There hasn't been much discussion regarding Jeb Stuart's role in the battle. If he had performed his primary duty, to monitor the movement of the AOP and scout out the terrain, his information could have made all the difference.
With reconnaissance from Stuart, Lee may or may not have decided to fight at Gettysburg. But, if he did, there would have had time to take the high ground. It would have been interesting to see what Meade would have done' if the tables were turned.
For all the value Stuart had provided for Lee, he seems to have failed him at the time of his greatest need. Didn't he realize the seriousness of this campaign?
In the The Killer Angels, Lee is said to have talked privately with Stuart. Stuart seems to be somewhat surprised by Lee's sternness, and mention that others requested that he be court-martialed. (In fact, it would have been interesting to see what Meade would have done to Stuart, if he had been in Lee's place.)
What else has been written concerning Stuart's failing? Did this diminish Stuart's name? What happened to Stuart after Gettysburg?
Tom Swantko wrote:
There hasn't been much discussion regarding Jeb Stuart's role in the
>battle. If he had performed his primary duty, to monitor the movement of
>the AOP and scout out the terrain, his information could have made all the
>difference.
[snip]
>
>What else has been written concerning Stuart's failing? Did this diminish
>Stuart's name? What happened to Stuart after Gettysburg?
>
Apart from anything else he did, he never strayed far from the ANV after
Gettysburg.
John Mosby's memoirs strongly defend Stuart, mostly because Mosby suggested the big ride, but most other writers are very critical of Stuart's actions.
Kerry Webb
Tomn Swantko wrote:
There hasn't been much discussion regarding Jeb Stuart's role in the
>battle. If he had performed his primary duty, to monitor the movement of
>the AOP and scout out the terrain, his information could have made all the
>difference...
>In the The Killer Angels, Lee is said to have talked privately with Stuart.
>Stuart seems to be somewhat surprised by Lee's sternness, and mention that
>others requested that he be court-martialed. (In fact, it would have been
>interesting to see what Meade would have done to Stuart, if he had been in
>Lee's place.)
> One of the fun things about reading KILLER ANGELS is finding out where Shaara got his information. It helps to see why he wrote what he did. Anyway, much of his opinion of Stuart appears to come from reading G. Moxley Sorrel's RECOLLECTIONS OF A CONFEDERATE STAFF OFFICER. Recommend you take a look at it and you can get an idea of how Longstreet's staff felt about Stuart's "useless, showey parade."
Bill
It is a military dictate that military orders be precise and clear. Perhaps due to a string of victories and the capabilities of Longstreet, Stuart, and Jackson; Lee became loose in his order constructs. Questions affecting the operations of the army fall on Lee not Stuart. Asking men to sacrife their lives requires nothing less.
The rest is history. Stuart's moves from Jefferson were slow, 400 prisoners, 125 wagons, and tired mules. He had done what his orders implied. Contact at Carlisle added to problems of movement. Had Stuart been up and placed there by Lee ahead of time the battle may never have been fought at Gettysburg. If nothing else can be said his presence would have helped Heath and Hill.
Lee wrote later that his problems at Gettysburg were due to a lack of cavalry...this is Lee's problem not Stuart's. Lee had cavalry, and if he did not have enough the plunge ahead against Meade on his hills was pure folly. Lee never knew Federal strength with any confidence and Stuart, had the orders been clear would have know this and come to his commanders aid. The truth is Lee was determined to have his battle with or without Stuart, and with or without the counsel of Longstreet.
As Longstreet said "(for Lee) the hunt was up and threatened his superb equipoise." The blame has always been placed on subordinates because Lee was always above criticism. A very great general but a very human, human being...
Patrick
Note: quotes from Thomason on Jeb Stewart
semperfi@siu.edu
Patrick King
According to one of the speakers at the Longstreet conference in Gettysburg recently (I think it was Wert), the cavalry available at Gettysburg was either needed to guard supply wagons or too inexperienced at battle reconnaissance for Lee to use them.
Subject: Re: Stuart...
Regarding cavalry, Patrick commented:
"It is clear by most diary sources few foot soldiers had anything good to say about troopers both north and south. They were seen as dandies who would not fight..."
Harvey Hill used to say he had never seen spurs on a dead soldier. At Chickamauga, however, he was surprised when told that the "infantry" fighting next to him was none other than Forrest's cavalry, fighting dismounted. He was pleasantly astonished and told Bedford so.
Ref: "Lee's Maverick General: Daniel Harvey Hill" Hal Bridges (an interesting little book, btw, though not completely impartial---Lee and Longstreet fans beware)
Pat
Greetings,
When I sent my comments on Stuart I was implying Lee had plenty of
horse soldiers in which to "check" out Meade. While trying not to beat a
dead horse, a few further comments.
It was Lee's choice where and when to fight. Whether it was shoes or peanuts, contact was made in Gettysburg. In spite of all the fighting the ANV could have moved on or the large mounted force (good or not) could have moved out to find the Union force. It is clear by most diary sources few foot soldiers had anything good to say about troopers both north and south. They were seen as dandies who would not fight (which was the case most of the time). I'm sure fans of Sheridan and Stuart would find fault with this. Most troopers fought unmounted when they did, but their best use was recon...when they applied themselves
The move into Pennsylvania was tempered then and much later by the death of Jackson. Lee wrote years later, that he could have won it all on the first day had "...Stonewall been there." It is difficult to believe he truely believed his men were superior. He stood on Lee's Hill (later named) at Fredricksburg and watched it all, the bravery of Union forces-though poorly led-was evident to all on both sides.
Jeb and Pete, Hill, Early, Pickett, Hood, Heth and so forth were just not good enough for Lee on those fateful three days. He brought them there and he left many on the ground there, he chose the place and time, and the how and why, yet Stuart and Longstreet plus a host of others have taken the blame. If he didn't have news of Union forces, whatever was he doing fighting like he knew all the news? Because we have hindsight we can say what Jeb should have done. Hindsight has more than once tainted historical consideration...
semperfi@siu.edu
Patrick King
Greetings,
I had sent a post in October that listed the mounted units that Lee had at his disposal at Gettysburg. In my opinion more than enough to get the job done. Stuart may have not operated completly up to snuff, but Lee holds the lions share of responsibility...if you don't know the lay of the land, the enemy strength, or disposition, you might want to reconsider throwing your army to the winds. In fact, with his own supplies well protected, Lee could have used his calvary to better use. He seemed to trust only his "trusted" lieutenants. I like the comment about Jackson not being dead long enough for Lee to consider other military options. Also, Lee had to consider the dreaded outcome of Stuart being overrun and his mounted soldiers being destroyed during his moves east of Gettysburg. Then we would be discussing how the destruction of Stuart and his men had a major impact on the battle.
Although Longstreet's book was written long after the fact and has a number of errors and fabrications, I believe he had every reason to be angry with Lee. The commander of ANV fough his battles with intelligence and bravery, but he acted as though he had unlimited assets and that honor and glory in battle was supreme (the Civil War finally laid to rest for the world that war was an honorable and glorious pasttime...it was death, horror, maiming, and great loss for all involved).
I have just finished reading a good book on the battle of the Wilderness, I especially enjoyed comments about Meade, who though many admire him, operated with the power and verve that reminds one of his persuit of Lee after Gettysburg. For Pete Longstreet fans, he took his time getting there but did the job when he arrived...
I remember being incensed upon first reading of Judson Kirkpatrick's senseless 3rd day cavalry charge which cost the life of Elon J. Farnsworth, who I recall was a rather attractive personality in contrast to the irascible Kirkpatrick. Any comments from members about the personalities of these two? Shouldn't such a rash decision have affected Kirkpatrick's career?
From: DPowell334@aol.com
In a message dated 95-12-29 14:09:37 EST, you write:
> >I asked Dave Weaver (a battlefield gudie) about this earlier this month and >his >reply was that the 3 cavalry units available to Lee were truly second-class, >typically assigned to guarding the trains and such, not used for scouting or >such other adventures. I'd like to know more about these units.... > >Dave N
Grumble Jones was called "the best outpost officer" in the cavalry by Stuart - he and his brigade were fine troops, and first rate. Bev Robertson was somewhat hard to get along with, and Stuart had him transferred to North Carolina, but he was recalled for the invasion. He was a solid officer, and his small command was also very reliable. I think the criticism of him was more related to his quarrelsome personality than his lack of skills. As I recall, he disliked Stuart's "cavalier" image.
Jenkins and his brigade had made a name for themselves as raiders prior to the campaign. Certainly his proformance during the advance and up into PA was very uneven. His troops contributed to Ewell's success at Winchester, but proved sloppy in trying to round up some of the outlying Union troops. He was wounded on July 2nd, when his command got into a skirmish with Union Cavalry. His command was useful, but clearly less than first-rate. Imboden seems to have been a capable officer, as evidenced by by his handling of the wounded. However, his brigade could be considered not of the first rank - his troops were less well-trained, and regarded by Lee as effective only for raiding and escort work.
Jones, and Robertson's commands, however, both did first rate screening duty on the march north - they were capable, if not elite, troops.
Dave Powell
Bill,
Imboden's command was an unusual one. It consisted of one regiment of Cav - the 18th VA, one of mounted inf - 62nd Va, and a company called McNeil's Partisan Rangers (Oh yeah, and a battery of arty - 6 guns.) The command was called up from Western Virginia to support Lee in June, and operated mostly west of Chambersburg. As I recall, they replaced Pickett at Chambersburg on July 2nd.
On the 3rd, Lee called them forward to the battlefield, but they were not engaged. On the 4th, Imboden was assigned to command Lee's train of misery - the wagons of wounded. His and (I think) Jones' brigades were assigned as escorts, taking the round-a-bout way to Falling Waters.
Since Imboden arrived via the Chambersburg Pike departed the field via the Fairfield Rd, I've always assumed that was as good a place as any for his monument.
As an interesting side note - Imboden was part of Sam Jones' Dept. Originally, the infantry was alerted to join Lee in the valley on the move north, but got sidetracked by Federal activity. During the retreat, one of Jones' infantry brigades was shifted north to help cover the retreat, but never saw any real action.
Dave Powell
Here is Lee's opinion of Imboden 6 mos. after Gettysburg:
January 13, 1864
"My own opportunities of observation have not impressed me favorably with regards to the discipline and efficiency of General Imboden's troops, and the accounts I receive represent the other (William Jackson and Sam Jones) to be no better.
General Early in a recent letter states that his operations were impeded, and in a measure arrested by his inability to get service from General Imboden's men. He says he could get no information about the enemy because he could make no reconnaisances with those troops. I have been disappointed in my expectations of the services of General Sam Jones' command also. I think a reorganization of these troops necessary, and a change of command desirable."
The Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee Clifford Dowdey ed. pp. 650-651.
I don't have the secondary sources at hand, but I believe they will support that Lee's opinion of Imboden was equally low at the time of Gettysburg.
Dennis
>Dennis
On the other hand, Imboden did an excellent job of commanding the train of wounded during the retreat, and covering that movement.
Of the four brigades of mounted troops remaining with the army, three - Jenkins', Robertson's and Imboden's - were clearly of a lesser quality, and Lee suffered for it. Jones' men were very good - the equal of any of the three 'premier' commands of the Cavalry with Stuart, but too few to really dominate the Union mounted arm. All of this begs the question, however, because Lee essentially ignored all of them during the critical hours between Harrison's arrival and the return of Stuart on July 2nd. Certainly they could have been of some use.
Dave Powell
In a message dated 96-02-21 17:13:12 EST, Jeff wrote:
>Talking about Old Peter's proposed move, as we have been and doubtlessly >always will, necessarily brings up the absence of Stuart. Coddington >(shouldn't we just call him "God," for as often as he comes up here?) >criticizes Lee for not effectively using the cavalry he DID have -- >which was, what, two brigades? Cavalry is one of my achilles' heels of >CW knowledge, so I'd like to ask the group what it thinks of this >assessment. Could Lee have gotten much greater use out of Imboden, etc., >than he did? Was Stuart so unbelievably essential to the ANV that it was >by definition paralyzed every time he got out of sight?
> > > I think Coddington is right (god forbid I call him wrong!) about Lee's failure to bring forward the units he did have - especially Grumble Jones, whose command was an excellent unit for recon and screening work, and even near the important flank (around Fairfield) to boot.
However, this problem really points out another of the structural flaws the ANV operated with. Seven brigades of cavalry were far too many to be administered to or commanded by a single division commander. Lee desperately needed a Corps structure, with men like Fitz Lee or Hampton as Divisional commanders under him. Had a competent suprior officer remained behind while Stuart's three brigades were tangled up in the AOP's rear, Lee could have expected a much more coherent response out of his remaining mounted units.
Unfortunately, This is one area of command where Lee routinely failed to step in and set matters right administratively. Consistantly, the ANV placed too many units under commanders, simply giving even the best of them too much to do. Focus of mission demands that no single command level is overburdened with details. Divisions were better managed with three, rather than four brigades, and Corps operated best with three divisions. It was routine for the ANV to give a commander four or five sub-units to run.
Dave Powell
Imboden's men were not suited to traditional cavalry operations. They were more along the lines of partisans, suited more toward holding mountain gaps, raiding, etc. Scouting and screening, the traditional roles for the cavalry, were not missions these irregulars were suited to. Also, Jenkins's Brigade was largely made up of irregular units as well--only the 35th Battalion of Virginia Cavalry had seen any significant organized combat of the units with Jenkins. They were more a rabble than a disciplined cavalry command. Again, there men were not well suited to traditional cavalry operations.
The better question is why not get the Laurel Brigade involved. Jones' Brigade was one of the better cavalry brigades, yet it never got into the fray. They spent most of the battle camped in the area around Cashtonw or Emmittsburg, Maryland. These guys were hard fighters and good riders. They could have brought into the fray easily, and likely would have made a difference. Perhaps one explanation is that Jones and Stuart hated each other. Stuart did not respect Jones's considerable abilities, and I think that this was probably a major factor.
Hope this helps.
Eric Wittenberg
You should really check out Mark Nesbitt's "Sabre & Scapegoat" to get the picture of cavalry at Lee's disposal. JEB took no more than 6000 troopers (Hampton's & two Lees'). Jenkins was out ahead of Lee, Imboden was more or less off to the west of the ANV advance, and Jones/Robertson initially guarded the Blue Ridge per Lee's orders to Stuart.
In a message dated 95-12-29 15:05:21 EST, Bob Witt wrote:
> >According to Coddington (The Gettysburg Campaign), the cavalry >available to Lee for the usual cavalry type operation of recon was >Jenkins Brigade. This Brigade was (again according to Coddington) >not reaching the usual standard of performance of the AVN. >Initially assigned to Ewell, the brigade was assigned to bring up >the rear of his column. See footnote 49 for Chapter VIII. Early >is qouted as saying about these troopers that they had "little real >traing as soldiers."
> >The units were the 1st MD bn, the 35th VA bn and the 17th VA. >This battle leads me to the conclusion that, other than Stuart and >Forrest, the CSA realy lacked in effective cavalry leadership.
> > I think this is too harsh a judgement of Jenkins and his men. The 1st Maryland, BTW, was actually part of Fitz. Lee's brigade, considered one of the elite commands of the army. His own brigade was not up to those standards, but not as useless as Early paints them.
Jenkins' proformance was spotty on the way north, but he did effectively screen the column into PA. He and his brigade did less well in combat, and Longacre says "he was wont to lose his head in a crisis." He retreated out of Chambersburg and Greencastle too hastily in June, when he was a considerable ways ahead of Ewell's infantry. On July 2nd, his troops were fully engaged on the army's left.
Dave Powell
One quick note:
Longacre, in his book, is much harder on Robertson than I remember (I just checked.) Most of that criticism, it does seem, comes from the post-battle phase. Coddington and Freeman mention him very little.
Anyone got any more detailed accounts of Robertson and his two NC regiments out there?
Most non-Longacre criticism I remember stems from the length of time Robertson and Jones loitered in the upper Shennandoah prior to following the Army into PA. I've always regarded this as more of a problem of the army high command, due to a lack of controlling officers or missions for the two commands. With Stuart out of touch, it seems the ANV HQ just plum forgot about them...
Dave Powell
From: DPowell334@aol.com
In a message dated 95-12-29 22:33:12 EST, Ed wrote:
>Dave... >I confess to knowing little to nothing of the CSA Calvary Divisions...why is >it >that Stuart takes most of the heat (if not all) in the books I have read.... >I am aware that 7 brigades existed but have never really known why only >"The Prodical Son" I believe Longstreet says is continual bashed!!! >Can you shed some light on this issue?? Where would Robertson and Jones >to be utilized and What would be a reasonable explanation of why Lee et al. >did not seek out the ability to utilize them??
Robertson and Jones were both close enough to operate on Lee's right flank, where Longstreet had all his problems in movement, etc. Why they were not used, I confess I've never known, and have seen very little discussion of the subject.
Robertson was out of favor with both Lee and Stuart. He was considered a better trainer than field soldier, and earlier in the war had been relieved of command of Fitz. Lee's Brigade and moved to North Carolina, where he raised a new command. The two regiments he brought with him to Gettysburg were from this new command, and considered well trained by fairly green. After the campaign, he was promptly exiled to NC again.
Jones was called "grumble" because of his argumentativeness. After the campaign, I think he and Stuart got into a fight over the loss of some wagons on the retreat, and he was returned to the Valley district. His brigade, BTW, was the Laurel Brigade of Turner Ashby fame, and considered excellent troops. He was also personally regarded as a fine cavalry commander, but difficult as hell for superiors.
Dave Powell
>Jones was called "grumble" because of his argumentativeness. After the >campaign, I think he and Stuart got into a fight over the loss of some wagons >on the retreat, and he was returned to the Valley district. His brigade, BTW, >was the Laurel Brigade of Turner Ashby fame, and considered excellent troops. >He was also personally regarded as a fine cavalry commander, but difficult as >hell for superiors. > >Dave Powell
> In October of 1863, Grumble Jones was sent packing by Jeb Stuart who had tired of his complaints. Thomas Rosser was promoted to the head of Turner Ashby's legendary cavalry. In December, the brigade was sent to the Shenandoah Valley which was the first time in the valley for Rosser. In January and February, 1864, Rosser distinguished himself in Jeb Stuart's eyes by carrying off two raids in the likeness of both Stuart and Ashby. In January, it was a 95 wagon train loaded with food desperately needed by the Confederates. In February, Rosser went to Petersburg where he got 13,000 Federal cartridges and destroyed some of the B&O Railroad bridges as well as a lock in the C&O Canal. In his official report of the raids, Stuart wrote, "...furnishes additional proofs of General Rosser's merit as a commander, and adds fresh laurels to that veteran brigade so signalized for valor already." Rosser then proclaimed his brigade the "Laurel Brigade" and said the men would wear laurel leaves in their hats. Thus we went from Turner Ashby's Cavalry, to Jone's Brigade, to Rosser's Brigade. The name Laurel Brigade, bestowed by Rosser, was largely ignored by the men as Rosser did not seem to understand these types of names came from the shared experiences of the men and their general census of the leadership qualities of the men leading them.
Nikki
>Hi Dave... >I am quilty of not making myself totally clear....my intension was to ask if >their was in the CSA a MORE capable Mounted Commander.... >Blushing: I do realize the Good General had the last viewpoint and his needs >are the primary concern here....I am sorry for not being clear...rather since >I was totally unfamiliar with the CSA Calvary Hierarchy I thought perhaps >there was a former Mounted Commander more experienced than Stuart that was >now >serving the CSA in another capacity..... >Not a real important point but I was/am very interested in this issue.... > >Thank you Dave for your patience.... >Ed.... > >
Sorry Ed, I misunderstood,
As a matter of fact, I'd be hard-pressed to name a Southern commander, east or west, who had more experience and was a better mounted officer than Stuart. Pat is clearly alluding to Forrest, but he was only a brigade commander at the time, not familiar with directing the large bodies of mounted troops that Stuart had.
It is easy to assume that the mistakes Stuart made during the campaign were marks of a bad commander. In fact, I think Stuart was an outstanding mounted officer, especially in the screening and recon roles so vital to the armies. Part of the problem by June of 1863, was that Lee had assigned Stuart 6 Brigades of mounted troops, with no intermediate command structure. The Cav desperately needed to be re-organised into a Corps, so that quality Division commanders (say Hampton and Fitz Lee, for instance) could assume some of the burden. As it stood, there was just too much that required Stuart's immediate supervision, and when he was unavailable, things failed to get done.
Dave Powell From Eric Wittenberg
Here goes--this is my opinion on the role of Stuart and his cavalry during the repulse of Pickett's Charge. The truth is that Stuart was not engaging in some sort of coordinated or concentrated effort to support the breakthrough of Pickett's Charge. If you read Stuart's official report of the Gettysburg Campaign, you will see that Stuart "hoped to effect a surprise upon the enemy's rear." (OR 27, Part2, p. 697). This language implies that this was a raid on the Union rear, not some coordinated effort to support Pickett.
This being the case, unless Pickett actually broke the line, and if Gregg and Custer did not block Stuart's path, the main effect of his raid, in my opinion, would have been to disrupt the lines of communication and perhaps disrupt the staging area of the 6th Corps. I seriously doubt whether much more would have happened than that. Stuart did not have orders to do anything more.
Just my two cents' worth.
I want to throw my two cents worth into the what was Lee thinking discussion. In particular, the question of whether Stuart was properly supporting Pickett's Charge arose. The truth is that Stuart was not participating in some coordinated or concentrated effort to support Pickett's Charge. If you read Stuart's official report of the Gettysburg Campaign, Stuart states that he "hoped to effect a surprise upon the enemy's rear". (OR 27, Part 2, p. 697) This language indicates that it was a raid, not some coordinated effort to support Pickett. Assuming that Pickett indeed broke the line in the charge, STuart would have been operating independently. The presence of Stuart's men might have created some problems with the A of P's lines of communications, and perhaps some disruption in the staging area of the 6th Corps, but I seriously doubt whether anything more would have happened. THe angle of approach also does not support the theory that Stuart was trying to support Pickett.
Therefore, I believe that Pickett was entirely on his own. It does make you wonder what MArse Robert was thinking....
From: MattR78@aol.com
Eric wrote:
>If you read Stuart's official report of >the Gettysburg Campaign, you will see that Stuart "hoped to >effect a >surprise upon the enemy's rear." (OR 27, Part2, p. 697). This >language >implies that this was a raid on the Union rear, not some >coordinated effort >to support Pickett.
He just happened to be in the enemy's rear at the time Pickett's men hit the front, but it wasn't coordinated? Did he arrive there by random chance? After being bawled out by Lee the day before? (By the way, there was a brigade of Reb infantry not too far away.)
>The VIth Corps was not in the rear, but on the southern flank. >Angle of approach wrong? He was directly in the rear of the center of the AoP line.
Eric Wittenberg
Jack Kelly's got it right--the truth is that STuart's action on July 3 was
at best a diversion, not some coordinated element of the grand strategy of
Pickett's Charge. As I have mentioned previously, while East Cavalry Field
is partially behind the Union line, it is certainly nowhere near that
portion of the Union line which was subject to Pickett's attack.
Further, if it was intended to be some portion of Pickett's Charge,
why was Grumble Jones, one of STuart's better fighters, at Fairfield and not
with the body of Stuart's Division? Where was Robertson's Brigade? Why
wasn't Fitz Lee's brigade more vigorously involved in this fight? Stuart's
attacks were piecemeal, uncoordinated affairs which don't in any way
indicate that he expected to fight. The truth is that Stuart was on a raid.
Nothing more, nothing less.
Eric Wittenberg
Just to beat the dead horse some more....
If STuart's foray into the Union rear was part of some grand,
coordinated assualt scheme, then why was the outstanding cavalry brigade of
Grumble Jones off holding Fairfield Gap, and not with Stuart? Jones's
brigade, also known as the Turner Ashby Brigade or the Laurel Brigade, was
one of the hardest fighting units in the ANV. These guys were good. Why
not send John Imboden's command to hold Fairfield Gap? This was precisely
the type of work that Imboden's command was best suited for, and which, in
fact, did a fine job of throughout the campaign. Could it be that MArse
Robert intended to retreat, and wanted a good force along the way? It
certainly was not because he wanted the best of his cavalry units in the
Union rear. And why was the undisciplined mob of irregular cavalry under
Albert Jenkins with Stuart? Why not send them to Fairfield, and keep Jones
with the regular cavalry? It just doesn't make sense. If the idea is to
send your cavalry to support a major frontal assualt, don't you want your
best units there? The answer, methinks, is that this was not a well-planned
or organized effort. Rather, I think it was what I have said all
along--that it was just a predatory raid to make mischief in the UNion rear.
Nothing more, nothing less.
Just some food for thought....
Ed wrote..................
>Cava'y was so much more accomplished than the Union Cava'y...then I realized
>that most CSA mounted soldiers were most likely raised on farms and brought
>up handling horses in one way or another...thus the formation of Cava'y Units
>was a logical and easy process to refine...whereas some Union Cava'y
>undoubtably had riding experience but some perhaps may have been city
>dwellers.....most assurdedly less experienced as a whole.
This was the same mistaken assumption made by the South,
underestimating the ability of the north to train cavalry and infantry.
Shelby Foote dismisses this assumption by saying the South soon learned the
"pasty faced mechanics" up north would not be pushed aside easily.
Probably, the cavalier-like assumptions made by southerners about
cavalry was a negative in the long run. Sherridan did not wear plumes in
his hat nor gallop around the enemy's positions - he went through them.
The cavalry at Getysburg is a good example of the evoluion of the
concept of the use of cavalry by the North. The South did not take to
dismounted fighting - why have a horse if you can't ride it? The dismounted
efforts on July 3 played a big role in Union victory, as did Buford's effort
Day 1.
Dennis
From: MBRADLEY@MSCC1.MSCC.CC.TN.US
Why does anyone assume the C.S. forces had a "cavalier" myth about cavalry? Bedford Forrest
didn't. Wade Hampton didn't. Wearing a plume was a matter of style which does not necessarily
reflect an attitude. Stuart was not from the "plantation aristocracy." Enlistment records show that
the North recruited heavily from farms, so the Northern cavalryman should have had plenty of
experience with horses. The answer to Confederate success with cavalry, especially in the East,
will have to go beyond these kinds of ideas.
MBRADLEY
The cavalier myth is not presentism. You don't have to assume anything in this case; check
the primary source material of the era. It is everywhere, and not just limited to cavalry.
Dennis
I've always thought the "cavalier" thing was not really germaine. Why was CSA cavalry superior
in the early war? - Organization? The Union rarely concentrated more than a single regiment
together at one time until after the Peninsula campaign. Stuart had numbers on his side in
virtually all of these encounters early on.
Dave Powell
Hi, Dave.
I think the cavalier thing can be overworked, but it was a pervasive strand in the southern
culture. On another topic, Dave Wieck questioned whether just because there was a Greek
revival movement in the North in the mid-nineteenth century whether we have to assume Lincoln
was affected by it to the extent Wills said he was. I think the same is true here. Just because
there was a cavalier myth propagated in the South - did it lead to the type of differences in the
way cavalry fought to the extent I claimed in my post?
Maybe not. But at Gettysburg, Stuart chose a grand encirclement of the AOP - I find
cavalier type aggrandizement in that. Not the only factor, but one that I think can be legitimately
considered as contributing to his interpretation of the role of cavalry.
Dennis
Hi Dennis,
Interesting, and a good point. I was thinking more along the lines of the
individual soldier and his skills than the mindset of superior leadership...
Dave Powell
Boy, do I have to disagree with this one. The truth is that most of the Yankee cavalry was
recruited from cities. The farm boys often knew how much work was required to maintain
horses, and chose the infantry instead. It took a couple of years for (a) the Union troopers to
become acclimated to the job of taking care of horses and to become cavalrymen, and (b) for
competent leadership to emerge. Once it did in 1863, the Union cavalry in the east became the
equal, and perhaps, superior, to the CSA cavalry. Read Stephen Z. Starr's 3 volume set, The
Union Cavalry in the Civil War for the academic support for what I've said.
So, while you're right about the lack of plumes, the research simply does not support you at all.
You could look it up.
Eric Wittenberg
Dennis:
I agree with you. By the by, cavalierism was not limited to the CSA. One need only study
Alfred Pleasonton a bit to know that he was every bit the vainglorious cavalier that Stuart was.
Stuart just made the art famous first. And Stuart was a much better commanding officer. You all
know what I think about Longacre's work. One area where I wholeheartedly agree with him is in
his criticism of Pleasonton. Longacre calls him the "The Knight of Romance." What does that
tell you?
Eric Wittenberg
Having just done a quick check of Starr's vols on the Union cavalry, let me suggest that Eric, and
those who agree with him, need to reread Vol. 1, chapters III and IV. It was only in the New
England regts that "city boys" predominated, and only a few of those. "Over half of the cavalry
came from the farm"--Starr.exit
MBRADLEY
A couple of points in reply to recent responses. Farmers, north and south, drove teams. Farmers
do not ride horses to do their work. I have read the Union Cavalry text mentioned--all three
vols--but I have also looked at the recruiting records of numerous Union cavalry units. I stand by
my point that the Union recruited heavily from farms for cavalry. Some of you have been
drinking too many mint juleps during those cold northern winters. You need to read something
about the real South in the antebellum period, say, Clement Eaton's Plain Folk of the Old
South or even Myers, Children of Pride. This would lay to rest the idea that a
"cavalier" myth was widespread in the South in the Ante-bellum period. The idea came to be
much prevalent in the 1880's and later along with the myth of the "Lost Cause."
MBRADLEY
I had the impression that farmers in the more populous North spend more time driving horse
teams, instead of riding individual animals.
Steve Cassel
You can't get much more "original" in sources than Myers, Children of Pride, which is a
collection of letters from a large and wealthy family near Savannah, GA, during the period
1854-68. Eaton's work also rests solidly on primary sources. Let me add to the list Flowering
on the Cumberland.
May I also remind everyone that the assertion that the Union cavalry did not recruit farm boys is
NOT supported by Starr in his 3 vols on the Union Cavalry. Starr points out that "half, if not
more, " of the Union cavalry came from farms. Since I have cited sources, primary and secondary,
for my contention that the "cavalier" ethos was not predominant in the ante-bellum South I would
like to see the list from Dennis where he thinks it was.
MBRADLEY
You have cited, but not quoted. Here are a few quick quotes on cavaliers and chivalry (the
honor code of the cavalier) to support my contention that Cavalierism was a theme found
throughout the Southern war time society. These are all primary - I am ignoring all secondary
discussion of this issue.
First from a Confederate soldier:
"The debonair Stuart and his gay cavaliers on his staff and others
of similar tastes, filled the house with a sound of revelry every evening.
The sound of Sweeney's banjo and a string band, the heavy step of martial
heels drowning the soft sound of little feet lightly clad feet lightly clad,
the musical laughter of the dance, might often be heard late into the night.
There had not been and never was afterwards, another such Headquarters in
all the Virginias."
- Henry Kidd Douglas,_I Rode With Stonewall_ , 188.
From popular music:
"Now each Cavalier that loves honor and right
Let him follow the Feather of Stuart tonight."
"Riding A Raid" Sheet Music published in Richmond - Library of Congress:
Ye Cavaliers of Dixie!
Who guard the Southern shore
Your glorious sabers draw once more....
Ye Cavaliers of Dixie," quoted in Blue and Gray v. 1, 571
Here's from Mary Chesnut
Speaking of an acquaintance Colonel Watts:
"Romantic enough, surely, Beaufort Watts - bluest blood. Gentleman to the tips of his
fingers, Chivalry incarnate...
To go back to my knight errant.
He knelt, handed me the sword, and then kissed my hand... He looks
now as he did then. He is always in uniform covered with epaulets,
aigulettes, &c,&c. Shining in the sun - with his plumed hat, reins upon his
war steed and bows low as ever.
>From James Chesnut - member of Davis' inner circle discussing a novel by
Sir Walter Raleigh - cavalier extrodinaire.
"In fencing as in fighting, one is taught to salute politely one's
antagonist...as Ravenwood rode away he passed his foes on the lawn...He
raised his hat in mute salutation to them and looked them in the eye. And
they returned his bow with polite graveness. That's my idea of behavior to
a foeman. I mean behavior worthy of chivalry as they call it."
Women of Richmond society on the "airs" put on by the Hampton's.
"Airs, airs," laughed Mrs. Bartow , parodying Tennyson's "Charge of
the Light Brigade." "Airs to the right of them - airs to the left of them
-someone had blundered."
Mary Chesnut's Civil War (52, 191, 394)
I could go on, but only my cavalier reaction to the throwing of the
gauntlet has led me this far off topic.
In your rebuttal please include some quotes from your primary
sources that specifically refute the cavalier image. Not just quotes that
support other themes present in the South, quotes that somehow show that
there was no strain of cavalierism in the South. Primary, please.
I will give you the final say on this, as I am sure brother Bob is
reaching for the off topic post.
I bow to my foeman as I leave the field
Dennis
Does living on a farm necessarily mean that a person is a skilled horseman? Today most
people drive, but I don't think anyone would dare claim that most people are good drivers.
TJ
Deb
Another source to review, for those who are interested is a PhD. dissertation from the early '60's
from the University of Michigan by a man named Thiele called "The Development of the Union
Cavalry in the Civil War". I agree with Thiele about the origins of Union cavalry inferiority, and
stand firmly by what I have said previously, which is that Union horsemen had to grow into the
role.
Sorry, but I firmly believe in what I have said all along....
Eric Wittenberg
While I generally agree with Dennis, I personally think it's giving Stuart too much credit to call it
a grand encirclement of the AOP. There really was no other route available from the area around
Lee's HQ, which is where Stuart spent the night of July 2, to the rear of the Union army except to
swing wide around one of the flanks. The right flank was closest, so it was the logical choice.
That said, I return to my original point, which is that Stuart was engaged in a joyride to try
to wreak havoc in the Union rear, not to support Pickett's Charge.
Eric Wittenberg
Good Grief Dennis, I finally got back up on the net and find that you have gone bonkers. Down
boy. Heel. Sit.
You're right but if you weren't I would not mention it. You might unload again. And I thought I
was getting carried away with some of this stuff. Do you have ATTACK AND DIE: CIVIL
WAR MILITARY TACTICS AND THE SOUTHERN HERITAGE? It is a good book and
discusses what motivated the Confederates and why they fought the way they did.
My crummy provider finally answered my pleas for help and promise to have fixed the IP address
problems. I hope they are right. I'm getting mail tonight so maybe they have. I see that Bob
Younger is cooperating with you. That is great. I have to admit I'm surprised. I think it's
great.
Bill
To Dennis:
I assume you mean Sir Walter Scott (not Raleigh--about 200-odd years difference).
Remember that the steamboat that sinks in Huckleberry Finn is called the "Sir Walter
Scott" and is generally taken to represent the folly of the ante-bellum notion of "chivalry" in the
South.
Norm Levitt
Don't move the goalposts, please. My contention is that "cavalier" ethos was not the primary
world view of Southerners in the WBTS period. Few Southerners accepted that romantic
clap-trap because they lived in a pragmatic society where economic survival depended on daily
application of pragmatic concepts. Of course there were some people who used poetic
expressions which refer to "cavaliers" but such random phrases hardly establish an ethos.
MBRADLEY
Eric Wittenberg said:
That said, I return to my original point, which is that Stuart was engaged in a joyride to try
to wreak havoc in the UNION rear, not to support Pickett's Charge.
I ask:
Isn't there considerable strategic value in getting behind your enemy? Isn't it almost inevitable that
some resources must be drawn from the front line to strengthen the rear guard on your supplies,
&c when you have been given notice that your opponent is behind you? Perhaps Stuart was not
engaged in support of Pickett's action specifically, but I wonder if he didn't increase
the odds for Pickett no matter what his mission. Can those of you with better knowledge of the
ACW in general shed some light, based on Stuart's other rides around other armies (McClellan),
what he might have had in mind at Gettysburg? I'd also be interested in knowing if Lee ordered
Stuart's ride or if Stuart acted on his own initiative.
John Blair
* Seeking any information especially letters and diaries regarding *
* the 5th Maine Infantry, Vols. assigned to 1st Division, 2nd Brigade *
* VI Corps, Army of the Potomac. The 2n Brigade also included 121st *
* NY, 95th, and 96th Penn. I would also appreciate letters and diaries *
* from those units.
I enjoyed the discussion of "Cavaliers" and I believe it was a very important part of the southern
attitude. Still not every Southerner was a gifted Cavalier any more than gifted horseman.
Romantic was probably a better term to describe to describe the Ante-Bellum South. Much of the
plantation culture of the Deep South was copied from the Tidewater planters of 17th Century
Virginia. These early Virginia planters were transplanted Cavaliers from England, brought over
by Governor William Berkeley during the decades around the English Civil War (you know, "off
with his head and all that.."). These early Cavaliers set the tone for elite society, copying English
country manor values.
As the English colonies expanded into what would become South Carolina and Georgia, the great
planters of these new regions copied the Virginia Cavalier life style. The majority of the elite in
17th century society yearned for the English social values and way of life. By the 19th
century that yearning was expanded to include European classical culture and traditions. In the
early 19th century a great wave of romanticism swept the South, as did a wave of great religious
revival. Part of the embracing of the romantic and cavalier values on the part of the South was in
reaction to its fears and insecurity about its own culture.
That insecurity had a lot to do with an largely under-educated population outside of the planter
class and an economy which was agrarian-based. It probably had something to do with
rationalizing slavery.
This upper class of planters and their associates did see themselves in this romantic and Cavalier
role. Life for them was an imitation of a classical European lifestyle. The lower classes saw none
of this, but they along with the Yeomanry would imitate that romantic air in their letters and
speech from time to time. In time of war that feeling was used to keep the fires burning as the
Confederate soldier fought for home, family, and wives. The "Fire-Eaters" kept the general
population whipped into a frenzy before and during the war by using these themes. The vast
majority of the people in the South were not Cavaliers, but they bought into the image.
I wish I was at home so I could site a few references, but off the top of my head: Clement Eaton-
The History of the Old South, WJ Cash- History of the South, David Hackett
Fischer- Albion's Seed, Brown- Honor and Violence in the South. I apologize- I
am brain-dead on names today.
It's not fair and not possible to pigeon-hole people to explain events. There was a diversity of
opinions and life styles in the South from politics and the military to culture and religion. What
made events happen was when individuals managed to unite several of these diverse groups on a
common issue.
There were plenty of romantics who fancied themselves Cavaliers (and probably an equal number
who thought they were round-heads).
John Carter
Thanks, Norm.
The error was mine not Mary Chesnut's. Embarrassing to a British Literature teacher.
Sir Walter Scott was the author of Ravenwood.
Dennis
In the discussion of the relative effectiveness of Federal and Confederate cavalry, and the way in
which this changed during the course of the war, one factor seems to have been overlooked.
Maintaining cavalry units in good condition for combat was an expensive proposition, logistically.
Specifically, acquiring good-quality horseflesh and keeping it fit for service was not a cheap
proposition. Cavalry horses needed large quantities of first-rate fodder--it wasn't just a matter of
letting ol' dobbin chomp on the local grass for a while. As the war closed down the south's
economy and supply system, and eventually wrecked its agriculture, it became harder and harder
to maintain the cavalry's mounts in healthy condition. By contrast, as the North's logistical
expertise grew, it became easier to keep cavalry reliably supplied. This, as much as experience
and morale (and the tactical acumen of a genius like Sheridan) gave Federal cavalry its increasing
superiority during the last 18 months or so of the war.
Norm Levitt
John:
It's hard to say. Stuart's OR does not say one way or the other. Lee's report is also silent.
Knowing Stuart, and knowing how he had been thrashed by Lee the day before, I tend to think
that it was Stuart acting on his own, attempting to redeem himself in the chief's eyes. I think that
he had something grand like the rides around McClellan in mind, and was stymied by the
unexpected presence and strength of the UNION cavalry at the East Cavalry Field.
Eric Wittenberg
In looking over accounts of various battles in which the Union cavalry played a significant part,
one item cannot be overlooked in explaining how the USA cavalry seemed to get better as the
war progressed. And that was the overwhelming technological advantage the Union troopers had
in using breech loaders and repeating rifles. Some units even paid for these weapons out of their
own pockets. The ability to lay down a lot of firepower can do wonders in repulsing an attack
(even today, no modern army sends their people into combat with anything less than
semi-automatics with full auto capability). One of the reasons Buford held off Heth and Pender as
long as he did on the first day was due to these types of weapons.
Bob Witt
Eric,
The Thiele dissertation is interesting, I'll have to try and track it down...
However,
The problem with assuming some innate inferiority with Union Cav is the fact that in terms of
training and development, they are fully in line with standard European thoughts on the issue.
Napoleonic Cavalry generally took about 12 to 18 months to train up to effectiveness, not at all
out of line for Union mounted forces of the time.
There were inhibiting factors that _did_ hinder Union training progression, and I think they have a
lot more to do with the weakness in the Federal cav than the standard Cavalier take on things.
1) McClellan's dispersal of the units meant that none of the Corps that went to the Peninsula had
more than about 600 mounted troopers in a command - and further distribution as couriers and
escorts seriously hindered efforts to drill large bodies of mounted men. Hence, training suffered
acutely until effective large-scale (read regiment and brigade) drilling became possible.
Inadequate training has always been a major watershed between good and bad armies - I suspect
it was no different here.
2) McClellan started out desiring a European heavy cavalry force: he paid little attention to
traditional light cavalry duties or needs. Given that Light Cav tasks were exactly where the CSA
used their forces right from the start - it's not surprising that Union troopers suffered in
comparison. So did Napoleonic Heavy Cav like Curraissiers when tasked for LC duties, even
units regarded as some of the finest battle-cavalry in the world. In fact, the Union never achieved
anything like a useful heavy cav force, and the training done in the spring of '62 was essentially
useless to the kind of tasks the Cav was asked to handle in August of '62, for instance.
3) One the perception of inferiority was created, it had a tendency to last. Such Morale problems
are extremely difficult to overturn, and not done overnight. The lingering effects of early defeats
created a stigma that lasted quite awhile.
These things, I think, go a long way towards explaining Union tactical defects without resorting
to the sort of "cavalier mysticism" that is often offered as the shorthand answer. Military history
is replete with examples of quality disparities that are explained away by such shorthand, and I'm
always wary when one is proffered. Invariably, more practical reasons are at hand.
Dennis did make a good point about leadership, however, and I think the Cavalier Myth might
well play into that. Southern mounted leaders were definitely more aggressive than their
counterparts. Aggressive actions in combat can dominate a situation, especially one where a lot of
amateurs abound. I think the cavalier ethos could easily instill that aggressiveness, in essence a
self-imposed "positive mental attitude."
Dave Powell
This is absolutely correct. Another additional point that needs to be made is that until Hooker
reorganized the A of P's cavalry into a cohesive corps command in early '63, the cavalry had been
badly misused by the high command of the A of P. George McClellan was clueless as to the
proper use of cavalry. For example: instead of forming cohesive cavalry commands like
brigades, companies of cavalry would be assigned to serve with brigades of infantry, where they
served as messengers, etc. These cavalry units were not even used properly--the true role of
cavalry is to scout and to screen the army's advance, not to serve as glorified messengers. The
fiasco of arming the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry with lances is well-known and is solely
attributable to McClellan's sorely mistaken concept of cavalry. By Brandy Station, the lances
were history, the 6th was armed with proper ordinance, and became one of the best cavalry units
in either army. In fact, the 6th, which was brigaded with the Regular cavalry units in the
east, was called by no less than John Buford "my seventh Regulars" after their stellar performance
at Brandy Station. Accordingly, I submit that this issue is far more complex than it appears, and
much of the discussion, including some of my prior comments, greatly understate the
situation.
If anyone wants to discuss this further, please e-mail me privately. I'm not persuaded that the
full essence of this discussion is appropriate to this group (unless the moderator disagrees).
Eric Wittenberg
Since Brother Dennis went on ad nauseam about plumes in hats I see no reason this thread should
not continue.
lawrence@arthes.com
How true. However, to dispel a long-standing and irrational rumor, perpetuated by Edward
Longacre as late as 1986, none of John Buford's men (save possibly one company of the 17th
Pennsylvania Cavalry, and this is not for sure; personally, I don't buy it...) had Spencers. Having
personally reviewed the ordinance returns of the A of P, I am confident in saying this.
Their work was done with single-shot carbines like the Sharps, Merrill, Burnside, and other
similar ordinance. While your point is well-taken, and I agree with you, I wanted to make
absolutely certain that the understanding is clear.
Eric Wittenberg
Eric:
You certainly know far more about this than I, and I don't disagree that Stuart was probably
acting on his own initiative. It had read, though, that Stuart's activity that took him out of contact
with the ANV was another attempt on his part to ride around the AoP. If this is the case, wouldn't
it be odd for him to seek to redeem himself by doing the same thing over again? Perhaps I have
Stuart's motivation/intention for his actions earlier in the campaign wrong.
Doug Miller
From: curlew@cts.com (David Clark)
This evening at the San Diego Civil War Round Table, guest speaker
Stuart M. Robinson defended J.E.B. Stuart's role in the Gettysburg
campaign. Among his points
David Clark
On Wed, 17 Apr 1996, David Clark wrote:
>
> This evening at the San Diego Civil War Round Table, guest speaker
> Stuart M. Robinson defended J.E.B. Stuart's role in the Gettysburg
> campaign. Among his points
There is merit to all of this and also to the fact that sufficient
cavalry was left to Lee for screening and recon of the main body, but I
think the judgement of history is that the absence of Stuart himself
meant that these troops would not be properly employed. And it was the
lack of screening and recon on June 30-July 2 that contributed much to
the Federal success.
> He further stated that Stuart's biggest mistake was in holding onto
> the 150 or so Union wagons that he captured, which greatly slowed his
> movement and delayed his reunion with the ANV.
This is definitely the case. He should have burned the wagons to
maintain a mobility.
Jim Epperson
True, but too kind. Lee's instructions were less than precise (as
usual), but they did include instructing Stuart to "feel the right
of Ewell's troops." The route Stuart chose to take made that
impossible.
> 2) Once Lee's forces began to move up the Shenandoah Valley, the narrow
> passes and roads would not have permitted the rapid movement of cavalry had
> Stuart attempted to follow via that route and catch up.
It wasn't the cavalry that was slowed, it was the accompanying
artillery, for which the cavalry had to wait. The captured wagons
slowed him even further. More on this in a bit.
> 3) The position of Hooker's corps as it crossed the Potomac made it
> impossible for Stuart to connect with the Confederate right flank below
> that river, and forced him to cross to the east.
I don't buy this argument at all. At the time Stuart chose his route
Hooker had not moved, but it was inevitable that he would follow Lee.
That being the case, the AoP would interpose itself between Stuart and
Lee. Either Stuart didn't think of this (unlikely), or he was blinded by
the blandishments of Mosby and by his desire to cleanse the stain of
Brandy Station. In less purple prose - he went glory-hunting.
> 4) In doing this, Stuart created such a stir that all of the Union cavalry
> save Buford's were drawn off of the task of probing Lee's right flank and
> thus giving Lee valuable breathing space and extra time before the
> inevitable collision. In Mr. Robinson's opinion, this was an important,
> positive contribution to the campaign, not a blunder.
This, like the other arguments, sounds good but is incomplete. The Union
was left with its best troopers to seek out Lee; the ANV had Imboden and
some others in whom Lee had no faith. Stuart's primary purpose in a
campaign whose central purpose was to draw the AoP into the open was to
provide intelligence. When Stuart lost contact with both armies he could
neither gather intelligence nor deliver it. Further, I believe Meade
only detailed 3000 men to counter Stuart and then gave him no more
thought, hardly the important, positive contribution Mr. Robinson
suggests. (Well, I can't prove Meade gave him no more thought, but he
didn't do anything further about him.) The stir was in Washington, not
with the AoP.
I would add that Lee reaped here what he had sowed on the Peninsula.
There he had sent Stuart to scout McClellan's right. When Stuart
discovered it was in the air he should have reported back to Lee. But
no. Jackson was moving to strike that exposed flank when Stuart rode around
the Union Army the first time. Stuart gathered great glory, but he alerted
McClellan to the danger. Lee, as far as I know, never chastised Stuart
in any way for his adventurism, encouraging Stuart to do it again.
As Henry Hunt said about Stuart's ride during the Gettysburg Campaign
(but which applies equally to the first sortie), "It is a good lesson on
cavalry raids around armies, a thing easily done but of no particular use."
> He further stated that Stuart's biggest mistake was in holding onto
> the 150 or so Union wagons that he captured, which greatly slowed his
> movement and delayed his reunion with the ANV.
Whether it was his biggest mistake or one of several equally serious, it
was certainly a bad one. He could have destroyed the wagons or divided
his force but chose to do neither, the worst of three alternatives.
> Mr. Robinson's presentation was very nicely done, and stimulated a
> great deal of discussion. I couldn't help but wonder what the members of
> this group might have to say about Stuart's ride seen in this "positive"
> light.
If the presentation stimulated discussion, then it was a worthy effort.
It's a pity, of course, that he doesn't have the great good taste to
agree with me (but then, I may not agree with me in a month's time). (-:
David Wieck
David:
I suppose something positive can be said about almost any
situation if one takes 130 years to look for it, but I still don't see
how Stuart's blunders could come close to outweighing his mistakes.
The battle almost surely would have been very different if Lee had
been given some minimal intelligence about the terrain and troops he
faced that first day at Gettysburg, and Stuart should not have
been concerned at all with collecting such minor prizes.
He was undoubtedly trying to recapture some of the glory that
had subsided as the Union cavalry
became more effective in meeting his once unchallenged superiority.
Stuart had seen his star fade
beginning with the insult of having his plumed hat captured by Buford
at Verdiersville just prior to
second Manassas, which marked the ascension of the Union cavalry as
an effective force in the war.
The Anglo-Saxons had a word for this--ofermod--meaning an
excessive pride that distracted one
from an ultimate goal by being caught in points of personal glory. I
think this word applies well to
Stuart in this situation, and I see very little worth defending about
Stuart in the Gettysburg campaign.
Best Regards.
Dave:
FYI, this is the John Singleton Mosby defense. It more or less
comes from the book Mosby wrote in the 1880's defending JEB's role in the
G-burg Campaign. As a lawyer, I can appreciate a great defense brief, and
that's what Mosby's book is.
I see a number of flaws in this argument. First, the Union cavalry
was numerically larger, but it did just fine going through the same narrow
passes. I see that as a red herring.
Second, I think the issue of Stuart drawing off the Union cavalry is
also a red herring. Buford covered the right wing of the AofP. Gregg
covered the left. Theoretically, this left Kilpatrick's division. However,
this division was in the process of being revamped entirely in the earlier
phases of the campaign. The old division of Julius Stahel wasn't
incorporated fully into the AofP's cavalry until late June, and the Michigan
Brigade (which we know as Custer's Brigade), was actually in G-burg on June
28, under command of Brig. Gen. Joseph Copeland. They were looking for the
body of Lee's army, not for Stuart. I argue that this is also a red herring.
I contend that Stuart got embarrassed and then angry about the
flogging he took in the Richmond press after Brandy Station (see the
newspaper articles--they really take him to task), and he was pouting. He
saw an opportunity to go on a joyride similar to the rides around McClellan,
and felt that doing so would restore him to glory. Stuart interpreted his
discretionary orders so broadly that any other general (save, of course, Dan
Sickles) would probably have been court -martialed. I think a temper tantrum
like that of a child was the motivation, and not the Mosby arguments, which
Mr. Robinson evidently did a good job of presenting.
For the record, Stuart himself acknowledged that he erred in
bringing the damned wagons along.
Just my two cents' worth....
Eric Wittenberg
HI FOLKS,
Does anyone have a copy of Lee's EXACT orders to Steuart, with the
(I'm pretty sure) 2 addendums.
I can't seem to find my copy anywhere and I think the recent posts
regarding Stuart's actions have not fully appreciated one of the
restrictions placed on Steuart by Lee. I don't want to jump in though until
I have the exact wording. (that's right, I'm turning over a new leaf).
THANKS
Hi folks:
Joe:
Actually, three brigades were available. They were the superb
brigade of Brig. Gen. William E. "Grumble" Jones, and the irregular brigades
of Beverly Robertson and John Imboden. Further, the irregular brigade of
Albert G. Jenkins was with Ewell, and actually had a minor skirmish in the
outskirts of Harrisburg. These men were, at best, ruffians, and were not
good soldiers. Grumble Jones's brigade, on the other hand, was perhaps the
best single brigade of cavalry in the CW--it had been Turner Ashby's
Brigade, and after Jones's death in 1864, earned the name the Laurel
Brigade. Why it was left behind, and sat unused until the afternoon of July
3 is one of the great mysteries of the Gettysburg Campaign to me. I wish I
had a good explanation for it, but I don't. The best I can come up with is
that Grumble and Stuart hated each other, and I suspect that that was the
reason.
Eric Wittenberg
Forgot something...
The brigades of Imboden and Robertson were very poorly suited to
scouting. They were a sort of mounted guerrilla force, much like that of
Mosby. They were raiders, not suited to traditional cavalry roles. What
Imboden did best was to hold the mountain passes, and this is what he did
very well during the campaign. Robertson's men were green, and had not
performed well at all at Brandy Station. Finally, Jeb also hated Robertson,
once referring to him as the most difficult officer to deal with he had ever
encountered. He even relieved Robertson of brigade command of the Laurel
Brigade in late '62, even though he had won a major victory over Buford in
the closing engagement of the Battle of Second Manassas. So, there was
little hope of him making any sort of a contribution.
Eric Wittenberg
Eric - I hate to be a stickler for details - BUT - Jones was court
martialled and found guilty in October 1863 and transferred to the Dept. of
Western Virginia. Tom Rosser was given command of Ashby's/Jones' Brigade.
They never earned the name Laurel Brigade. After a successful raid through
the Shenandoah Valley in January and February, 1864, Stuart wrote in his
official report that the raid "furnishes additional proofs of General
Rosser's merit as a commander, and adds fresh laurels to that veteran
brigade so signalized for valor already". Rosser issued general orders
congratulating the brigade - telling them they would now be known as the
Laurel Brigade and would wear laurel leaves in their hats. It seems Rosser
had never learned how units got their nicknames - by sharing experiences and
by agreement on the qualities of their leader. It was considered arrogant
and mostly ignored by the men at the beginning.
Nikki
I have seen a great many postings stating that what Stuart did prior to
Gettysburg was wrong (and worse than wrong). What I have not seen is what he
should have done. Given the road net and troop dispositions at the time, what
would have been the proper thing to do?
I happen to agree. What was Stuart to do? He obeyed orders of his
commander! He left two units to follow Lee's Army once they were up
north. He ducked, dodged, tried to ford the Potomac several places with
no luck. True he should have left and burned the wagons. He sent a
message to Lee indicating troop movements toward the ANV, but they did
not get through. A lengthy trip-yes, necessary-yes, orders obeyed--yes,
Lee upset--yes, but who was to blame--Sorry, folks, it always falls upon
the commander.
Ray
Interesting comments on Stuart:
The defense of Stuart usually revolves around the fact that he did not
violate the letter of his orders, and in fact was well within the discretion
that Lee gave him on the move North. However, this is not the full story by
half.
As has been pointed out by many in the past, Lee was a man who relied on
discretionary instructions and allowed his subordinates a great deal of
initiative and latitude. Modern armies would call these mission-oriented
orders, i.e. "here's the job, get it done any way you want."
Stuart's primary mission, however, was not even really discussed in Lee's
orders to Stuart, because after a year of close relations, it was understood
by all, and took the form of a standing order: Stuart must at all times
screen the movement of the ANV, and provide it with critical intelligence
about enemy movement. Any other task had to remain secondary to that mission.
What Stuart did was fail to ensure the success of that primary task entirely.
He took the three best brigades of the army on a route that was guaranteed to
unmask the movements of the main body, and worse yet, made absolutely no
provision for any coordinated action among the remaining mounted force to
support Lee.
during the week in question, none of Lee's cavalry was positioned so as to
remain between the army's main body and the Union AOP. Jenkins preceded
Ewell into Pa, Imboden ranged to the far west on a looting expedition, and
Jones & Robertson remained behind in the Valley to screen the army's rear.
Who guarded the eastern flank? The troops who should have done it were with
Stuart, hopelessly tangled in the AOP's traffic backwash, and separated from
Lee by that Union force.
Lee has been faulted for not using what cavalry he did have, and I think some
of this criticism is fair - but not all of it. Lee was the army commander,
and when an army of 75,000 men is on the move, the commander *must* rely on
his subordinates to fulfill their jobs. It is impossible for the AC to also
straw-boss every brigade in the army. Lee knew this, and was smart enough to
let his officers do their jobs. Admittedly, by July 1st or so - when it had
become painfully obvious that Stuart had failed to keep the army informed -
Lee should have summoned up Jones and his outstanding brigade for exactly the
kind of recon duties the ANV would have need of on the 2nd, but by then the
greater problems Stuart left the Army in were insoluble.
This command failure really points to a systemic problem within the ANV
command structure, however - only one officer above brigade level (Stuart
himself) was tasked with directing the details of 5 Cavalry brigades
(technically, Imboden and Jenkins were not under Stuart's command, if I
remember correctly.) The Union army, with 7 brigades organized in three
divisions, had much greater flexibility during this campaign. Imagine it Wade
Hampton, with his own and Jones or Robertson's commands, were screening that
exposed flank. Lee might well have had the intelligence he needed to fight
the kind of battle he really wanted - one on his own ground and terms.
Stuart's failure was a cardinal one, and no about of guard-house lawyering
about not violating the "letter of his orders" excuses it. He and Lee both
knew what the primary mission was, and clearly it was not fulfilled.
Dave Powell
I finally found Lee's order to Jeb Stuart (taken from JEB STUART, by John W.
Thomason,Charles Scribner Sons, 1930):
June 23, 1863, 5 p.m.
I highlighted what is I think is the key sentence, at least to Stuart. I
think, if I were Stuart I would consider this an OK to take the scenic route
around the AoP.
Several Points:
1) Stuart was authorized to make the move if Hooker's Army remained inactive
- Aldie and Upperville showed definitively that it was not inactive, quite
the contrary, large Union forces were on the move.
2) Lee envisioned Stuart screening his forces as far north as Frederick and
Shepardstown - note that Stuart began his move east far to the South of MD,
back in Northern VA. Lee fully expected Stuart's Cav to be screening his
right flank all the way into MD. It wasn't there...
3) Vic, note that the two brigades in question left behind (Jones and
Robertson) were specifically detailed to guard the Army's rear and cover the
route back into VA. This is where Lee expected them to be, and needed them to
be. Moving them over to replace the absent Stuart would simply leave a hole
in another place, and leave the army blind there instead.
Dave Powell
Dave:
I agree that Lee intended Stuart to move JUST east of the mountains.
Thomason says the following:
"Probably, Lee meant: IMMEDIATELY east of the Mountains.
But at the time this order was sent, no passage immediately east was
practicable. From Harper's Ferry down to Edwards Ferry the enemy
concentration commanded the approaches to the Potomac from the south.
Stuart's first movements made it appear that he thought he could get
through to this stretch of the river, but there are no direct statements
bearing on this matter.".....p.424
The last sentence is interesting. Could anyone elaborate on this statement?
Did, in fact, Stuart's initial moves indicate that he was attempting to move
"immediately east of the Mountains"? I must confess that I have not read
this book in at least 20 years, so it now appears that I must fit it into my
schedule, and re-read it. So many books, so little time!
Regards,
On June 22, Lee sent the following to Stuart:
"Headquarters, June 22, 1863 .
I have just received your note of 7:45 this morning to General
Longstreet. I judge the efforts of the enemy yesterday were to arrest
our progress and ascertain our whereabouts. Perhaps he is satisfied. Do
you know where he is and what he is doing? I fear he will steal a march
on us, and get across the Potomac before we are aware. If you find that
he is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge
and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into
Maryland, and TAKE POSITION ON GENERAL EWELL'S RIGHT, PLACE YOURSELF IN
COMMUNICATION WITH HIM, GUARD HIS FLANK, KEEP HIM INFORMED ON THE ENEMY'S
MOVEMENTS
Lee's order of the 23rd has already been posted here, so I will cut to
the chase:
"You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their
army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the
river east of the mountains. IN EITHER CASE, AFTER CROSSING THE RIVER,
YOU MUST MOVE ON AND FEEL THE RIGHT OF EWELL'S TROOPS, COLLECTING
INFORMATION, PROVISIONS, ETC."
The first question Lee asked Stuart was as to the enemy's
whereabouts and activities, which clearly indicates his concern. In both
letters he specifically assigns Stuart to Ewell's right flank, and his
duties are to communicate (with Ewell), guard his flank, and provide him
with information. I submit that there is no reasonable interpretation of
Stuart's activities that can show that Stuart performed even one of these
several closely related duties. Someone posted here that Stuart was where
he was ordered to be, but that was clearly on Ewell's right flank (see
both letters), where he was not.
Stuart did not obey his orders, even loosely.
David Wieck
At 05:34 PM 4/21/96 -0400, you wrote:
>
> Stuart did not obey his orders, even loosely.
>
> David Wieck
Good point, David, but, IMHO, this would have to be classified as an
aberration in Jeb Stuart's otherwise illustrious career under RE Lee. Why
would he do this? Thomason maintains that Stuart initially attempted (or
made moves indicating such an attempt) to get across the river nearer to the
mountains, but found that the crossings were already blocked by Federals. In
following orders to get ACROSS the river EAST of the mountains, Stuart could
probably argue that he made every effort to follow those orders.
Then comes the matter of contacting Ewell's right after crossing the river;
Ewell was ordered to march to the Susquehanna by the Emmitsburg and
Chambersburg routes. In attempting to get around Hooker's forces, Stuart
was pushed further east of where he wanted to go. Knowing the route of march
of Ewell's corps, Stuart could have decided that he could not meet up with
Ewell until the infantry cleared South Mountain, so the cavalry was headed
in the direction of the line of march (i.e., Emmittsburg and/or
Chambersburg). Of course, the main problem was that the AoP was spread
across most of Maryland at this point, making straight-line travel a little
tough.
The wagons he captured are often cited as the reason he was slowed up, which
nearly everyone agrees with. However, didn't Lee's orders specifically
mention gathering provisions (I assume he meant provisions for the rest of
the army?)? Wouldn't the seizure of the wagons indicate that he tried to
follow that order?
I must admit that this is one part of the campaign I'm not at all sure of,
my reading on this subject being so far out of date. However, it does appear
that the major problems encountered by the Confederate Army in the campaign
were really the result of a series of ambiguous orders issued by CSA HQ
(i.e., Robert E. Lee).
Regards,
In the June 22 letter, Lee made NO MENTION of Stuart moving east of
South Mountain. In the letter of the 23rd, he said: "I think you had better
withdraw this side of the mountains tomorrow night, cross at
Shepherdstown the next day, and move over to Frederickstown.
I agree fully that Stuart was a gifted and able leader, gallant and
often brilliant, but I can't see how anyone can claim he was following
Lee's orders in this case.
David Wieck
David Wieck
DPowell334@aol.com wrote:
>
> Interesting comments on Stuart:
>
> The defense of Stuart usually revolves around the fact that he did not
> violate the letter of his orders, and in fact was well within the discretion
> that Lee gave him on the move North. However, this is not the full story by
> half.
>
> As has been pointed out by many in the past, Lee was a man who relied on
> discretionary instructions and allowed his subordinates a great deal of
> initiative and latitude. Modern armies would call these mission-oriented
> orders, i.e. "here's the job, get it done any way you want."
>
> Stuart's primary mission, however, was not even really discussed in Lee's
> orders to Stuart, because after a year of close relations, it was understood
> by all, and took the form of a standing order: Stuart must at all times
> screen the movement of the ANV, and provide it with critical intelligence
> about enemy movement. Any other task had to remain secondary to that mission.
>
> What Stuart did was fail to ensure the success of that primary task entirely.
The ANV moved north down the Shenandoah Valley then up the Cumberland.
There were 2 brigades there to screen the passes and block any
observation by any Federal forces. In fact it took two years after
Stonewall's death before ANY Yankee commander would dare venture into
the Valley. Screening Accomplished, Orders Obeyed, Mission Accomplished.
> He took the three best brigades of the army on a route that was guaranteed to
> unmask the movements of the main body, and worse yet, made absolutely no
> provision for any coordinated action among the remaining mounted force to
> support Lee.
Lee and Longstreet both informed him that the two brigades would be used
by them. What more provisions do you want????
Without repeating your entire post, are we going back to the fact that
on 1 July Heth started a battle he was ordered not to and Stuart wasn't
there? Late for Accident theory again??
Had Lee followed his own orders and established a strong line at
Cashtown, this would all be moot. THERE IS THE ERROR. Not Stuart's ride
or Longstreet's Meandering all over the battlefield on 2 July.
vic
My good friend Billy Howard makes an excellent point (welcome out of the
shadowy realm of lurking, Billy!). The parallels between Stuart's conduct
after being embarrassed at Verdiersville and after Brandy Station are
striking. The second ride around McClellan occurred, if I remember
correctly, after the Verdiersville incident (although I could well be wrong
about the timing). IN any event, I have seen lots of accounts of JEB
pouting after both episodes, and both episodes were preambles to grand
efforts to redeem himself by Stuart.
Eric Wittenberg
>Dave Navarre <73613.1150@CompuServe.COM> says:
>
>Skelton states that "Stuart, in an excess of chivalry, insisted on wasting
>precious hours paroling his horde of prisoners - a useless gesture, since the
>Lincoln administration immediately annulled the agreements."
>
>Any idea how much of a delay this generated? Could it have made any difference
>in the movement of Stuart's troopers around towards York, and, ultimately,
>Gettysburg?
>
>I also thought that paroling prisoners was a standard practice at this point in
>the war. Is Skelton showing a sketchy understanding of the ACW prisoner-of-war
>system or would this parole be considered "useless" by others?
>
>Finally, why did the Lincoln administration annul the agreements - on what
>grounds?
>
>As a followup - is Military History considered slightly "fluffy" by historians?
>The articles seem to lack depth, and tend not to include notes.
>
>Thanks for your time on this,
>Dave N
MY guess is that the whole column stopped maybe 6 or 8 hours on the
28th and 2 or 4 hours the next morning. All in all, the Wagons cost the
column about half a day on the 28th and probably 10%-20% (reduced speed of
the wagons) on the 29th, 30th, 31st, 1st, and 2nd. Possibly a total delay
of 24 - 28 hours in all. About equal to the extra time that had been spent
going farther south and east than anticipated at the start of the campaign in
order to get around Hancock's II Corps in the first place.
Together, The wagons and the time it took to get to and then ford
the Potomac river probably ate up 2 or 2.5 days that had never been planed
for. Had everything gone as planned, problems would not have compounded
themselves and Stuart may well have joined up with Ewell on the 29th near York.
BUT, I'm not sure all the Rockville and afterwards time was entirely
wasted. If Stuart fell asleep, the men with him must have been incredibly
exhausted by that time as well
In the writings over the last few days, and in my past readings, I
think that the exhaustion / human factors issue has been overlooked.
Whatever pro / con angle you support about JEB's ride, when they actually
got to GB, they and their mounts were worn out and probably needed 3 days
rest to get back into shape. Neither man nor horse got this rest for about
three weeks. I think that some of the consequence of the ride were seen in
the ineffective efforts made on July 3.. I know that I personally could not
have gone so long without sleep and done what they did.
Unfortunately, neither book explains why the paroles were rejected.
Perhaps the OR can shed some light on this good issue that you've raised.
John Leo
On April 23rd, John Leo wrote a detailed analysis of the two sets of orders
(Lee to Stuart, Stuart to Robertson), and it was a job well done.
We in the GDG seem to be attacking the myths of Gettysburg, one myth at a
time. First, among others, it's "shoes", then the "9:00 AM Order", then the
"Bayonet Charge", now it's the old chestnut of "It was all Jeb Stuart's fault!"
Before this latest thread, I had always believed that Jeb Stuart had, in
reaction to the Brandy Station embarrassment, had charged off in a
vainglorious attempt to recover his reputation, thoughtlessly leaving the
ANV without any information. This may still be correct, but the past few
days have given me a better appreciation of what seems to be the situation
(positively amazing what a little reading does for you!).
Regards,
From: Eric Wittenberg
Eric Wittenberg
From: lawrence (Dennis Lawrence)
From: lawrence (Dennis Lawrence)
From: DPowell334@aol.com
From: lawrence (Dennis Lawrence)
From: DPowell334@aol.com
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
From: MBRADLEY@MSCC1.MSCC.CC.TN.US
From: MBRADLEY@MSCC1.MSCC.CC.TN.US
From: STEVEN CASSEL
From: MBRADLEY@MSCC1.MSCC.CC.TN.US
From: lawrence (Dennis Lawrence)
From: "todd jones"
It might be noted that more than half of the Northern population as a whole lived on farms at that
time, so this makes sense.
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)
From: Norman Levitt
From: MBRADLEY@MSCC1.MSCC.CC.TN.US
From: jblair@roanoke.infi.net (John Blair)
*
From: JCARTE6@wpgate.gmu.edu
From: lawrence (Dennis Lawrence)
From: Norman Levitt
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
From: BobHW@gnn.com (Bob Witt)
From: DPowell334@aol.com
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
From: lawrence@appsmiths.com (Robert W Lawrence)
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
From: Doug Miller
Subject: Stuart's Ride
1) Stuart's actions were in accord with his instructions from Lee, which
allowed
Stuart to use his discretion when needed.
2) Once Lee's forces began to move up the Shenandoah Valley, the narrow
passes and roads would not have permitted the rapid movement of cavalry had
Stuart attempted to follow via that route and catch up.
3) The position of Hooker's corps as it crossed the Potomac made it
impossible for Stuart to connect with the Confederate right flank below
that river, and forced him to cross to the east.
4) In doing this, Stuart created such a stir that all of the Union cavalry
save Buford's were drawn off of the task of probing Lee's right flank and
thus giving Lee valuable breathing space and extra time before the
inevitable collision. In Mr. Robinson's opinion, this was an important,
positive contribution to the campaign, not a blunder.
He further stated that Stuart's biggest mistake was in holding onto
the 150 or so Union wagons that he captured, which greatly slowed his
movement and delayed his reunion with the ANV.
Mr. Robinson's presentation was very nicely done, and stimulated a
great deal of discussion. I couldn't help but wonder what the members of
this group might have to say about Stuart's ride seen in this "positive"
light.
From: "James F. Epperson"
Subject: Re: Stuart's Ride
[details deleted]
From: ajackson@oyez.law.upenn.edu (Anita Jackson-Wieck)
Subject: Re: Stuart's Ride
> curlew@cts.com (David Clark) says:
> Stuart M. Robinson defended J.E.B. Stuart's role in the Gettysburg
> campaign. Among his points
> 1) Stuart's actions were in accord with his instructions from Lee, which
> allowed Stuart to use his discretion when needed.
From: William_Howard@prodigy.com (MR WILLIAM R HOWARD JR)
Subject: Re: Stuart's Ride
Through some misguided sense of honor, Stuart failed to act in the
common good of his army in
order to reclaim the headlines and salve his pride.
William Howard
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
Subject: Re: Stuart's Ride
From: "John A. Leo"
Subject: JEB's ORDERS
John Leo
From: javal
Subject: Re: Stuart's Ride
I'm going to use this question to bring up another point that's
been slightly frustrating to me. As I understand it, Stuart took 3
brigades with him, and left 2 with Lee (Coddington, The Gettysburg
Campaign, p.183).
If Lee was concerned so about this "blindness" that Stuart left him
with, why didn't he use the 2 remaining brigades as "eyes"? Was it too
late?
I now bow to the group to relieve me of this onus..:)
Joe Avalon
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
Subject: Re: Stuart's Ride
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
Subject: Stuart's ride
From: nikki@prolog.net (Nikki Roth-Skiles)
Subject: Re: Stuart's Ride
From: MBRADLEY@mscc.cc.tn.us
Subject: Jeb's Tour of Maryland and PA
From: sholarm@TEN-NASH.TEN.K12.TN.US
Subject: Re: Jeb's Tour of Maryland and PA
From: DPowell334@aol.com
Subject: Re: JEB's ORDERS
Date: Sat, 20 Apr 96 04:22 EDT
Subject: Stuart's Ride
"Major-General J.E.B.Stuart, Commanding Cavalry.
"GENERAL:
"Your notes of 9 and 10:30 A.M. today have just been received. As
regards the purchase of tobacco for your men, supposing that Confederate
money will not be taken, I am willing for commissaries or quartermasters to
purchase this tobacco, and let the men get it from them, but I can have
nothing seized by the men. If General Hooker's Army remains inactive you
can leave two brigades to watch him, and withdraw the three others, but
should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw
this side of the mountains tomorrow night, cross at Shepherdstown next day,
and move over to Fredericktown.
YOU WILL, HOWEVER, BE ABLE TO JUDGE WHETHER YOU CAN PASS AROUND THEIR ARMY
WITHOUT HINDRANCE, DOING THEM ALL THE DAMAGE YOU CAN, AND CROSS THE RIVER
EAST OF THE MOUNTAINS. {My emphasis} In either case, after crossing the
river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting
information, provisions, etc. Give instructions to the commander of the
brigades left behind to watch the flank and rear of the army, and, in the
event of the enemy leaving their front, to retire from the mountains west of
the Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the passes, and to bring
in everything clean along the Valley, closing upon the rear of the army. As
regards the movements of the two brigades of the enemy moving toward
Warrenton, the commander of the brigades to be left in the mountains must do
what he can to counteract them, but I think the sooner you cross into
Maryland after tomorrow the better. The movements of Ewell's Corps are, as
stated in my former letter. Hill's First Division will reach the Potomac
today and Longstreet will follow tomorrow. Be watchful and circumspect in
your movements.
I am respectfully and truly yours,
R. E. LEE, General"
[p.422-423}
From: DPowell334@aol.com
Subject: Re: Stuart's Ride
From: John Kelly
Subject: Re: Stuart's Ride
Jack Kelly
From: ajackson@oyez.law.upenn.edu (Anita Jackson-Wieck)
Subject: Stuart's Orders
Date: Sun, 21 Apr 1996 17:34:03 -0400 (EDT)
Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart,
Commanding Cavalry
From: John Kelly
Subject: Re: Stuart's Orders
David Wieck says:
Jack Kelly
From: ajackson@oyez.law.upenn.edu (Anita Jackson-Wieck)
Subject: Re: Stuart's Orders
Ray asked me not to repost JEB's orders, but since he said JEB was
following them, I think I'm justified in reposting them, at least in part:
"You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their
army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the
river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river,
you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops..." This is a
reiteration of the point in the letter of June 22, where Lee said, "take
position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with
him, guard his flank, keep him informed on the enemy's movements..."
Ray, Jack, et al. Please note where Shepherdstown is: WEST (that's W
WEST) of South Mountain. Please note too that telling phrase: "in either
case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of
Ewell's troops..."
The clear intent of this order is that REGARDLESS of which route
JEB chose, he had an immediate duty to perform thereafter. Lee gave JEB
the latitude to choose his route,; he did not order him to go east of the
mountains. On the contrary, he said "you had better..." To Stuart fell
the choice, and he chose wrong. From that mistake all his others flowed.
>
From: ajackson@oyez.law.upenn.edu (Anita Jackson-Wieck)
Subject: Stuart's Ride
Thanks to John Leo and Jack Kelly for their very fine posts. I
have a bit more to add but please don't take it as Stuart-bashing. This
isn't about character or competence, just his choice of routes - it seems
to me there's just a little more to it than has been said. Vic said, for
example, that, Stuart couldn't go by way of Shepherdstown because Hill's
troops were clogging the roads. You don't think they could have squeezed
2000 men and 6 artillery pieces in among the 40,000+ men and 100
artillery pieces that crossed the Potomac over those three days? Ewell
had already crossed, more than a week before. Hill's troops began
crossing on the 23rd, Longstreet's corps went last, beginning late on the
24th. General J.B. Kershaw's brigade, which brought up the rear, crossed
on the afternoon of the 26th. This terse entry from Kershaw's diary:
"Twenty-sixth, crossed the Potomac; encamped near Williamsport." These
units crossed on schedule, but Stuart was already a day behind. Had
Stuart been with the ANV, then being late or early would have had no
meaning regarding his troops.
Stuart's decision was neither irreversible nor made without
evidence that Hooker was moving. Nor was it a snap judgment that, once
made, could not be revised. Not only should Jeb not have been surprised,
he ignored evidence that a move by the AoP was under way. Early on the
morning of the 25th he began his ride, but encountered Hancock and the
Union 2nd Corps marching north. He stopped, and save for sending Lee a
message that Hancock was moving north, spent most of the rest of the day
doing nothing constructive. At this point he was roughly equidistant
between Shepherdstown and Rowser's Ford, and he should have reconsidered
his plan in light of time wasted, evidence the AoP was moving north, and
that his route and schedule were going to hell in a hurry. To the
contrary, after staying put for most of the day, he marched six miles west
to Buckland before resuming his ever-widening sweep around the Union
army. He was still riding southeast about the time Ewell, whose right he
was supposed to feel, was entering Pennsylvania.
From Lee's order of the 23rd: "You will, however be able to judge
whether you can pass around their army without hindrance..." Here was
hindrance in the form of Hancock. Time was of the essence, as Lee had
gone on to say: "the sooner you cross into Maryland, after tomorrow, the
better." Lee gave the order of march: "Hill's first division will reach
the Potomac today, and Longstreet will follow tomorrow."
By this time (afternoon of the 25th) Stuart may already have lost
touch with the ANV. If not, he would have known that the Shepherdstown
crossing would be clear by the time he could get back there. If he had
not lost touch, it was irresponsible to consider any other route than the
safest and most direct. But he was committed to the ride around Hooker,
despite everything.
Thomason makes no mention (at least that I caught) of Stuart's
being upset by the criticism he received after Brandy Station and
withholds criticism. Freeman is harsh, but he may be seeking to deflect
criticism from Lee. But Emory Thomas in "Bold Dragoon" speaks of
"fantasy" in Stuart's account of Brandy Station, labeling it "pretension
and prevarication". (P.255) It seems unlikely Stuart would have stooped
to fantasy (and it is a pretty self-serving report at that) unless he was
sensitive about the results and public perception. We know Stuart
subscribed to the Richmond Examiner, which described the engagement in
dire terms, as "the necessary consequence of negligence and bad
management," urging David to "reorganize our own forces, enforce a
stricter discipline among the men, and insist on more earnestness among
the officers." (June 12, 1863)
So why did Stuart persist with a plan that was already
unraveling? Mosby, incredibly, puts the blame on Lee: "It would have
been far better if the orders had been less rigid and Stuart had been
given discretion." (Mosby, "Stuart's Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign",
P.180) So much for John Leo's analysis of the Lee's and Stuart's
orders. But then, perhaps Mosby had an agenda. :-) Coddington waxes
quite sardonic about it: "Here was a scheme befitting the Lochinvar of
the South - the bold, dashing, gay warrior in the tradition of Sir Walter
Scott, dear to the heart of his Southern admirers." (P.109)
From: Victor Vernon
Subject: Re: JEB's ORDERS
From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg
Subject: Stuart's ride
Excellent point, Billy.
From: "John A. Leo"
Subject: Re: Cavalry Clash at Hanover
>Folks,
>Just got my copy of Military History magazine, June 1996. In it there's an
>article entitled "Cavalry Clash at Hanover" by Geoffrey Skelton. I found it an
>interesting article, if vaguely less scholarly than I'd hoped.
DAVE,
According to Mark Nesbitt's "Saber and Scapegoat" p79: "He paroled nearly 400 prisoners, including many officers, at
Brookeville the night of June 28 and the rest at Cooksville the next
morning. At 11:00am, June 29, as Stuart rode out of Brookville, he promptly
fell asleep in the saddle, visibly swaying from side to side."
According to Burke Davis' "JEB Stuart, The Last Cavalier", p328:The column reached Rockville, MD about noon on the 28th.
"Most of the day was spent in Rockville on the 28th, for Stuart had
some 400 prisoners, and paroled them with meticulous regard for the code of
war. Officers were still working on the parole papers as the column moved,
and spent 10 or 12 hours on them in the villages of Brookville and
Cooksville. It was time wasted in the end, for the Federal government
refused to honor the paroles and the freed men went back into the fighting
ranks."
From: John Kelly
Subject: Orders, Orders, and more Orders
It looks very much like Jeb tried to follow Lee's vague orders, made the
wrong initial decision in the middle of a rainy night, and found himself out
on a limb once he committed his forces. He determined that Hooker was not
moving (Wrong!) and he therefore could cross "east of the mountains". This
forced him to ride around the Federals (he couldn't ride through them)to
reach Ewell, whom he knew was heading for the Susquehanna via Chambersburg
and Emmittsburg, per Lee's orders. The wagon train was a real problem, but
Marse Robert had ordered him to pick up provisions as he went along. This
was another bad decision, in hindsight, but Stuart was totally out of it as
far as knowledge of the ANV went. This was not the ideal situation for the
"eyes and ears of the army", but it was the situation.
I have the definite feeling that the R.E.Lee apologists were at work early
in the game after the battle, using Stuart as THE reason the CSA was
defeated at Gettysburg. The emergence of Longstreet as the real villain
during Reconstruction probably gave the apologists from the "Virginia Gang"
the opportunity to let up on Jeb Stuart, a favorite son.
Jack Kelly