issues leading up to the
crucial
decade of the 1850's. If there is something you think I left out, feel
free
to bring it up for discussion and comment.
If you begin with the assumption that slavery was the sole cause, then
you will "touch on" those issues that were tied to slavery, and you will
see everything in that light.
>>
Perhaps an expiriment is in order here. Devoid of slavery, the other issues
brought up as causes for the war had all come up before, but not resulted in
a serious secession crisis before. Why not? If the issue were one simply one
of power spheres, than any issue likely to precipitate a crisis should have.
Take Tarrifs - remove the Slavery undertone to the Tarrif issue, would
secession have resulted? Well, it hadn't proved enough of a stumbling block
in the past, so I submit that it likely would not have. On the other hand,
virtually any issue named as a cause has a slavery connection as a motive - I
see a common thread. Remove the tarrif part of the equation, and you still
have Slavery as an ignition point.
Dave Powell
Esteemed member "Kate Boden"
Esteemed member "Kate Boden"
1. The growth of the "rabid" anti-slavery movement in the North. I use the
word "rabid" as from a 1850's Southern standpoint, not necessarily my own.
This was very much evident by the saint-making of John Brown.
The South, as I see it, felt, by 1860, and the election of Lincoln, backed
into a corner, so to speak. That the time of compromises had ended. This
opinion wasn't merely based the slavery issue, but, from decades of seeing
their interests falling into the minority. I see the slavery issue as the
proverbial straw that broke the camel's back rather than the only factor
leading to the decision to secede.
Esteemed member DPowell334@aol.com contributes:
Esteemed member Norman Levitt
Esteemed member Dennis Lawrence "There were thousands of protectionists in Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, New York, and in New England who were not abolitionists. There
were thousands of abolitionists who were not free traders. The mongers
bought them together upon a mutual surrender of their principles. The free
trade abolitionists became protectionists; the non-abolition protectionists
became abolitionists. The result of this coalition was the infamous
Morill bill - the robber and the incendiary struck hands and united in a
raid against the South."
If southerners of the time couldn't separate the tariff from the
issue of slavery, how can we do so now?
>
Esteemed member "James F. Epperson"
Esteemed member "Douglas E. Weirich"
Esteemed member smithr@agate.net (Ned & Diane Smith) contributes:
Esteemed member "Douglas E. Weirich"
Esteemed member SYLVIA SHERMAN
Esteemed member Dennis Lawrence
Dennis
Esteemed member lawrence@arthes.com (Robert W Lawrence) contributes:
Esteemed member Richard Rollins
Esteemed member "Kate Boden"
Esteemed member Dennis Lawrence
Esteemed member Greg Mast
John C. Inscoe, _Mountain Masters, Slavery, and the Sectional Crisis in
Western North Carolina_ (University of Tennessee Press, 1989)
Robert C. Kenzer, _Kinship and Neighborhod in A Southern Community:
Orange County, North Carolina, 1849-1881_ (University of Tennessee
Press, 1987)
> Esteemed member Richard Rollins
Esteemed member "Kate Boden"
Kate
Esteemed member DPowell334@aol.com contributes:
In a message dated 97-03-18 13:45:58 EST, you write:
Esteemed member DPowell334@aol.com contributes:
Esteemed member DPowell334@aol.com contributes:
Esteemed member "James F. Epperson"
<<
Also, a basic phenomena that everyone who deals with these issues is
what historians used to call "presentism". We often project our
contemporary values and points of view on the past, without really
looking at the conditions at the time. The fact is that the morality of
owning another person is so repulsive to us that we find it hard, indeed
often impossible, to understand the thinking of those who did, or even
to get past that and see that there were other things going through
their minds. In your introduction you outline the argument. The very
next section is labeled "Sectional Politics Prior to 1860", but in the
first paragraph you jump right into slavery, as if there was nothing
else. Your first sentence, "If we insist...." simply dismisses the
possibility that secession was anything other than an excuse for
slavery. IN fact, you then go on talk abaout northern emancipation, the
Miss. Compromise, etc., all within the framework of the debate over
slavery. Is it possible that your point of view leads you to interpret
everything within this framework, thereby leading you to the inevitable
conclusion that the sole important issue was slavery?
>>
Rich.
Esteemed member Brian Hampton
Esteemed member smithr@agate.net (Ned & Diane Smith) contributes:
Certainly the black man showed his willingness to fight during the
CW, but I'm curious, & haven't found the figures yet, how many of the black
men in the Union Army were slaves & how many freemen.
Information on the dig in Va. most interesting! Is potential slave
revolt the only possible explanation for hidden weapons, though? Was there
many violent incidents between slaves?
I question the slaves readiness to rise up because of their
behavior in the Southern states during the war. I may be unaware of
incidents, but my impression was that slaves "rebelled" by acting as
guides, giving information, helping Union prisoners escape, etc.. I don't
recall any tales of them rising up & kill their masters & mistresses.
Were slave revolts all led by educated, artisan slaves? Is some
explanation to why educating slaves was discouraged or forbidden?
Great stuff, Dennis, & thank you!!
Diane
Esteemed member "James F. Epperson"
Esteemed member Brian Hampton
Esteemed member Anita Jackson-Wieck
Esteemed member Dennis Lawrence
>Kate
Esteemed member "Douglas E. Weirich"
Esteemed member SYLVIA SHERMAN
Esteemed member "Kate Boden"
On Tue, 18 Mar 1997, Kate Boden wrote:
Esteemed member DPowell334@aol.com contributes:
Esteemed member DPowell334@aol.com contributes:
>>
David,
I'd agree very much, here. As it relates to the ACW, the Constitution created
two problems - one of comission, and one of omission. First, in comission,
the Constitution granted special powers to the Slaveholding South with the
3/5 rule. In effect, this gave the Southern voter a lot more power per vote
than his northern counterpart, and helped set the stage for Southern
dominance of Congress and the Presidency for the ongoing future. It allowed
southerners to all but completely stifle legal debate in Congress, even going
so far as to maintain a permanent gag rule for a number of years.
Esteemed member Dennis Lawrence
> Diane
Dennis
Esteemed member Dennis Lawrence
Dennis
Esteemed member "Kate Boden"
>
> This brings up another sideline issue in my mind. Would the Southern
people
> have even supported the idea of secession had their emotions not been
> stirred to such a fevered pitch by those who demanded it. Did the
Southern
> people, as opposed to the politicians who always seem to take center
stage
> in this discussion, support the idea of secession before they were
convinced
> their homes and lives were threatened? (That's a question. I know what
the
> Southern "aristocracy" thought, but what about Joe Blow farmer. Not that
> Joe Blow farmer really mattered to anyone until his body was needed to
catch
> bullets, but that's another subject.) Perhaps, in that light, it is
clear
> that the few who were thinking of secession prior to the 1850's needed
to
> build on a situation that had enough emotional impact to sway popular
> opinion to their side. Until Lincoln, they didn't have that situation.
> Dramatic cases generally draw dramatic responses.
>
>
Brian,
Esteemed member Richard Rollins
Richard Rollins
Esteemed member Norman Levitt
Esteemed member "James F. Epperson"
Esteemed member "Douglas E. Weirich"
Esteemed member Dennis Lawrence
Esteemed member "Kate Boden"
Esteemed member "James F. Epperson"
Esteemed member Richard Rollins
Esteemed member Richard Rollins
Esteemed member "James F. Epperson"
Esteemed member "James F. Epperson"
Esteemed member Greg Mast
Esteemed member Greg Mast
Esteemed member jeffburk
Esteemed member "James F. Epperson"
Esteemed member "James F. Epperson"
Esteemed member "Douglas E. Weirich"
Esteemed member DPowell334@aol.com contributes:
Esteemed member DPowell334@aol.com contributes:
Esteemed member DPowell334@aol.com contributes:
Esteemed member Rich Rollins wrote:
Dennis