Captain Johnston's Reconnaissance

To A Cameron (and others);

I think that Freeman, Coddington, et al did not consider quite the same question that we are considering: Whether Johnson went where he said he went, and whether there might have been some dissembling if he didn't. Freeman seems to take it on faithe that Johnson was, in fact, on LRT sometime in the early morning hours of July 2. Coddington seems more puzzzled, but doesn't seem to have explored all possibilities.

The "fog" explanation just doesn't sit right with me. There were tens of thousands of men in the general area, both N. and S. (as well as E.) of LRT. Lot's of animals as well. There had to have been considerable noise in all directions, as well as men passing along the Emmitsburg road in samall groups if not in large. It's apossible that Johnson "saw" and "heard" only what he wanted to, for some inexplicable reason. But the whole question needs a hard look that takes nothing for grantd. For one thing, we need to know more about Johnson. What, exactly, did he or others say in the most reliable sources? I still don't know. Beyond that, what was his reputation, and what were his idiosyncracies? The trouble with the older writers is that they give a man the benefit of the doubt merely for having worn an officer's uniform (especially if he was a Reb). But the world is full of screw-ups in and out of uniform.

Norm Levitt

Bill,

I think you've misunderstood my question here, a little bit. Pfanz, Coddington, and Freeman all _do_ seem to take Johnson at face value, at least in assuming that they start from the premise that Johnson went everywhere he said he did. They all have various adjectives (inexplicable is perhaps the best) describing the mission, but none have examined it with the premise that perhaps Johnson didn't see anything because he was not where there was anything to see.

I certainly did not mean to imply that such noted students of the battle missed this issue - after all, this is where I first learned of it.:)

There is one point that none of them have mentioned, BTW - that of Buford's main body and campsite. I first found mention of the location of his encampment on the morning of July 2nd only in The Bachelder Papers, reprinted by Morningside. Freeman et. al. mention the picket line - and certainly Johnson would have eluded that as a matter of course - but the encampment of the whole division is something else again, and a significant factor.

Freeman's discussion, however, is really directed towards discussing the deployments of the Federal army vis a vis a larger question, one which has really since been laid to rest. If you recall, when Freeman was writing, the issue of Longstreet, the Dawn attack and the big delay was about the most significant question in ACW scholarship then, and it was with that issue in mind that Freeman examined Federal dispositions. More recent scholarship, of course, has essentially shown that the Dawn Attack myth was just that, fabricated in the post-war bile that flew so freely.

Freeman, et. al. really only dealt with these deployments in relationship to Johnson in passing. Certainly this is true for Freeman: He only contrasts Johnson's itinerary with the Federal dispositions once in Appendix II, that in context with the LRT occupation issue. You'll notice that his referenced time-frame is 9:00 a.m., well after Johnson's ride. Why? The last paragraph sums up the entire justification of that appendix - when could Longstreet have put troops into action on that spot. It is not a study of Johnson's movements, per se.

I guess why I have my doubts is not because of any one coincidence - it is the compounding of coincidences, that adds up to odds similar to winning the lotto - (I never play, BTW, must be my natural scepticism at work there too.:)) I don't think Freeman and the gang looked at things from specifically Johnson's POV. They tended to note the coincidence and it's consequences for the South, and move on.

I will say this, that there are just-possible explanations for virtually all of these non-encounters: Geary's men left LRT - and I believe they were on LRT, it held more significance, militarily, than did BRT, and occupying the latter without holding the former would have been a recruit mistake - just in time; Birney's men were screened by the trees and fog; II Corps was inaudible due to some trick in acoustics, Burling and De Trobriand were too late, etc. Only Buford's troopers are not so easily explained away, but very little attention has been directed towards the Cavalry North or South, excepting Stuart - at all.

It's not that I see their scholarship as faulty - I wish I could make those kinds of errors:) - just that I think they have not spent much time on what has always been a peripheral issue.

Military scouts are expected to notice the details, and draw accepted military conclusions from them. Johnson and his party noticed _none_ of the details. Something is fundamentally flawed here. Dave Powell

P.S. - I'm glad I found this list, this is the best discussion I've had On-line. Even if it does sometimes feel like an oral defense of a thesis!

Dave,

On the "face value" issue, perhaps we are just approaching that term differently. I thought Freeman did a careful analysis. It is true that from that analysis, he didn't conclude that Johnson never crossed the Emmitsburg Road. As far as Pfanz, please take a look at page 487, note 11. It says, "Johnston stated specifically that he told General Lee he had gone to Little Round Top. Since his writings indicate that he became familiar with the Gettysburg terrain, there seems to be little doubt that he was really on that hill." So at least we know that Pfanz considered the issue as to whether he went up there or not. Pfanz may have not concluded that Johnson was never on the hill but there is _absolutely_ no doubt that he did consider it.

Norm, you are correct, we need to find out more about Johnson. Perhaps he did lie about it. I don't see how he could have with Clarke with him but none of the explanations make a lot of sense.

Bill

Jim,

You are exactly right. Johnson was up there between the time the 5th Ohio and the 147th Pennsylvania left and when the first signal station (Arron Jerome, Buford's Signal Officer) arrived. According to Freeman in "Lee's Lieutenants", Johnson arrived on LRT at 5:30. Feeman got his information from a manuscript by Johnson. Col. Patrick of the 5th Ohio stated that he received orders at 5:00 a.m. to rejoin Candy's Brigade and most accounts have him gone by 5:30. It would be over an hour later when Briney went into position. Birney wrote in his report that he relieved Geary at 7:00 a.m. I just finished an order of battle of LRT for Dennis and sent it to him tonight. I made an attempt to do a time-line on all the units.

Bill

In "Lee's Lieuts", Douglas Southall Freeman quoted Johnston's letters saying he had mounted "a shoulder" of LRT, saw no enemy (he had seen no organized force anywhere on his trip), and then rode south of BRT to the area of Farnsworth's attack before heading back to Seminary Ridge. It happened between 4 and 7 AM but Freeman absotively says 5:30 AM. (By the way, folks, there was no standard time and not even an organized attempt to synch timepieces, so don't go too far with that balloon juice in "Time On Little Round Top" - it's a nice try at a sequence of events but not a railroad timetable.) A good piece of III Corps was north of there around the Weikert farm and Johnston had just missed the 5th OVI and 147th PA. They spent the night there. Johnston took the opportunity to BS about how he had only taken a few men with him (I think Lafayette M razzed him about taking 200) because Massa Robert had frequently told him about how he got really close to the Mexicans with tiny scouting parties.

I've always wondered at the usefulness of Johnston's report. Even if he did "stand on LRT" in the early morning of July 2, I doubt if anyone thought he could do that again as the day went on. Johnston's report implies that there would have been less Yankees on LRT early on July 2 and, son of a gun, wasn't Johnston one of those postwar Pete bashers who went on and on about "the late attack"?

From: acameron@tcac.com (Alexander Cameron)

Dave,

I don't know what Lee told him to do. It is a bit "convenient" to hang this all on a staff Captain. My experience is that if you want someone to specifically do something, you specifically tell him what it is you want him to do. Where was Clarke in all of this? Did Lee or Longstreet tell Johnston or Clarke to find a route that would bring two divisions from Herr Ridge to Seminary Ridge undetected? Meade had a Brig. Gen. (ex-brigade commander) for a Chief Engineer. A bit more experienced? I don't know how competent Johnston was. If you read Coddington's account, Johnston and Clarke followed Willoughby's Run, crossed at the Peach Orchard, went to LRT, then south passing BRT. They avoided a couple of troopers, re-crossed the Emmitsburg Road, and upon reaching Willoughby's Run again, galloped back through fields "in his haste to report to his general". If so, they didn't go west to Black Horse Tavern. Again, according to Coddington, Lee asked Johnston to show him the route he took and Johnston did so. Lee and Longstreet had an opportunity to know where he had gone. They were in charge I think. Longstreet had sent along his own emissary. As I have stated, I don't think Johnston knew where he was going when they were west of Willoughby's Run. Perhaps he should have. However, regardless if Johnston really was "one of the least competent officers of all time", I still believe that Longstreet has some culpability in all of this. He was the Lieutenant General with the big paycheck. :)

Bill

You're right, of course. Certainly I'm venting on Johnson too much. Clarke's at least as much a problem, in that he missed all those troops as well, and was the superior (and theoretically) more experienced officer.

In fact, it was probably impossible for Johnson and Clarke to accomplish all of these tasks that morning, and still get back to report. Here might well be where Longstreet is culpable: he had other officers, at least two hours of down-time while Lee went to visit Ewell, AND some idea that a movement to the right might be contemplated. Given that one of the hallmarks of his more successful actions was careful preparation, he could have sent other officers forward to search for a concealed route. Certainly Alexander was so occupied during that time, and productively too.

The other thing that's apparent here is the lack of Cavalry. Certainly mention has been made earlier, but this brings it into sharp focus. Contrast Jackson at Chancellorsville again. Jackson had the benifit of extensive cavalry patrolling that scouted his route and continually observed the targeted Federals for activity. When Jackson reached his intended jump-off point, CSA cavalry informed him that the Union flank was not exactly where he thought it was, and ably guided him to the correct position without excess delay. Longstreet's move simply screams for a similar screen.

I've always wondered why Grumble Jones and Bev Robertson's brigades weren't called forward to the field. These two commands were in the vicinity of Fairfield by July 2nd, just a few miles west of the ground in question here.

In any case, Johnson may have screwed up LRT, but blaming him for the entire mess is a bit much, I agree:)

Dave Powell

I contacted the Virginia Historical Society today, looking for Johnston material. They have some of his papers, and will send me a listing of the holding so I can request specific copies of the material. Hopefully I will obtain all we need thru the VHS.

Dave Powell

Bill

Subject: Johnson's moonlit recon

Vic recently wrote:

O.K. Let's be realistic here. Johnson moved out at 4 am. Does anyone know haw much cloud cover there was and what was the stage of the moon. We're talking about a man who had never been at Gettysburg before, traveling over land he had never seen, at a time of day that we know is the DARKEST. The only light he could rely upon was moonlight. If the moon was not full He could have ridden THROUGH Buford's men and not known they were there. A whole Union army marched within 20 feet of Hood's army during the Franklin/Nashville Campaign AND NOBODY KNEW IT! So Stop blaming Johnson. It probably wasn't his fault. In the dark of night looking for a "hill" that he didn't know where it was or how high it was, could confuse anything for Little Round Top or "that SMALL Rocky Hill' as the Confederates called it.

According to my planetarium software, the moon was about 20 degrees above the SW horizon at about 5am on July 2, 1863 and sunrise was about 5:45am Standard Time - implying that twighlight would have begun about 5am.

John Leo

From: Steven Cassel (scassel@freenet.columbus.oh.us)

Subject: Re: Fwd: Johnson & Buford

On Sat, 16 Mar 1996 GaTechFan@aol.com wrote:

Pfanz was dumfounded that Johnston saw no Federal troops. He wondered if he went TOO far south and climbed some other hill, mistaking it for the round tops.

In the last few days, the thread about a bogus BRT/LRT elevation giving Capt. Johnson the wrong idea of his location and that of elements of the AoP is interesting. If true it would explain a lot. In the last couple of days, I looked at my copy of the Warren-Bachelder Gettysburg maps and can not find any likely elevation that could have possibly confused Capt. Johnson. The Warren-Bachelder maps go, as far south as, South Cavalry Field, without any noteable hill formation. Even with out the Warren-Bachelder maps, I could not recall ever seeing any other notable hills in the area.

So my question to the GDG is this: Is the theory of the Capt. Johnson being fooled by a bogus BRT/LRT valid, and if yes, where are these elevations located? I do not see how Capt. Johnson could have confused any elevation, on the southern part of the Gettysburg battlefield for either of the Round Tops.

Steve Cassel

From: Victor Vernon ( vicv@voicenet.com)

Subject: Re: Buford & Capt. Johnson

Steven Cassel wrote:

Vic,

What you say about the lighting conditions at the time of Johnson's recon is true (bright moonlight, full moon). Under the full moon, the black mass of BRT is very easily seen for some distance. With regards to Capt. Johnson not being familiar with the area is also true. Who but local Yankee soldiers would have known anything about BRT either?

Probably None at that part of the field at that time. Most of the PA troops were either enroute (6th Corps) or on Cemetary Hill (1st Corps). There were PA troops in other corps, but PA is a big state. Would someone from the Poconos know about the round tops? I doubt it.

I do not think it unreasonable, that the Confederates had not acquired some maps of the Gettysburg area by the end of June, that would have noted the Round Tops. General Lee would not have sent Johnson to that area if, the Confederates did not already have some vague idea that the Federals were in the process of extending their line along Cemetery Ridge from Cemetery Hill.

Why would the Confederates need maps of Gettysburg in June? They had no intention of doing anything in Gettysburg than moving through. The battle was an accident. Maps of Cashtown would have made more sense. The light of campfires on the southern end of Cemetary ridge would have told Lee that someone was on that ridge. I would assume that he would surmise that someone to be tha AoP. And Johnson was sent to find out details of any deployment. I agree that some noise in camp is normal, But by early AM the fires would be out and most of Bufords men were probably asleep, considering what they did on 1 July. Could the pickets have nodded off too? What do you think? If I'm in left field move me.

Vic

From: Steven Cassel (scassel@freenet.columbus.oh.us)

Subject: Re: Buford & Capt. Johnson

Vic,

What you say about the lighting conditions at the time of Johnson's recon is true (bright moonlight, full moon). Under the full moon, the black mass of BRT is very easily seen for some distance.

With regards to Capt. Johnson not being familiar with the area is also true. Who but local Yankee soldiers would have known anything about BRT either? I do not think it unreasonable, that the Confederates had not acquired some maps of the Gettysburg area by the end of June, that would have noted the Round Tops. General Lee would not have sent Johnson to that area if, the Confederates did not already have some vague idea that the Federals were in the process of extending their line along Cemetery Ridge from Cemetery Hill. I did not originally raise this issue but, I think it is an interesting topic to consider. If a division of cavalry or two or more divisions of infantry are not trying to move in the stealth mode like at Springhill in the Franklin/Nashville Campaign, there will be some noise associated with a large camp area. There would be a screen of pickets/videttes that would have troubled Johnson.

Writing years later, Johnson would have been writing with certain knowledge of where the Round Tops were located. But the question remains; what possible other elevation on the southern Gettysburg battlefield could have been mistaken for the Round Tops? The Warren-Bachelder maps show nothing from the Peach Orchard to South Cavalry Field. I can not recall anything from my battlefield wanderings that would be a good prospect. But the possibility remains. So....

Steven L. Cassel

From: Victor Vernon (vicv@voicenet.com)

Subject: Re: Buford & Capt. Johnson

Steven Cassel wrote:

In the last few days, the thread about a bogus BRT/LRT elevation giving Capt. Johnson the wrong idea of his location....

O.K. Let's be realistic here. Johnson moved out at 4 am. Does anyone know haw much cloud cover there was and what was the stage of the moon. We're talking about a man who had never been at Gettysburg before, traveling over land he had never seen, at a time of day that we know is the DARKEST. The only light he could rely upon was moonlight. If the moon was not full He could have ridden THROUGH Buford's men and not known they were there. A whole Union army marched within 20 feet of Hood's army during the Franklin/Nashville Campaign AND NOBODY KNEW IT! So Stop blaming Johnson. It probably wasn't his fault. In the dark of night looking for a "hill" that he didn't know where it was or how high it was, could confuse anything for Little Round Top or "that SMALL Rocky Hill' as the Confederates called it.

Vic

From: lawrence@appsmiths.com (Robert W Lawrence)

Subject: Stand Frim

Really from Tom Desjardin:

Regarding other hills near LRT/BRT...

There are a number of elevations that may have confused Johnson on his recon. He could have confused the "spur" or shoulder of BRT toward Devil's Den or ascended Houck's Ridge anywhere between DD and the Wheatfield. Most of this ridge was open and rocky on its western face in 1863 (near the triangular field). Your guess is as good as mine on this one.

Also, a note - when things got hot (129 degree heat index July 15) here this summer I would tell the folks at the desk that I was on my way to do my program on Medium Round Top. It was a joke at the time but there is a third hill, south of BRT at Rt. 15 that is approx. between the Round Tops in terms of elevation.

Tom Desjardin GNMP

From: ajackson@oyez.law.upenn.edu (Anita Jackson-Wieck)

Subject: Johnston, Buford, et al.

The notion that Johnston - and Clarke, let's not forget Clarke - could have ridden through Buford's men and without noticing them taxes my credulity beyond its limits, as does the argument that Buford's men would all have been nodding off, pickets included. Nor do I buy the notion that Johnston would have "sandbagged" his patrol.

1) As was pointed out here last week, the Plum Run valley is small, maybe even too small to hold 3000 men - and 3000 horses, let's not forget those horses (large highly noticeable beasts, particularly to a recon patrol). While that doesn't really fly with me because the presence of Rebels in the immediate area would have prompted them to bivouac more compactly than otherwise, it does point out the extreme improbability that anyone could have passed through these massed troops and horses without noticing them.

2) Buford's pickets would be extremely unlikely to be nodding off in the immediate presence of the enemy. Personally, I would have been scared out of my mind at the prospect of a dawn attack. Eric is the boss jock here, but my impression is that Buford would probably have been up and about himself by this time.

3) Johnston alone might have "sandbagged" his patrol, but it is extremely unlikely that he and Clarke would have both done so. Further, the two officers left their party and crossed the Emmitsburg Road together. Are they supposed then to have ducked into the bushes and emerged a couple of hours later with their manufactured tale of no Yankees in sight? Surely that would have been a riskier and more dishonorable course than simply to have pushed on ahead. They still haven't seen any Yankees, why should they stop? I don't believe it for a second.

4) John Leo presented an most compelling (and heroically earned, I should add) argument here that Buford and his men were actually in the South Cavalry Field. If one accepts that, and, if Geary's men shifted over to the Union right before Johnston and Clarke came through, as Coddington suggests, then it is barely possible that the two Rebel scouts could have seen nothing. To carry this notion further, if Buford's men then leave to guard the trains before Johnston and Clarke leave LRT, then the return trip might also be uneventful. In fact, the two or three horsemen they did see might well have been Meade's couriers returning to HQ after leaving Buford.

I'm a great believer in simple explanations, perhaps because I'm simple-minded, or so I'm told.

David Wieck

From: Susan & Eric Wittenberg (wittenberg@qn.net)

Subject: Re: Johnston, Buford, et al.

David Wieck wrote:

The notion that Johnston - and Clarke, let's not forget Clarke could have ridden through Buford's men and without noticing them taxes my credulity beyond its limits, as does the argument that Buford's men would all have been nodding off, pickets included. Nor do I buy the notion that Johnston would have "sandbagged" his patrol....

Dave:

I have to agree with you. I can't possibly accept that Buford's pickets would be so diligent on one night (June 30)--if you don't believe me, read the correspondence and what not in the OR's, and asleep at the wheel the next night, even if they did have a long hard fight that day.

Also, I agree that there is simply no way that 2 full brigades of cavalry, plus Calef's battery could have fit into the Valley of Death. No way.

I agree with John Leo (by the way, John, thanks for sending me the material!), and now believe that while some of Buford's command likely was in the Valley of Death, most of them were very likely in the South Cavalry Field. And knowing as much about John Buford as I do, I also can't accept that he was not alert and not knowing what was going on, although I am certain that he would have required some good rest that night. Remember, his signal officer indicated that Buford had been extremely anxious the night before, and he had had a very long and very stressful day, so it's not unreasonable to assume that he would have required some serious rest that night. Be that as it may, I am convinced that something like a serious recon of the nature of Johnson's would have been: (A)picked up by Buford's videttes, and (B) reported to him. No mention of either appears in any of the accounts (I've got lots, now), and Buford never mentioned it.

Therefore, I have to wholeheartedly agree with you John.

Eric Wittenberg

From: "John A. Leo" (johnleo@erols.com)

Subject: Buford v Johnson with full moon

David Wieck recently wrote:

The notion that Johnston - and Clarke, let's not forget Clarke could have ridden through Buford's men and without noticing them taxes my credulity beyond its limits, as does the argument that Buford's men would all have been nodding off, pickets included. Nor do I buy the notion that Johnston would have "sandbagged" his patrol....

HI Dave,

I like some of your "what ifs", but my biases and suspicions lead me to believe that the situations here are just a little more complicated, and until we all get a lot more evidence, mostly unfathomable.

First, my suspicion is that Buford's men were not just along the line from Plum Run Valley to South Calvery field, I think they very heavily patroled the area north past Pitzer's woods across from the Peach Orchard to below McMillan Woods and to the west beyond the Eisenhower property. I suspect that the Hagerstown Road out as far as Herr Ridge may have been lightly patroled" with pickets extending almost to Fairfield " as Buford himself claimed.Remember, this is the man who put pickets out 4 miles along the Chambersburg Pike justthe day before to aggressively keep a close eye on Confederate activity

Hopefully, I or someone else from our group can prove or disprove my suspicions. regarding Buford's placement of his troopers. I guess we know where tolook, its just going to take a lot of effort to dig through the regimental histories and corespondences of those who were actually there.

I know that this bottles up Johnson and his recon party and I can't explain yet where he went. To make matters worse for me, since he was working directly for General Lee in a capacity that Lee earned his initial notice as an excellent and reliable officer, I suspect that Capt. Johnson had to be a man of high integrity and competance. I just don't believe that such a person would lie about his night's work to the marble man, and I don't believe that such a man would botch a mission that could seriously affect his country's war for independence.

So I'm stuck along with everyone else. We have two seemingly mutually exclusive descriptions of events before us, and we just don't yet have enough information in our possession to form an honest opinion based on facts. I honestly have no idea how all this will turn out, or even if enough evidence remains for us to dig up after all of our searching. I'm not woried that we may uncover something that Coddington or Phantz overlook, misinterpreted, or was simply wrong about. Their works are monumental and an oops here or there will have no impact on them in my opinion.

I don't know, WHAT DO YOU THINK about all this?

By the way, the moon that night was about one day past full and about 20 degreesabove the SW horizon at 5am. Sunrise was about 6am (all standard time) with twilight starting about 5:15am. Plenty of light to see and be seen. Now we need to find out about cloud cover that morning that might have blocked the moonlight. Wasn't theresomeone in town whokept weather reports. My Getttysbug magazines are unavaible to me curently, so can someone track the cloud cover question down for us all?

THANKS

John Leo

From: Victor Vernon (vicv@voicenet.com)

Subject: Re: Buford v Johnson with full moon

John A. Leo wrote:

By the way, the moon that night was about one day past full and about 20 degreesabove the SW horizon at 5am. Sunrise was about 6am (all standard time) with twilight starting about 5:15am. Plenty of light to see and be seen. Now we need to find out about cloud cover that morning that might have blocked the moonlight. Wasn't theresomeone in town whokept weather reports. My Getttysbug magazines are unavaible to me curently, so can someone track the cloud cover question down for us all?

Something just occured to me. John's mention of standard time jogged my memory. The Confederates and Federals were not on the same time. For some reason events reported by both sides were recorded as happening at different times. As I recall the Confederate clocks were 1/2 to 1 hour BEHIND the Federal clocks. So Johnson's reports of recon at 4:00 AM could mean he started his recon at 3 or 3:30. How does this affect anything?

Vic

From: DPowell334@aol.com

Subject: Re: Buford & Capt. Johnson

In a message dated 96-03-19 09:14:48 EST, Deb wrote:

Hi all:

I keep wondering what kind of person Johnson was. Does anyone have any write-ups on him? The problem is this, he either was not given specific enough orders, or he got lost himself while scouting around, or he just wobbled the job. (Or all three). I'm amazed the old R.E. didn't have scouts out swarming all over the place once he decided to fight at Gettysburg. It all strikes me as a psychological problem. The ANV believed its own hype about being unbeatable, and they kept forgetting that THEY were now the invaders.

In fact, Johnson seemed to be a fairly competent sort. He rose to the rank of Col., and routinely was assigned such scouting missions. In 1862, for instance, On the 29th of June, it was he that discovered that McClellan had withdrawn from in front of Richmond while on just such a scouting mission.

After the war, Johnson declined to write a detailed account of the recon and approach march, saying he didn't want to become involved in attacking Longstreet because he had too much respect for the General.

It would be very interesting to discover if Johnson's companion on the Recon - Major Clarke of Longstreet's staff - had ever written or talked of the subject, to corroborate the Johnson account.

Dave Powell

From: B1638@aol.com

Subject: Buford and Johnston

I need some help from Dave P. and Eric.

I am placing Johnston across from the Peach Orchard at 5am. Does this seem ok Dave.

Eric, in Edward Longacre The Cavalry at Gettysburg on page 205 he says at 5am Devin sent a skirmish forward to reconnoiter suspected enemy positions beyond the Emmitsburg road. Meeting Rebel infanty picketts, his troops and five guns of Calef's battery were drawan into a long and costly firefight against heavy odds. His footnotes are OR pt1 pp928,939,1032 Cheney 9th NY and Hall, Besley and Wood 6th NY. Are this good sources? I know the OR is.

Pfanz in Gettysburg 2nd day on page 89 to 90 Also talks about the Cav. patrols into the area Johnston went. In his notes on page 483#19 Pfanz states that the 17th was in line on the left of the PO and that the 17th exchanged shots with the enemy. It goes to say that Buford and other said that the area was heavily picketted by cav. buy Humphrey's div. apparently did not encounter any cav. picketts until it reached the Peach Orchard area.

What time did Humphreys get to the Peach Orchard? Anybody.

To me, all this action pushes Johnston crossing point to the lower branch of the Plum Run on the South side of the Roses farm using the Rose's orchard as cover once he crossed. Look at the map on pg 170 of Pfanz.

Next question, was there a farm trail that goes from the Roses farm to the Wheatfield area?

Thank you

Barry L. Summrs

From: "John A. Leo" (johnleo@erols.com)

Subject: Re: July 3rd, 1863

At 08:13 PM 3/19/96 -0800, Richard Rollins wrote:

I saw your posting on the GDG about the sunrise, etc. , on July 2nd. Interesting. Would you mind consulting your planetarium program and giving me the same information for July 3rd? I appreciate your help.

HI Richard,

I've repeated my imperfect planetarium readings in response to your question. The standard time results for July 2 and 3, 1863 (at Harrisburg [close enough] ) are estimated as:

Full moon seems to have occurred during the day of June 30, 1863.

The planetarium program I used is Skyglobe 3.5. The sunrise is estimated for the 2nd. The July third sunrise would be about 2 minutes later. The moon setting altitudes (degrees above the horizon) are all in the SW part of the sky, while the Sun rising is ESE.

If anyone needs more accurate info, we can call Jeff Chesters, Planetarium director at the Air & Space museum in DC.

John Leo

From: "John A. Leo" (johnleo@mail.erols.com)

Subject: Capt Johnson: At the wrong LRT???

Looking over Trailhead Graphics, Inc. map, I noticed something suspicious.

A half mile South of BRT, the LRT - BRT physical features are repeated on a much smaller scale. On the map I mean the features from G 16-15. I don't think anyone or anything was in the open field where Wright Ave now is, unlike the real LRT where some cavalry was in the Plum Run Valley and the III Corps was just 1/4 - 1/2 mile north of LRT. If Capt. Johnson were at the wrong LRT, Dave Powell's cavalrymen of 3rd Indiana quote might also have been silenced by the trees and wooded hill itself.

I'm not claiming a perfect replication of features, just general similarities that could have confirmed what CAPT Johnson whated to believe in the first place: I'm here where I'm supposed to be, I see nothing of importance in front of me, now let's get the hell out of here, the sun's rising.

If Johnson had swung far south of South Cavalry Field (a mile maybe?), maybe he could have crossed the Emmitsburg Road and made his way north behind the patrols, pickets, and vedetts. According to my Planatarium program, Sunrise was about 5am and the almost full moon was about 22 degrees above the horizen, so there was some light to get around with dark adapted eyes.

WHAT DO YOU THINK?

From: Paul Esposito (pp000709@pop3.interramp.com)

Subject: RE: Buford and Johnston

Folks:

Not wanting to stir the waters too much on this topic, I thought that I would add a few things.

1) There were/are 8 farms along the Emmitsburg Road in the area from the Codori farm to the park entrance near the current picnic area on S. Condfedrate Ave. Are we (collective) sure that Johnston and Clark crossed at "the" Peach Orchard and not one of the down road farms "peach orchards"? I cannot remember whether it was Coddington or Pfanz who made the point about almost all of the farms in that area had orchards. I have not read Capt/Col Johnston narrative of his scout. But does he say "the" Peach Orchard or "a" peach orchard?

2) There are several ridges that might have been Johnston's Big Round Top. Bushman's Hill on the south end of S. Confederate Ave is one. 550' on my map. 200' smaller than BRT. The south end of Warfield ridge is another option. Another option off the beaten track but still around a farm and near a creek is by the current Eisenhower Farm. My vote is Bushman's Hill. Still does not answer the how he "evaded" the cavalry in the Valley of Death.

paul....

From: "Frederick W. Hawthorne" (hawthorf@pa.net)

Subject: Re: Hotchkiss Map & Johnson Recon

Several postings were made over the last day or so concerning this map, prepared by J. Hotchkiss in the spring of '63. Bill Frassanito in his new book has an entire chapter on early cartography of the Gettysburg-Adams County area. Specifically he talks of the county map craze of the late 1850's. County maps contained the key road web, along with farmsteads and owners names (hence why the Hotchkiss map has this type of information.) It does not have what we would consider topographic features and thus no Round Tops. According to Bill, the earliest any attempt at placing topographical features was by E.B. Cope just after the battle using the Adams Co. map as a base. The Warren Map of 1867-68 was probably the first to obtain any topological rendering at all. Johnson, therefore, would have had to rely on what he was able to observe the evening before while still light enough to see features or whatever the pre-dawn light of July 2 would've permitted. No map would've likely been on hand to assist in his recon of topo features - certainly not any prepared months before, while the army was still in Virginia.

BTW I highly recommend Bill's book: 'Early Photography at Gettysburg' for any interested in that subject.

Fred Hawthorne

From: benedict@ns.moran.com (Benedict R Maryniak)

Subject: Buford & Johnston

Regarding Barry's question about a road/path linking the Rose farm area with the Wheatfield, nothing appears on the Bachelder Map but CSA Genl Kershaw's "Battles & Leaders" article about his brigade at Gburg has a relevant illustration. Rendered by 9th Massachusetts Artillery member Chas W Reed (who did the drawings in "Hard Tack & Coffee"), it's a view across the Wheatfield from the east side toward the west - it clearly shows the Rose buildings in the distance via a treeless field that appears to follow Rose Run where it goes by the Loop.

Ben Maryniak

hello all

i've been following the discussion on capt. johnston's and maj. clarke's route during their scout of the union position about 4 am on 7/2. could it be that capt jojnston mistook the bushman peach orchard for the sherfy peach orchard and that the hill he went around was the bushman hill where the elder's battery marker is located?....johnston could have circled behind the bushman hill to the south of BRT and came up on the east side....then he could have retraced his route back to the emittsburg road south of the bushman house, where supposedly he saw 4 union horsemen riding....he might have avoided all contact with the union position if he took this route...i still can't figure out how he missed seeing all campfires of buford's, sickles's and /or geary's men

jim martin